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Abstract
Differential privacy (Dwork, 2006; Dwork et al., 2006a) has achieved prominence
over the past decade as a rigorous formal foundation upon which diverse tools
and mechanisms for performing private data analysis can be built.
The guarantee of differential privacy is that it protects privacy at the in-
dividual level: if the result of a differentially private query or operation on a
dataset is publicly released, any individual present in that dataset can claim
plausible deniability. This means that any participating individual can deny the
presence of their information in the dataset based on the query result, because
differentially private queries introduce enough random noise/bias to make the
result indistinguishable from that of the same query run on a dataset which
actually does not contain the individual’s information. Additionally, differential
privacy guarantees are resilient against any form of linking attack in the presence
of auxiliary information about individuals.
Both static and dynamic tools have been developed to help non-experts write
differentially private programs: static analysis tools construct a proof without
needing to run the program; dynamic analysis tools construct a proof while
running the program, using a dynamic monitor executed by the unmodified
runtime system. The resulting proof may apply only to that execution of the
program.
Many of the static tools take the form of statically-typed programming
languages, where correct privacy analysis is built into the soundness of the
type system. Meanwhile dynamic systems typically take either a prescriptive or
descriptive approach to analysis when running the program.
This dissertation proposes new techniques for language-based analysis of
differential privacy of programs in a variety of contexts spanning static and
dynamic analysis. Our approach towards differential privacy analysis makes use
of ideas from linear type systems and static/dynamic taint analysis. While several
prior approaches towards differential privacy analysis exist, this dissertation
proposes techniques which are designed to, in several regards, be more flexible
and usable than prior work.
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Differential privacy has achieved prominence over the past decade as a rigorous
formal foundation upon which diverse tools and mechanisms for performing
private data analysis can be built. The guarantee of differential privacy is that
it protects privacy at the individual level: if the result of a differentially private
query or operation on a dataset is publicly released, any individual present in
that dataset can claim plausible deniability. This means that any participating
individual can deny the presence of their information in the dataset based on
the query result, because differentially private queries introduce enough random
noise/bias to make the result indistinguishable from that of the same query
run on a dataset which actually does not contain the individual’s information.
Additionally, differential privacy guarantees are resilient against any form of
linking attack in the presence of auxiliary information about individuals.
High profile tech companies such as Google have shown a commitment to
differential privacy by developing projects such as RAPPOR (Erlingsson et al.,
2014) as well as several open-source privacy-preserving technologies (Guevara,
2019; Guevara et al., 2020; Wilson et al., 2019). Facebook recently released
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an unprecedented social dataset, protected by differential privacy guarantees,
which contains information regarding people who publicly shared and engaged
with about 38 million unique URLs, as an effort to help researchers study social
media’s impact on democracy and the 2020 United States presidential election
(Nayak, 2020; Kifer et al., 2020; King and Persily, 2020; Evans and King, 2021;
Evans et al., 2021). The US Census Bureau has also adopted differential privacy
to safeguard the 2020 census results (Abowd, 2018).
Both static and dynamic tools have been developed to help non-experts write
differentially private programs: static analysis tools construct a proof without
needing to run the program; dynamic analysis tools construct a proof while
running the program, using a dynamic monitor executed by the unmodified
runtime system. The resulting proof may apply only to that execution of the
program.
Many of the static tools take the form of statically-typed programming
languages, where correct privacy analysis is built into the soundness of the type
system.
Meanwhile dynamic systems typically take either a prescriptive or descriptive
approach to analysis when running the program. Intuitively, the prescriptive
approach represents the scenario in which the analyst wishes to enforce an upper
bound on the privacy leakage and that bound is known a priori. The descriptive
approach represents the scenario in which the analyst only wishes to record the
privacy leakage incurred, and no previously determined bound on privacy leakage
is enforced during program execution.
The contributions of this dissertation cover both static and dynamic analysis.
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1.1 Significance
Differential privacy has become the standard for protecting the privacy of
individuals with formal guarantees of plausible deniability. In this dissertation
we propose new techniques for language-based analysis of differential privacy of
programs in a variety of contexts spanning static and dynamic analysis. Our
approach towards differential privacy analysis makes use of ideas from linear
type systems and static/dynamic taint analysis.
1.1.1 Challenges of Implementing Differential Privacy
• Differential privacy is a definition of privacy which is proven to be resilient
against linking attacks. While this is an attractive prospect theoretically,
in practice differential privacy can be difficult to analyze and implement.
This dissertation proposes several techniques for automatic analysis and
implementation of differential privacy.
• Violations of differential privacy are silent, and in most cases are impossible
to catch by human observation, even by experts. This makes differential
privacy an especially important field in which to apply verification tech-
niques. The nature of privacy bugs necessitates an approach to privacy
analysis which can be pervasive in all of the tools and software that can
access and manipulate sensitive data (i.e. language-based techniques).
This dissertation discusses approaches to privacy analysis which make this
possible and convenient in practice.
• The techniques needed for validating DP depend on the implementation
language.
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1.1.2 Practical Impact of this Dissertation
This dissertation proposes several techniques which make it possible for regular
programmers (who are not experts in differential privacy) to safely create and
modify statically and dynamically typed programs which satisfy differential
privacy, with little or no domain knowledge required.
1.1.3 Technical Contributions of this Dissertation
We will show a series of works that, in short, demonstrate the following key
ideas:
• A pure linear typing discipline is sufficient to perform accurate analysis
of differential privacy, even for its advanced variants. This is relevant for
performing static privacy analysis of differential privacy alongside other
important security properties in modern type systems. Linear type systems
have gained popularity in mainstream languages such as Rust and Haskell
for tracking/analysis of various security properties (II).
• Prescriptive and descriptive dynamic analysis of differential privacy is
possible with low overhead for general-purpose programming languages.
This is important because it demonstrates that privacy analysis can be
embedded as a library in some of the most popular languages for data
analysis and scripting in modern times, such as Python and JavaScript
(III).
• Mainstream statically typed languages can be made to perform differential
privacy analysis as part of their standard typechecking process, without
any runtime execution or information. This is important because it shows
that static differential privacy analysis can be convenient and accurate
with full data-independence even in the absence of linear types (IV).
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Figure 1.1: Static vs. Dynamic Privacy Analysis
• Language-based analysis of differential privacy can be practical and conve-
nient in any given scenario.
It is our hope that the usability and strong guarantees of the works contained
in this dissertation will inspire data analysts, technology corporations, researchers,
and students in computer science to continue to build a community and culture
of verifiable data privacy.
The following 3 sections briefly outline the high-level motivation and contri-
butions for the major works which make up this dissertation.
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1.2 Duet: An Expressive Higher-Order Language
and Type System for Differential Privacy
Goal: Linear types based analysis for advanced differential privacy variants.
1.2.1 Motivation
Linear Type Systems Type-system-based solutions to proving that a program
adheres to differential privacy began with Reed and Pierce’s Fuzz language (Reed
and Pierce, 2010), which is based on linear typing. Fuzz, as well as subsequent
work based on linear types aided by SMT solvers (Gaboardi et al., 2013a),
supports type inference of privacy bounds with type-level dependency and
higher-order composition of programs. However, these systems only support the
original and most basic variant of differential privacy called ε-differential privacy.
More recent variants, like (ε, δ)-differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014a) and
others (Mironov, 2017a; Bun and Steinke, 2016; Bun et al., 2018), improve on
ε-differential privacy by providing vastly more accurate answers for the same
amount of privacy “cost” (at the expense of introducing a negligible chance of
failure).
1.2.2 Contribution
The strengths of Duet w.r.t. prior work are summarized as follows: (1) Duet
supports sensitivity analysis in combination with higher order programming,
program composition, and compound datatypes, building on ideas from Fuzz
(SA+HO); (2) Duet supports type-level dependency on values, which enables
differentially private algorithms to be verified w.r.t. symbolic privacy parameters,
building on ideas from DFuzz (DT); (3) Duet supports calculation of independent
privacy costs for multiple program arguments via a novel approach (MA); and (4)
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Duet supports (ε, δ)-differential privacy—in addition to other recent powerful
variants, such as Rényi, zero-concentrated and truncated concentrated differential
privacy—via a novel approach ((ε, δ)-DP, Rényi/ZC/TC)). Duet is able to
achieve all of these features while maintaining a pure linear typing discipline.
In striking this balance, Duet comes with known limitations: (1) Duet
is not easy to extend with new relational properties (Rel-ext); and (2) Duet
is not suitable for verifying implementations of low-level mechanisms, such
as the implementation of advanced composition, gradient operations, and the
sparse-vector technique (SVT-imp).
1.3 DDuo: General-Purpose Dynamic Analysis
for Differential Privacy
Goal: dynamic analysis of differential privacy as a library.
1.3.1 Motivation
Both static and dynamic tools have been developed to help non-experts write
differentially private programs. Many of the static tools take the form of statically-
typed programming languages, where correct privacy analysis is built into the
soundness of the type system. However, existing language-oriented tools for
compositional verification of differential privacy impose significant burden on the
programmer (in the form of additional type annotations) (Reed and Pierce, 2010;
Gaboardi et al., 2013b; Near et al., 2019b; de Amorim et al., 2019; Zhang et al.,
2019a; Winograd-Cort et al., 2017; Barthe et al., 2019, 2012, 2013, 2016b; Sato
et al., 2019; Albarghouthi and Hsu, 2018; Zhang and Kifer, 2017; Wang et al.,
2019; Bichsel et al., 2018; Ding et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2020) (see Chapter 25
for a longer discussion).
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The best-known dynamic tool is PINQ (McSherry, 2009), a dynamic anal-
ysis for sensitivity and privacy. It features an extensible system which allows
non-experts in differential privacy to execute SQL-like queries against relational
databases. However, PINQ comes with several restrictions that limit its ap-
plicability. For example, PINQ’s expressiveness is limited to a subset of the
SQL language for relational databases. Methods in PINQ are assumed to be
side-effect free, which is necessary to preserve their privacy guarantee.
1.3.2 Contribution
We introduce DDuo, a dynamic analysis for enforcing differential privacy. DDuo
is usable by non-experts: its analysis is automatic and it requires no additional
type annotations. DDuo can be implemented as a library for existing program-
ming languages; we present a reference implementation in Python. Our goal in
this work is to answer the following four questions, based on the limitations of
PINQ:
• Can a PINQ-style dynamic analysis extend to base types in the programming
language, to allow its use pervasively?
• Is the analysis sound in the presence of side effects?
• Can we use this style of analysis for complex algorithms like differentially
private gradient descent?
• Can we extend the privacy analysis beyond pure ε-differential privacy?
We answer all four questions in the affirmative, building on PINQ in the following
ways:
• DDuo provides a dynamic analysis for base types in a general purpose
language (Python). DDuo supports general language operations, such as
9
mapping arbitrary functions over lists, and tracks the sensitivity (stability)
and privacy throughout.
• Methods in DDuo are not required to be side-effect free and allow pro-
grammers to mutate references inside functions which manipulate sensitive
values.
• DDuo supports various notions of sensitivity and arbitrary distance metrics
(including L1 and L2 distance).
• DDuo is capable of leveraging advanced privacy variants such as (ε, δ) and
Rényi differential privacy.
1.4 Solo: A Lightweight Static Analysis for Dif-
ferential Privacy
Goal: static analysis of differential privacy as a library.
1.4.1 Motivation
All current approaches for statically enforcing differential privacy in higher
order languages make use of either linear or relational refinement types. A
barrier to adoption for these approaches is the lack of support for expressing
these “fancy types” in mainstream programming languages. For example, no
mainstream language supports relational refinement types, and although Rust
and modern versions of Haskell both employ some linear typing techniques, they
are inadequate for embedding enforcement of differential privacy, which requires
“full” linear types a la Girard. Recent work has made significant progress towards
techniques for static verification of differentially private programs (Reed and
Pierce, 2010; Near et al., 2019b; Barthe et al., 2015; Gaboardi et al., 2013b).
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However, the specialized features they rely on do not exist in mainstream
programming languages.
1.4.2 Contribution
We propose a new type system that enforces differential privacy, avoids the
use of linear and relational refinement types, and can be easily embedded in
mainstream richly typed programming languages such as Scala, OCaml and
Haskell.
We introduce Solo, a novel type system for static verification of differential
privacy, with a reference implementation as a Haskell library. Solo is similar
to Fuzz (Reed and Pierce, 2010) and its descendants in expressive power, but
Solo does not rely on linear types and can be implemented entirely in Haskell
with no additional language extensions. In particular, Solo’s sensitivity and
privacy tracking mechanisms are compatible with higher-order functions, and
leverage Haskell’s type inference system to minimize the need for additional type
annotations.
1.5 Personal Contributions
I personally contributed to the works in this dissertation in the following ways:
• I worked on the development of the interpreter and typechecker for Duet,
helped iterate on the design and metatheory behind the language, and
made major contributions to the research paper describing Duet.
• I lead the design and implementation of the DDuo system, and wrote the
research paper describing DDuo.
• I lead the conceptualization, design and implementation of the Solo
system, and wrote the research paper describing Solo.
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1.6 Future Work
Below we briefly outline potential future work regarding this dissertation:
• A limitation of DDuo and similar software is the inability to automati-
cally discover the sensitivity of arbitrary functions, particularly functions
imported from third party software libraries. Property-based testing could
potentially be used to fully automate sensitivity analysis for large software
libraries.
• Gradual Differential Privacy could be used to bridge the gap between





Differential privacy is a formal notion of privacy; certain algorithms (called
mechanisms) can be said to satisfy differential privacy. Intuitively, the idea
behind a differential privacy mechanism is that: given inputs which differ
in the data of a single individual, the mechanism should return statistically
indistinguishable answers. This means that the data of any one individual should
not have any significant effect on the outcome of the mechanism, effectively
protecting privacy on the individual level. Formally, differential privacy is
parameterized by the privacy parameters ε, δ which control the strength of the
guarantee.
We say that two inputs x and x′ are neighbors when dA(x, x′) = 1. To provide
meaningful privacy protection, two neighboring inputs are normally considered
to differ in the data of a single individual. Thus, the definition of differential
privacy ensures that the probably distribution over K’s outputs will be roughly
the same, whether or not the data of a single individual is included in the input.
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The strength of the guarantee is parameterized by the privacy parameters ε and
δ. The case when δ = 0 is often called pure ε-differential privacy; the case when
δ > 0 is often called approximate or (ε, δ)-differential privacy. When δ > 0, the
δ parameter can be thought of as a failure probability : with probability 1− δ,
the mechanism achieves pure ε-differential privacy, but with probability δ, the
mechanism makes no guarantee at all (and may violate privacy arbitrarily). The
δ parameter is therefore set very small—values on the order of 10−5 are often
used. Typical values for ε are in the range of 0.1 to 1.
2.2 Sensitivity.
The core mechanisms for differential privacy (described below) rely on the notion
of sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006b) to determine how much noise is needed to
achieve differential privacy. Intuitively, function sensitivity describes the rate of
change of a function’s output relative to its inputs, and is a scalar value that
bounds this rate, in terms of some notion of distance. Formally:
Definition 2.2.1 (Global Sensitivity). Given distance metrics dA and dB, a
function f ∈ A→ B is said to be s-sensitive if ∀s′ ∈ R, (x, y) ∈ A. dA(x, y) ≤
s′ =⇒ dB(f(x), f(y)) ≤ s′·s.
For example, the function λx. x+ x is 2-sensitive, because its output is twice
its input. Determining tight bounds on sensitivity is often the key challenge in
ensuring differential privacy for complex algorithms.
2.3 Core Mechanisms.
The core mechanisms that are often utilized to achieve differential privacy are the
Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2014b) and the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork
et al., 2014b). Both mechanisms are defined for scalar values as well as vectors;
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the Laplace mechanism requires the use of the L1 distance metric and satisfies
ε-differential privacy, while the Gaussian mechanism requires the use of the L2
distance metric (which is often much smaller than L1 distance) and satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy (with δ > 0).
Definition 2.3.1 (Laplace Mechanism). Given a function f : A→ Rd which is
s-sensitive under the L1 distance metric dR(x, x′) =‖ x− x′ ‖1 on the function’s
output, the Laplace mechanism releases f(x) + Y1, . . . , Yd, where each of the
values Y1, . . . , Yd is drawn iid from the Laplace distribution centered at 0 with
scale sε ; it satisfies ε-differential privacy.
Definition 2.3.2 (Gaussian Mechanism). Given a function f : A→ Rd which is
s-sensitive under the L2 distance metric dR(x, x′) =‖ x− x′ ‖2 on the function’s
output, the Gaussian mechanism releases f(x) + Y1, . . . , Yd, where each of the
values Y1, . . . , Yd is drawn iid from the Gaussian distribution centered at 0 with
variance σ2 = 2s
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ε2 ; it satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0.
Definition 2.3.3 (Differential privacy). Given a distance metric dA ∈ A ×
A → R, a randomized algorithm (or mechanism) M ∈ A → B satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy if for all x, x′ ∈ A such that dA(x, x′) ≤ 1 and all possible
sets S ⊆ B of outcomes, Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[M(x′) ∈ S] + δ.
Differential privacy is compositional : running two mechanismsM1 andM2
with privacy costs of (ε1, δ1) and (ε2, δ2) respectively has a total privacy cost
of (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2). Advanced composition (Dwork et al., 2014b) improves on
this composition bound for iterative algorithms; several variants of differential
privacy (e.g. Rényi differential privacy (Mironov, 2017b) and zero-concentrated
differential privacy (Bun and Steinke, 2016)) have been developed that improve
the bound even further. Importantly, sequential composition theorems for
differential privacy do not necessarily allow the privacy parameters to be chosen
adaptively, which presents a special challenge.
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Variant SequentialComposition k-Loop Basic Mechanism
ε-DP (Dworket al., 2014a) ε1 + ε2 , ε1 + ε2 kε Laplace
(ε, δ)-DP (Dworket al., 2014a) (ε1, δ1) + (ε2, δ2) , (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2) (kε, kδ) Gaussian
RDP (Mironov, 2017a) (α, ε1) + (α, ε2) , (α, ε1 + ε2) (α, kε) Gaussian
zCDP (BunandSteinke, 2016) ρ1 + ρ2 , ρ1 + ρ2 kρ Gaussian
tCDP (Bunet al., 2018) (ρ1, ω1) + (ρ2, ω2) , (ρ1 + ρ2,min(ω1, ω2)) (kρ, ω) Sinh-normal
Figure 2.1: Variants of Differential Privacy
2.4 Composition.
Multiple invocations of a privacy mechanism on the same data degrade in an
additive or compositional manner. For example, the law of sequential composition
states that:
Theorem 2.4.1 (Sequential Composition).
If two mechanisms K1 and K2 with privacy costs of (ε1, δ1) and (ε2, δ2) respectively
are executed on the same data, the total privacy cost of running both mechanisms
is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2).
For iterative algorithms, advanced composition (Dwork et al., 2014b) can
yield tighter bounds on total privacy cost. Advanced variants of differential
privacy, like Rényi differential privacy (Mironov, 2017a) and zero-concentrated
differential privacy (Bun and Steinke, 2016), provide even tighter bounds on
composition.
The moments accountant was introduced by Talwar et al. (Abadi et al.,
2016) specifically for stochastic gradient descent in deep learning applications.
It provides tight bounds on privacy loss in iterative applications of the Gaussian
mechanism, as in SGD. The Rényi differential privacy and zero-concentrated
differential privacy generalize the ideas behind the moments accountant.
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2.5 Variants of differential privacy.
In addition to ε and (ε, δ)-differential privacy, other variants of differential privacy
with significant benefits have recently been developed. Three examples are
Rényi differential privacy (RDP) (Mironov, 2017a), zero-concentrated differential
privacy (zCDP) (Bun and Steinke, 2016), and truncated concentrated differential
privacy (tCDP) (Bun et al., 2018). Each one has different privacy parameters
and a different form of sequential composition, summarized in Figure 2.1. The
basic mechanism for RDP and zCDP is the Gaussian mechanism; tCDP uses a
novel sinh-normal mechanism (Bun et al., 2018) which decays more quickly in
its tails. All three can be converted to (ε, δ)-differential privacy, allowing them
to be compared and composed with each other. These three variants provide
asymptotically tight bounds on privacy cost under composition, while at the
same time eliminating the “catastrophic” privacy failure that can occur with
probability δ under (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
2.6 Group privacy.
Differential privacy is normally used to protect the privacy of individuals, but it
turns out that protection for an individual also translates to (weaker) protection
for groups of individuals. A mechanism which provides pure ε-differential privacy
for individuals also provides kε-differential privacy for groups of size k (Dwork
et al., 2014a). Group privacy also exists for (ε, δ)-differential privacy, RDP,










This section discusses Duet, an expressive higher-order language, linear type
system and tool for automatically verifying differential privacy of general-purpose
higher-order programs. In addition to general purpose programming, Duet sup-
ports encoding machine learning algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent,
as well as common auxiliary data analysis tasks such as clipping, normalization
and hyperparameter tuning–each of which are particularly challenging to encode
in a statically verified differential privacy framework.
We present a core design of the Duet language and linear type system,
and complete key proofs about privacy for well-typed programs. We then show
how to extend Duet to support realistic machine learning applications and
recent variants of differential privacy which result in improved accuracy for
many practical differentially private algorithms. Finally, we implement several
differentially private machine learning algorithms in Duet which have never
before been automatically verified by a language-based tool, and we present
experimental results which demonstrate the benefits of Duet’s language design
in terms of accuracy of trained machine learning models.
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Duet supports (1) general purpose programming features like compound
datatypes and higher-order functions, (2) library functions for matrix-based com-
putations, and (3) multiple state-of-the-art variants of differential privacy—(ε, δ)-
differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014a), Rényi differential privacy (Mironov,
2017a), zero-concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) (Bun and Steinke, 2016),
and truncated-concentrated differential privacy (tCDP) (Bun et al., 2018)—and
can be easily extended to new ones. Duet strikes a strategic balance between
generality, practicality, extensibility, and precision of computed privacy bounds.
The design of Duet consists of two separate, mutually embedded languages,
each with its own type system. The sensitivity language uses linear types with
metric scaling (as in Fuzz (Reed and Pierce, 2010)) to bound function sensitivity.
The privacy language uses linear types without metric scaling (novel in Duet)
to compose differentially private computations. Disallowing the use of scaling in
the privacy language is essential to encode more advanced variants of differential
privacy (like (ε, δ)) in a linear type system, because these definitions do not scale
linearly, a requirement imposed by the usual scaled-metric interpretation of linear
typing. E.g., Fuzz requires that the underlying definition of privacy supports
linear scaling—which is true of the simplest variant of differential privacy (pure
ε)—and it is well known that Fuzz cannot be used with more advanced variants
of differential privacy for this reason. Restricting Fuzz to disallow scaling would
severely limit the language’s ability to reason about sensitivity.
Linear typing is a general-purpose type discipline, which can be applied to
programming paradigms that track some notion of resource.
Linear typing (Barber, 1996; Girard, 1987) is a good fit for both privacy
and sensitivity analysis because resources are tracked per-variable and combined
additively. In particular, our linear typing approach to privacy allows for
independent privacy costs for multiple function arguments, a feature shared
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by Fuzz and DFuzz (which only support pure ε-differential privacy), but not
supported by prior type systems for (ε, δ)-differential privacy. This limitation of
prior work is due to treating privacy as a computational “effect”—a property of
the output via an indexed monad—as opposed to our treatment of privacy as a
“co-effect”—a property of the context via linear typing.
Our main idea is to co-design two separate languages for privacy and sen-
sitivity, and our main insight is that a linear type system can (1) model more
powerful variants of differential privacy (like (ε, δ)) when strengthened to disallow
scaling, and (2) interact seamlessly with a sensitivity-type system which does
allow scaling. Each language embeds inside the other, and the privacy mecha-
nisms of the underlying privacy definition (e.g. the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork
et al., 2014a)) form the interface between the two languages. Both languages
use similar syntax and identical types. The two languages aid type checking, the
proof of type soundness, and our implementation of type inference; programmers
need not be intimately aware of the multi-language design.
In addition to differential-privacy primitives like the Gaussian mechanism,
we provide a core language design for matrix-based data analysis tasks, such as
aggregation, clipping and gradients. Key challenges we overcome in our design
are how these features compose in terms of function sensitivity, and how to
statically track bounds on vector norms (due to clipping, for the purposes of
privacy)—and each in a way that is general enough to support a wide range of
useful applications.
We demonstrate the usefulness of Duet by implementing and verifying
several differentially private machine learning algorithms from the literature,
including private stochastic gradient descent (Bassily et al., 2014a) and private
Frank-Wolfe (Talwar et al., 2015), among many others. We also implement a
variant of stochastic gradient descent suitable for deep learning. For each of
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these algorithms, no prior work has demonstrated an automatic verification of
differential privacy, and Duet is able to automatically infer privacy bounds
that equal and in some cases improve upon previously published manual privacy
proofs.
We have implemented a typechecker and interpreter for Duet, and we use
these to perform an empirical evaluation comparing the accuracy of models
trained using our implementations. Although the “punchline” of the empirical
results are unsurprising due to known advantages of the differential privacy
definitions used (e.g., that using recent variants like zero-concentrated differential
privacy results in improved accuracy), our results show the extent of the accuracy
improvements for specific algorithms and further reinforce the idea that choosing





In summary, Duet makes the following contributions:
• We present Duet, a language, linear type system and tool for expressing
and automatically verifying differentially private programs. Duet supports a
combination of (1) general purpose, higher order programming, (2) advanced
definitions of differential privacy, (3) independent tracking of privacy costs
for multiple function arguments, and (4) auxiliary differentially-private data
analysis tasks such as clipping, normalization, and hyperparameter tuning.
• We formalize Duet’s type system and semantics, and complete key proofs
about privacy of well-typed programs.
• We demonstrate a battery of case studies consisting of medium-sized, real-
world, differentially private machine learning algorithms which are successfully
verified with optimal (or near-optimal) privacy bounds. In some cases, Duet
infers privacy bounds which improve on the best previously published manually-
verified result.
• We conduct an experimental evaluation to demonstrate Duet’s feasibility
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SA HO DT MA Rel-ext ε-DP (ε, δ)-DP Rényi/zCDP/tCDP SVT-imp
Fuzz X X 7 X 7 X 7 7 7
DFuzz X X X X 7 X 7 7 7
PathC X X 71 7 X X X X2 7
HOARe2 X X X 7 X X X X2 7
LightDP 7 7 X X 7 X X X2 X
Fuzzi X 7 71 X X X X X X
Duet X X X X 7 X X X 7
Figure 4.1: Legend: SA = capable of sensitivity analysis; HO = support for higher order
programming, program composition, and compound datatypes; DT = support for dependently
typed privacy bounds; MA = support for distinct privacy bounds of multiple input arguments;
Rel-ext = supports extensions to support non-differential-privacy relations; ε-DP = supports
ε-differential-privacy; (ε, δ)-DP = supports (ε, δ)-differential-privacy; Rényi/zCDP/tCDP:
supports Rényi, zero-concentrated and truncated concentrated differential privacy; SVT-imp:
supports verified implementation of the sparse vector technique. 1: This limitation is not
fundamental and could be supported by simple extension to underlying type theory. 2: Not
described in prior work, but could be achieved through a trivial extension to existing support
for (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
in practice by training two machine learning algorithms on several non-toy
real-world datasets using Duet’s interpreter. These results demonstrate the
effect of improved privacy bounds on the accuracy of the trained models.
4.1 Our Approach
We show the strengths and limitations of Duet in relation to approaches from
prior work in Figure 4.1. In particular, strengths of Duet w.r.t. prior work
are: (1) Duet supports sensitivity analysis in combination with higher order
programming, program composition, and compound datatypes, building on ideas
from Fuzz (SA+HO); (2) Duet supports type-level dependency on values,
which enables differentially private algorithms to be verified w.r.t. symbolic
privacy parameters, building on ideas from DFuzz (DT); (3) Duet supports
calculation of independent privacy costs for multiple program arguments via
a novel approach (MA); and (4) Duet supports (ε, δ)-differential privacy—in
addition to other recent powerful variants, such as Rényi, zero-concentrated
and truncated concentrated differential privacy—via a novel approach ((ε, δ)-DP,
Rényi/ZC/TC)).
In striking this balance, Duet comes with known limitations: (1) Duet
is not easy to extend with new relational properties (Rel-ext); and (2) Duet
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is not suitable for verifying implementations of low-level mechanisms, such





5.1 Duet: A Language for Privacy
This section describes the syntax, type system and formal properties of Duet.
Our design of Duet is the result of two key insights.
1. Linear typing, when restricted to disallow scaling, can be a powerful foun-
dation for enforcing (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Privacy bounds in (ε, δ)-
differential privacy do not scale linearly, and cannot be accurately modeled
by linear type systems which permit unrestricted scaling.
2. Sensitivity and privacy cost are distinct properties, and warrant distinct
type systems to enforce them. Our design for Duet is a co-design of two
distinct, mutually embedded languages: one for sensitivity which leverages
linear typing with scaling a la Fuzz, and one for privacy which leverages
linear typing without scaling and is novel in this work.
Before describing the syntax, semantics and types for each of Duet’s two lan-
guages, we first provide some context which motivates each design decision made.
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We do this through several small examples and type signatures drawn from state-
of-the-art type systems such as Fuzz Reed and Pierce (2010), HOARe2 Barthe




An important design goal of Duet is to support sensitivity analysis of higher-
order, general purpose programs. Prior work (Fuzz and HOARe2) has demon-
strated exactly this, and we build on their techniques. In Fuzz, the types for
the higher-order map function and a list of reals named xs looks like this:
map : (τ1 (s τ2)(∞ list τ1 (s list τ2
xs : list R
The type of map reads: “Take as a first argument an s-sensitive function from
τ1 to τ2 which map is allowed to use as many times as it wants. Take as second
argument a list of τ1, and return a result list of τ2 which is s-sensitive in the list
of τ1.” Two programs that use map might look like this:
map (λ x→ x+ 1) xs (1 )
map (λ x→ x+ x) xs (2 )
The Fuzz type system reports that (1) is 1-sensitive in xs, and that (2) is 2-
sensitive in xs. To arrive at this conclusion, the Fuzz type checker is essentially
counting how many times x is used in the body of the lambda, and type soundness
for Fuzz means that these counts correspond to the semantic property of function
sensitivity.
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In HOARe2 the type for map is instead:
map : (∀s′. {x :: τ1 | Dτ1(xC, xB) ≤ s′} → {y :: τ2 | Dτ2(yC, yB) ≤ s·s′})
→ ∀s′. {xs :: list τ1 | D(list τ1)(xsC, xsB) ≤ s′}
→ {ys :: list τ2 | D(list τ2)(ysC, ysB) ≤ s·s′}
This type for map means the same thing as the Fuzz type shown above, and
HOARe2 likewise reports that (1) is 1-sensitive and (2) is 2-sensitive, each in
xs, and where Dτ is some family of distance metrics indexed by types τ . To
arrive at this conclusion, HOARe2 generates relational verification conditions
(where, e.g., xC is drawn from a hypothetical “first/left run” of the program,
and xB is drawn from a hypothetical “second/right run” of the program) which
are discharged by an external solver (e.g., SMT). In this approach, sensitivity
is not concluded via an interpretation of a purely syntactic type system (e.g.,
linear typing in Fuzz), rather the relational semantic property of sensitivity
(and its scaling) is embedded directly in the relational refinements of higher-order
function types.
In designing Duet, we follow the design of Fuzz in that programs adhere
to a linear type discipline, i.e., the mechanics of our type system is based on
counting variables and (in some cases) scaling, and we prove a soundness theorem
that says well-typed programs are guaranteed to be sensitive/private programs.
Our type for map is identical to the one shown above for Fuzz.
Non-Linear Scaling
Fuzz encodes an ε-differentially private function as an ε-sensitive function
which returns a monadic type © τ . The Laplace differential privacy mechanism
is then encoded in Fuzz as an ε-sensitive function from R to © R:
laplace : R(ε © R
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Because the metric on distributions for pure ε-differential privacy scales linearly,
laplace can be applied to a 2-sensitive argument to achieve 2ε-differential privacy,
e.g.:
laplace (x+ x)
gives 2ε-differential privacy for x. Adding more advanced variants of differential
privacy like (ε, δ) to Fuzz has proved challenging because these variants do not
scale linearly. Azevedo de Amorim et al’s path construction successfully adds
(ε, δ)-differential privacy to Fuzz by tracking privacy “cost” as an index on the
monadic type operator ©ε,δ. However, in order to interpret a function application
like the one shown, the group privacy property for (ε, δ)-differential privacy must
be used, which results in undesirable non-linear scaling of the privacy cost. The
derived bound for this program using group privacy (for k = 2) is not (2ε, 2δ)
but (2ε, 2eεδ) Dwork et al. (2014a). As a result, achieving a desired ε and δ
by treating an s-sensitive function as 1-sensitive and leveraging group privacy
requires adding much more noise than simply applying the Gaussian mechanism
with a sensitivity of s.
In HOARe2, the use of scaling which might warrant the use of group privacy
is explicitly disallowed in the stated relational refinement type. This is in contrast
to sensitivity, which likewise must explicitly allow arbitrary scaling. The type for
gauss in HOARe2 (the analogous mechanism to laplace in the (ε, δ)-differential
privacy setting) is written:
gauss : {x :: R | DR(xC, xB) ≤ 1} →Mε,δ R
Notice the assumed sensitivity of x to be bounded by 1, not some arbitrary
s′ to be scaled in the output refinement (as was seen in the type for map in
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HOARe2 above). In this way, HOARe2 is able to restrict uses of gauss to
strictly 1-sensitive arguments, a restriction that is not possible in a pure linear
type system where arbitrary program composition is allowed and interpreted via
scaling.
In Duet, we co-design two languages which are mutually embedded inside one
another. The sensitivity language is nearly identical to Fuzz, supports arbitrary
scaling, and is never interpreted to mean privacy. The privacy language is also
linearly typed, but restricts function call parameters to be strictly 1-sensitive—a
property established in the sensitivity fragment. The gauss mechanism in Duet
is (essentially) given the type:
gauss : R@〈ε, δ〉(∗ R
where (∗ is the function space in Duet’s privacy language, and the annota-
tion @〈ε, δ〉 tracks the privacy cost of that argument following a linear typing
discipline.
Multiple Private Parameters Both HOARe2 and the path construction track
(ε, δ)-differential privacy via an indexed monadic type, notated Mε,δ and ©ε,δ
respectively. E.g., a program that returns an (ε, δ)-differentially private real
number has the typeMε,δ(R) in HOARe2. These monadic approaches to privacy
inherently follow an “effect” type discipline, and as a result the monad index
must track the sum total of all privacy costs to any parameter . For example,
a small program that takes two parameters, applies a mechanism to enforce
differential privacy for each parameter, and adds them together, will report a
double-counting of privacy cost. E.g., in this HOARe2 program (translated to
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Haskell-ish “do”-notation):
let f = λ x y → do { r1 ← gaussε,δ x ; r2 ← gaussε,δ y ; return (r1 + r2) }
The type of f in HOARe2 reports that it costs (2ε, 2δ) privacy:
f : {x :: R | DR(xC, xB) ≤ 1} → {y :: R | DR(yC, yB) ≤ 1} →M2ε,2δ R
This bound is too conservative in many cases: it is the best bound in the case that
f is applied to the same variable for both arguments (e.g., in f a a), however, if
f is applied to different variables (e.g., in f a b) then a privacy cost of (2ε, 2δ) is
still claimed, interpreted as for either or both variables 2ε, 2δ privacy is consumed.
A better accounting of privacy in this second case should report (ε, δ)-differential
privacy independently for both variables a and b, and such accounting is not
possible in either HOARe2 or the path construction.
In Duet, we track privacy following a co-effect discipline (linear typing
without scaling), as opposed to an effect discipline, in order to distinguish
privacy costs independently for each variable. The type of the above program in
Duet is:
f : (R@〈ε, δ〉,R@〈ε, δ〉)(∗ R
indicating that f “costs” (ε, δ) for each parameter independently, and only when f
is called with two identical variables as arguments are they combined as (2ε, 2δ).
Due to limitations of linear logic in the absence of scaling, privacy lambdas
must be multi-argument in the core design of Duet—they cannot be recovered
by single-argument lambdas. As a consequence, our privacy language is not
Cartesian closed.
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5.1.2 Duet by Example
Sensitivity. Duet consists of two languages: one for tracking sensitivities
(typeset in green), and one for tracking privacy cost (typeset in red). The
sensitivity language is similar to that of DFuzz Gaboardi et al. (2013a); its
typing rules track the sensitivity of each variable by annotating the context. For
example, the expression x+ x is 2-sensitive in x; the typing rules in Figure 5.3
allow us to conclude:
{x :2 R} ` x+ x : R
In this case, the context {x :2 R} tells us that the expression is 2-sensitive in x.
The same idea works for functions; for example:
∅ ` λx : R⇒ x+ x : R(2 R
Here, the context is empty; instead, the function’s sensitivity to its argument
is encoded in an annotation on its type (the 2 in R(2 R). Applying such a
function to an argument scales the sensitivity of the argument by the sensitivity
of the function. This kind of scaling is appropriate for sensitivities, and even
has the correct effect for higher-order functions. For example:
{y :2 R} ` (λx : R⇒ x+ x) y : R
{y :4 R} ` (λx : R⇒ x+ x) (y + y) : R
{y :4 R, z :2 R} ` (λx : R⇒ x+ x) (y + y + z) : R
{y :1 R} ` λx : R⇒ y : R(0 R
{y :1 R, z :0 R} ` (λx : R⇒ y) z : R
{y :2 R, z :0 R} ` (λf : R(0 R⇒ (f z) + (f z)) (λx : R⇒ y) : R
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Privacy. Differentially private mechanisms like the Gaussian mechanism Dwork
et al. (2014a) specify how to add noise to a function with a particular sensitivity
in order to ensure differential privacy. In Duet, such mechanisms form the
interface between the sensitivity language and the privacy language. For example:
{x :ε,δ R} ` gauss[R+[2.0], ε, δ] <x> {x+ x} : R
In a gauss expression, the first three elements (inside the square brackets)
represent the maximum allowed sensitivity of variables in the expression’s body,
and the desired privacy parameters ε and δ. The fourth element (here, <x>) is
a list of variables whose privacy we are interested in tracking. Variables not in
this list will be assigned infinite privacy cost.
The value of the gauss expression is the value of its fifth element (the “body”),
plus enough noise to ensure the desired level of privacy. The body of a gauss
expression is a sensitivity expression, and the gauss expression is well-typed
only if its body typechecks in a context assigning a sensitivity to each variable of
interest which does not exceed the maximum allowed sensitivity. For example,
the expression gauss[R+[1.0], ε, δ] <x> {x+ x} is not well-typed, because x+x
is 2-sensitive in x, but the maximum allowed sensitivity is 1.
Privacy expressions like the example above are typed under a privacy context
which records privacy cost for individual variables. The context for this example
({x :ε,δ R}) says that the expression provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy for the
variable x. Tracking privacy costs using a co-effect discipline allows precise
tracking of the privacy cost for programs with multiple inputs:
{x :ε,δ R, y :ε,δ R} ` gauss[R+[1.0], ε, δ] <x, y> {x+ y} : R
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The Bind rule encodes the sequential composition property of differential privacy.
For example:
{x :2ε,2δ R} `
v1 ← gauss[R+[1.0], ε, δ] <x> {x} ;
v2 ← gauss[R+[1.0], ε, δ] <x> {x} ;
return v1 + v2
: R
{x :ε,δ R, y :ε,δ R} `
v1 ← gauss[R+[1.0], ε, δ] <x> {x} ;
v2 ← gauss[R+[1.0], ε, δ] <y> {y} ;
return v1 + v2
: R
In the example on the left, the Gaussian mechanism is applied to x twice, so
the total privacy cost for x is (2ε, 2δ). In the example on the right, x and y are
each used once, and their privacy costs are tracked separately. The Return rule
provides a second interface between the sensitivity and privacy languages: a
return expression is part of the privacy language, but its argument is a sensitivity
expression. The value of a return expression is exactly the value of its argument,
so the variables used in its argument are assigned infinite privacy cost. return
expressions are therefore typically used to compute on values which are already
differentially private (like v1 and v2 above), since infinite privacy cost is not a
problem in that case.
Gradient descent. Machine learning problems are typically defined in terms of
a loss function L(θ;X, y) on a model θ, training samples X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) (in
which each sample is typically represented as a feature vector) and corresponding
labels y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) (i.e. the prediction target). The training task is to
find a model θ̂ which minimizes the loss on the training samples (i.e. θ̂ =
argminθL(θ;X, y).
One solution to the training task is gradient descent, which starts with an
initial guess for θ and iteratively moves in the direction of an improved θ until
the current setting is close to θ̂. To determine which direction to move, the
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algorithm evaluates the gradient of the loss, which yields a vector representing
the direction of greatest increase in L(θ;X, y). Then, the algorithm moves in
the opposite direction.
To ensure differential privacy for gradient-based algorithms, we need to
bound the sensitivity of the gradient computation. The gradients for many kinds
of convex loss functions are 1-Lipschitz Wu et al. (2017): if each sample in
X = (x1, . . . , xn) has bounded L2 norm (i.e. ‖ xi ‖2≤ 1), then for all models θ
and labelings y, the gradient ∇ (θ;X, y) has L2 sensitivity bounded by 1. For
now, we will assume the existence of a function called gradient with this property
(more details in Section 6.1).
gradient : MUL2[1, n] R(∞ MUL∞[m, n] D( 1m M
U
L∞[m, 1] D( 1m M
U
L2[1, n] R
The function’s arguments are the current θ, a m × n matrix X containing n
training samples, and a 1× n matrix y containing the corresponding labels. In
Duet, the type MUL∞[m,n] D represents a m×n matrix of discrete real numbers;
neighboring matrices of this type differ arbitrarily in a single row. The function’s
output is a new θ of type MUL2[1, n] R, representing a matrix of real numbers
with bounded L2 sensitivity (see Section 6.1 for details on matrix types). We can
use the gradient function to implement a differentially private gradient descent
algorithm:
noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, ε, δ) ,
let θ0 = zeros (cols X1) in
loop[δ′] k on θ0 <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒
gp ← mgauss[ 1m , ε, δ] <X, y> {gradient θ X y} ;
return θ − gp }
The arguments to our algorithm are the training data (X and y), the desired
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number of iterations k, and the privacy parameters ε and δ. The first line
constructs an initial model θ0 consisting of zeros for all parameters. Lines 2-4
represent the iterative part of the algorithm: k times, compute the gradient of
the loss on X and y with respect to the current model, add noise to the gradient
using the Gaussian mechanism, and subtract the gradient from the current model
(thus moving in the opposite direction of the gradient) to improve the model.
The typing rules presented in Figure 5.3 allow us to derive a privacy bound
for this algorithm which is equivalent to manual proof of Bassily et al. Bassily
et al. (2014b). Based on the type of the gradient function, the (-E rule allows
us to conclude that the gradient operation is 1m -sensitive in the training data,
which is reflected by the sensitivity annotations in the context:
{θ :∞ τ1, X : 1
m
τ2, y : 1
m
τ3} ` gradient θ X y : MUL2[1, n] R
where τ1 = MUL2[1, n] R
τ2 = MUL∞[m,n] D
τ3 = MUL∞[m, 1] D
Next, the MGauss rule represents the use of the Gaussian mechanism, and
transitions from the sensitivity language (implementing the gradient) to the
privacy language (in which we use the noisy gradient). The rule allows us to
conclude that since the sensitivity of the gradient computation is 1m , our use
of the Gaussian mechanism satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy. This context
is a privacy context, and its annotations represent privacy costs rather than
sensitivities.
{θ :∞ τ1, X :〈ε,δ〉 τ2, y :〈ε,δ〉 τ3} ` mgauss[ 1m , ε, δ] <X, y> {gradient θ X y}
: MUL2[1, n] R
Finally, the Loop rule for advanced composition allows us to derive a bound on
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the total privacy cost of the iterative algorithm, based on the number of times
the loop runs:
{θ :∞ τ1, X :〈ε′,kδ+δ′〉 τ2, y :〈ε′,kδ+δ′〉 τ3} ` loop[δ′] k on θ0 <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒ . . .}
: MUL2[1, n] R
where ε′ = 2ε
√
2k log(1/δ′)
Variants of Differential Privacy. The typing rules presented in Figure 5.3
are specific to (ε, δ)-differential privacy, but the same framework can be easily
extended to support the other variants described in Figure 2.1. New variants
can be supported by making three simple changes: (1) Modify the privacy cost
syntax p to describe the privacy parameters of the new variant; (2) Modify the
sum operator + to reflect sequential composition in the new variant; and (3)
Modify the typing for basic mechanisms (e.g. gauss) to reflect corresponding
mechanisms in the new variant. The extended version of this paper Near et al.
(2019a) includes typing rules for the variants in Figure 2.1.
As an example, considering the following variant of the noisy gradient descent
algorithm presented earlier, but with ρ-zCDP instead of (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
There are only two differences: the loop construct under zCDP has no δ′
parameter, since standard composition yields tight bounds, and the mgauss
construct has a single privacy parameter (ρ) instead of ε and δ.
noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, ρ) ,
let θ0 = zeros (cols X1) in
loop k on θ0 <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒
gp ← mgauss[ 1m , ρ] <X, y> {gradient θ X y} ;
return θ − gp }
Typechecking for this version proceeds in the same way as before, with the
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modified typing rules; the resulting privacy context gives both X and y a privacy
cost of kρ.
Mixing Variants. Duet allows mixing variants of differential privacy in a
single program. For example, the total privacy cost of an algorithm is often
given in (ε, δ) form, to enable comparing the costs of different algorithms; we can
use this feature of Duet to automatically derive the cost of our zCDP-based
gradient descent in terms of ε and δ.
noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, ρ, δ) ,
let θ0 = zeros (cols X1) in
ZCDP [δ] { loop k on θ0 <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒
gp ← mgauss[ 1m , ρ] <X, y> {gradient θ X y} ;
return θ − gp } }
The ZCDP {. . .} construct represents embedding a mechanism which satisfies
ρ-zCDP in another mechanism which provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy. The
rule for typechecking this construct encodes the property that if a mechanism
satisfies ρ-zCDP, it also satisfies (ρ+ 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-differential privacy Bun
and Steinke (2016). Using this rule, we can derive a total privacy cost for the
gradient descent algorithm in terms of ε and δ, but using the tight bound on
composition that zCDP provides.
{X :〈ε′,δ〉 τ2, y :〈ε′,δ〉 τ3, k :∞ τ4, ρ :∞ τ5} ` noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, ρ, δ)
: MUL2[1, n] R
where ε′ = kρ+ 2
√
kρ log(1/δ), τ3 = R+[k], and τ5 = R+[ρ]
We might also want to nest these conversions. For example, when the dimen-
sionality of the training data is very small, the Laplace mechanism might yield
more accurate results than the Gaussian mechanism (due to the shape of the
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distribution). To use the Laplace mechanism in an iterative algorithm which
satisfies zCDP, we can use the fact that any ε-differentially private mechanism
also satisfies 12ε
2-zCDP; by nesting conversions, we can determine the total cost
of the algorithm in terms of ε and δ.
noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, ε, δ) ,
let θ0 = zeros (cols X1) in
ZCDP [δ] { loop k on θ0 <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒
gp ← EPS_DP { mlaplace[ 1m , ε] <X, y> {gradient θ X y} } ;
return θ − gp } }
{X :〈ε′,δ〉 τ2, y :〈ε′,δ〉 τ3, k :∞ R+, ρ :∞ R+} ` noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, ε, δ)
: MUL2[1, n] R






Such nestings are sometimes useful in practice: in Section 7.1, we will define
a variant of the Private Frank-Wolfe algorithm which uses the exponential
mechanism (which satisfies ε-differential privacy) in a loop for which composition
is performed with zCDP, and report the total privacy cost in terms of ε and δ.
Contextual Modal Types
A new problem arises in the design of Duet governing the interaction of
sensitivity and privacy languages: in general—and for very good reasons which
are detailed in the next section—let-binding intermediate results in the privacy
language doesn’t always preserve typeability. Not only is let-binding intermediate
results desirable for code readability, it can often be essential in order to achieve
desirable performance. Consider a loop body which performs an expensive
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operation that does not depend on the inner-loop parameter:
λ xs θ0 → loop k times on θ0 { θ →
gaussε,δ (f (expensive xs) θ)) }
A simple refactoring achieves much better performance:
λ xs θ0 → let temp = expensive xs in
loop k times on θ0 { θ →
gaussε,δ (f temp θ) }
However instead of providing (ε, δ)-differential privacy for xs, as was the case
before the refactor, the new program provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy for
temp—an intermediate variable we don’t care about—and makes no guarantees
of privacy for xs.
To accommodate this pattern we borrow ideas from contextual modal type the-
ory Nanevski et al. (2008) to allow “boxing” a sensitivity context, and “unboxing”
that context at a later time. In terms of differential privacy, the argument that the
above loop is differentially private relies on the fact that temp ≡ expensive(xs)
is 1-sensitive in xs (assuming expensive is 1-sensitive), a property which is lost
by the typing rule for let in the privacy language. We therefore “box” this
sensitivity information outside the loop, and “unbox” it inside the loop, like so:
λ xs θ0 → let temp = box (expensive xs) in
loop k times on θ0 { θ →
gaussε,δ (f (unbox temp) θ) }
In this example, the type of temp is a [xs@1] data (a “box of data 1-sensitive
in xs”) indicating that when unboxed, temp will report 1-sensitivity w.r.t xs,
not temp. f is then able to make good on its promise to gauss that the result of
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m,n ∈ N r ∈ R ṙ, ε, δ ∈ R+ x, y ∈ var
s ∈ sens ::= ṙ | ∞ p ∈ priv ::= ε, δ | ∞
τ ∈ type ::= N | R | N[n] | R+[_r] | box[Γs] τ numeric and box
| τ (s τ | (τ@p, . . . , τ@p)(* τ functions
Γs ∈ tcxts , var ⇀ sens× type ::= {x :s τ , . . . , x :s τ} sens. contexts
Γp ∈ tcxtp , var ⇀ priv × type ::= {x :p τ , . . . , x :p τ} priv . contexts
es ∈ exps ::= N[n] | N[_r] | n | r | real e numeric literals
| e + e | e-e | e·e | 1/e | e mod e arithmetic
| x | let x = e in e | e e let/sens. app.
| sλ x : τ ⇒ e | pλ (x : τ , . . . , x : τ)⇒ e sens. /priv . fun.
| box e | unbox e sensitivity capture
ep ∈ expp ::= return e | x← e ; e | e(e, . . . , e) ret/bind/priv . app.
| loop[e] e on e <x, . . . , x> {x, x⇒ e} finite iteration
| gauss[e, e, e] <x, . . . , x> {e} gaussian noise
Figure 5.1: Core Types and Terms
f is 1-sensitive in xs (assuming f is 1-sensitive in its first argument), and gauss
properly reports its privacy “cost” in terms of xs, not temp.
We use exactly this pattern in many of our case studies, where expensive
is a pre-processing operation on the input data (e.g., clipping or normalizing),
and f is a machine-learning training operation, such as computing an improved
model based on the current model θ and the pre-processed input data temp.
5.1.3 Duet Syntax & Typing Rules
Figure 22.1 shows a core subset of syntax for both languages. We only present
the privacy fragment for (ε, δ)-differential privacy in the core formalism, although
support for other variants (and combined variants) is straightforward as sketched
in the previous section. See the extended version of this paper Near et al.
(2019a) for the complete presentation of the full language including all advanced
variants of differential privacy. We use color coding to distinguish between the
sensitivity language, privacy language, and shared syntax between languages.
The sensitivity and privacy languages share syntax for variables and types, which
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Γ ` e : τ
Nat
` n : N
Real
` r : R
Singleton Nat
` N[n] : N[n]
Singleton Real
` R+[_r] : R+[_r]
Real-S
Γ ` e : N[n]
` real e : R+[n]
Real-D
Γ ` e : N
Γ ` real e : R
Times-DS
Γ1 ` e1 : R Γ2 ` e2 : R+[_r]
ṙΓ1 ` e1·e2 : τ
Mod-DS
Γ1 ` e1 : R Γ2 ` e2 : R+[_r]
eΓ1dṙ ` e1 mod e2 : τ
Var
{x :1 τ} ` x : τ
Let
Γ1 ` e1 : τ1 Γ2 ] {x :s τ1} ` e2 : τ2
sΓ1 + Γ2 ` let x = e1 in e2 : τ2
(-I
Γ ] {x :s τ1} ` e : τ2
Γ ` (λ x : τ1 ⇒ e) : τ1(s τ2
(-E
Γ1 ` e1 : τ1(s τ2 Γ2 ` e2 : τ1
Γ1 + sΓ2 ` e1 e2 : τ2
(∗-I
Γ ] {x1 :p1 τ1, . . . , xn :pn τn} ` e : τ
eΓd∞ ` (pλ (x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn)⇒ e) : (τ1@p1, . . . , τn@pn)(* τ
Box-I
Γ ` e : τ
` box e : box[Γ] τ
Box-E
Γ ` e : box[Γ′] τ
Γ + Γ′ ` unbox e : τ
Sub
Γ1 ` e : τ Γ1 ≤ Γ2
Γ2 ` e : τ
Figure 5.2: Core Typing Rules: Sensitivity
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Γ ` e : τ
Return
Γ ` e : τ
eΓd∞ ` return e : τ
Bind
Γ1 ` e1 : τ1 Γ2 ] {x :∞ τ1} ` e2 : τ2
Γ1 + Γ2 ` x ← e1 ; e2 : τ2
(∗-E Γ ` e : (τ1@p1, . . . , τn@pn) (
*
τ eΓ1d
1 ` e1 : τ1 · · · eΓnd
1 ` en : τn
eΓd∞ + eΓ1d
p1 + · · · + eΓnd
pn ` e(e1, . . . , en) : τ
Loop (Advanced Composition)























` loop[e1] e2 on e3 <x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n> {x1, x2 ⇒ e4} : τ
Gauss
Γ1 ` e1 : R
+
[_rs] Γ2 ` e2 : R
+
[ε] Γ3 ` e3 : R
+













` gauss[e1, e2, e3] <x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n> {e4} : R
Figure 5.3: Core Typing Rules: Privacy
are typeset in blue. Expressions in the sensitivity language are typeset in green,
while expressions in the privacy language are typeset in red.1
Types τ include base numeric types N and R and their treatment is standard.
We include singleton numeric types N[n] and R+[ṙ]; these types classify runtime
numeric values which are identical to the static index n or ṙ, e.g., N[n] is a type
which exactly describes its runtime value as the number n. Static reals only
range over non-negative values, and we write ṙ for elements of the non-negative
reals R+. Singleton natural numbers are used primarily to construct matrices
with some statically known dimension, and to execute loops for some statically
known number of iterations. Singleton real numbers and are used primarily for
tracking sensitivity and privacy quantities. Novel in Duet is a “boxed” type
box[Γs] τ which delays the “payment” of a value’s sensitivity, to be unboxed
and “paid for” in a separate context. Boxing is discussed in more detail later
in this section. The sensitivity function space (a la Fuzz) is written τ1 (s τ2
and encodes an s-sensitive function from τ1 to τ2. The privacy function space
(novel in Duet) is written (τ1@p1, . . . , τn@pn)(∗ τ and encodes a multi-arity
function that preserves pi-privacy for its ith argument. Privacy functions are
1Colors were chosen to minimize ambiguity for colorblind persons following a colorblind-
friendly palette: http://mkweb.bcgsc.ca/colorblind/img/colorblindness.palettes.png
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multi-arity because functions of multiple arguments cannot be recovered from
iterating functions over single arguments in the privacy language, as can be done
in the sensitivity language.
In our implementation and extended presentation of Duet in the extended
version of this paper, we generalize the static representations of natural numbers
and reals to symbolic expression η, which may be arbitrary symbolic polynomial
formulas including variables. E.g., suppose ε is a type-level variable ranging over
real numbers and x:N[ε], then 2x:N[2ε]. Our type checker knows this is the same
type as N[ε+ε] using a custom solver we implemented but do not describe in
this paper. Because the typelevel representation of a natural number can be a
variable, its value is therefore not statically determined , rather it is statically
tracked via typelevel symbolic formulas.
Type contexts in the sensitivity language Γs track the sensitivity s of each
free variable whereas in the privacy language Γp they track privacy cost p.
Sensitivities are non-negative reals ṙ extended with a distinguished infinity
element ∞, and privacy costs are specific to the current privacy mode. In the
case of (ε, δ)-differential privacy, p has the form ε, δ or ∞ where ε and δ range
over R+.
We reuse notation conventions from Fuzz for manipulating contexts, e.g.,
Γ1+Γ2 is partial and defined only when both contexts agree on the type of each
variable; adding contexts adds sensitivities pointwise, i.e., {x:s1+s2τ} ∈ Γ1+Γ2
when {x:s1τ} ∈ Γ1 and {x:s2τ} ∈ Γ2; and scaling contexts scales sensitivities
pointwise, i.e., {x:ss′τ} ∈ sΓ when {x:s′τ} ∈ Γ.
We introduce a new operation not shown in prior work called truncation and
written es1ds2 for truncating a sensitivity and eΓds for truncating a sensitivity
context, which is pointwise truncation of sensitivities. Sensitivity truncation
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e ds maps 0 to 0 and any other value to s:
e d ∈ sens× sens→ sens es1ds2 ,
0 if s1 = 0s2 if s1 6= 0
Truncation is defined analogously for privacies ep1dp2 , for converting between
sensitivities and privacies esdp and epds, and also for liftings of these operations
pointwise over contexts eΓdp, eΓdp and eΓds. Sensitivity truncation is used for
typing the modulus operator, and truncating between sensitivities and privacies
is always to ∞/∞ and appears frequently in typing rules that embed sensitivity
terms in privacy terms and vice versa.
The syntax and language features for both sensitivity and privacy languages
are discussed next alongside their typing rules. Figure 5.3 shows a core subset of
typing rules for both languages. In the typing rules, the languages embed within
each other—sensitivity typing contexts are transformed into privacy contexts and
vice versa. Type rules are written in logical style with an explicit subsumption
rule, although a purely algorithmic presentation is possible (not shown) following
ideas from Azevedo de Amorim et al De Amorim et al. (2014) which serves as
the basis for our implementation.
5.1.4 Sensitivity Language
Duet’s sensitivity language is similar to that of DFuzz Gaboardi et al. (2013a),
except that we extend it with significant new tools for machine learning in
Section 6.1. We do not present standard linear logic connectives such as sums,
additive products and multiplicative products (a la Fuzz), or symbolic type-
level expressions (a la DFuzz), although each are implemented in our tool and
described formally in the extended version of this paper Near et al. (2019a).
We do not formalize or implement general recursive types in order to ensure
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that all Duet programs terminate. Including general recursive types would be
straightforward in Duet (following the design of Fuzz), however such a decision
comes with known limitations. As described in Fuzz Reed and Pierce (2010),
requiring that all functions terminate is necessary in order to give both sound and
useful types to primitives like set-filter. The design space for the combination of
sensitivity types and nontermination is subtle, and discussed extensively in prior
work Reed and Pierce (2010); Azevedo de Amorim et al. (2017).
Typing for literal values is immediate (Nat, Real). Singleton values are
constructed using the same syntax as their types, and where the type level
representation is identical to the literal (Singleton Nat, Singleton Real). Naturals
can be converted to real numbers through the explicit conversion operation real
(Real-S, Real-D). For the purposes of sensitivity analysis, statically known
numbers are considered constant, and as a consequence any term that uses
one is considered 0-sensitive in the statically known term. The result of this
is that the sensitivity environment Γ associated with the subterm at singleton
type is dropped from the output environment, e.g., in Real-S. This dropping is
justified by our metric space interpretation JN[n]K for statically known numbers
as singleton sets {n}, and because for all x, y ∈ JN[n]K, x = y and therefore
|x− y| = 0.
Type rules for arithmetic operations are given in multiple variations, depend-
ing on whether or not each argument is tracked statically or dynamically. We
show only the rule for multiplication when the left argument is dynamic and
the right argument is static (Times-DS). The resulting sensitivity environment
reports the sensitivities of e1 scaled by ṙ—the statically known value of e2—and
the sensitivities for e2 are not reported because its value is fixed and cannot
vary, as discussed above. When both arguments are dynamic, the resulting
sensitivity environment is ∞(Γ1 + Γ2), i.e., all potentially sensitive variables
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for each expression are bumped to infinity. The modulus operation is similar
to multiplication in that we have cases for each variation of static or dynamic
arguments, however the context is truncated rather than scaled in the case of
one singleton-typed parameter; we show only this static-dynamic variant in the
figure (Mod-DS).
Typing for variables (Var) and functions ((-I, (-E) is the same as in
Fuzz: variables are reported in the sensitivity environment with sensitivity 1;
and closures are created by annotating the arrow with the sensitivity s of the
argument in the body, and by reporting the rest of the sensitivities Γ from
the function body as the sensitivity of whole closure as a whole; and function
application scales the argument by the function’s sensitivity s.
The first new (w.r.t. DFuzz) term in our sensitivity language is the privacy
lambda. Privacy lambdas are multi-arity (as opposed to single-arity sensitivity
lambdas) because the privacy language does not support currying to recover multi-
argument functions. Privacy lambdas are created in the sensitivity language with
pλ (x : τ , . . . , x : τ)⇒ e and applied in the privacy language with e(e, . . . , e).
The typing rule for privacy lambdas ((∗-I) types the body of the lambda in
a privacy type context extended with its formal parameters, and the privacy
cost of each parameter is annotated on its function argument type. Unlike
sensitivity lambdas, the privacy cost of variables in the closure environment are
not preserved in the resulting typing judgment. The reason for this is twofold:
(1) the final “cost” for variables in the closure environment depends on how
many times the closure is called, and in the absence of this knowledge, we must
conservatively assume that it could be called an infinite number of times, and (2)
the interpretation of an ∞-sensitive function coincides with that of an ∞-private
function, so we can soundly convert between ∞-privacy-cost and ∞-sensitivity
contexts freely using truncation.
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The final two new terms in our sensitivity language are introduction and
elimination forms for “boxes” (Box-I and Box-E). Boxes have no operational
behavior and are purely a type-level mechanism for tracking sensitivity. The
rules for box introduction capture the sensitivity context of the expression,
and the rule for box elimination pays for that cost at a later time. Boxes
are reminiscent of contextual modal type theory Nanevski et al. (2008)—they
allow temporary capture of a linear context via boxing—thereby deferring its
payment—and re-introduction of the context at later time via unboxing. In a
linear type system that supports scaling, this boxing would not be necessary, but
it becomes necessary in our system to achieve the desired operational behavior
when interacting with the privacy language, which does not support scaling.
E.g., in many of our examples we perform some pre-processing on the database
parameter (such as clipping) and then use this parameter in the body of a loop.
Without boxing, the only way to achieve the desired semantics is to re-clip the
input (a deterministic operation) every time around the loop—boxing allows
you to clip on the outside of the loop and remember that privacy costs should
be “billed” to the initial input.
5.1.5 Privacy Language
Duet’s privacy language is designed specifically to enable the composition of
individual differentially private computations. It has a linear type system, but
unlike the sensitivity language, annotations instead track privacy cost, and the
privacy language does not allow scaling of these annotations, that is, the notation
pΓ is not used and cannot be defined. Syntax return e and x←e;e (pronounced
“bind”) are standard from Fuzz, as are their typing rules (Return, Bind), except
for our explicit conversion from a sensitivity context Γ to a privacy context Γ
by truncation to infinity in the conclusion of Return. Bind encodes exactly the
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post-processing property of differential privacy—it allows e2 to use the value
computed by e1 any number of times after paying for it once.
Privacy application e(e, . . . , e) applies a privacy function (pλ, created in the
sensitivity language) to a sequence of 1-sensitivity arguments—the sensitivity is
enforced by the typing rule. The type rule ((*-E) checks that the first term
produces a privacy function and applies its privacy costs to function arguments
which are restricted by the type system to be 1-sensitive. We use truncation in
well-typed hypothesis for e1 . . . en to encode the restriction that the argument
must be 1-sensitive. This restriction is crucial for type soundness—arbitrary
terms cannot be given tight privacy bounds statically due to the lack of a tight
scaling operation in the model for (ε, δ)-differential privacy. The same is true for
other advanced variants of differential privacy.
The loop expression is for loop iteration fixed to a statically known number
of iterations. The syntax includes a list of variables (<x, . . . , x>) to indicate
which variables should be considered when calculating final privacy costs, as
explained shortly. The typing rule (Loop) encodes advanced composition for
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. e1 is the δ′ parameter to the advanced composition
bound and e2 is the number of loop iterations—each of these values must be
statically known, which we encode with singleton types (a la DFuzz). Statically
known values are fixed and their sensitivities do not appear in the resulting
context. e3 is the initial value passed to the loop, and for which no claim is
made of privacy, indicated by truncation to infinity. e4 is a loop body with free
variables x1 and x2 which will be iterated e2 times with the first variable bound
to the iteration index, and the second variable bound to the loop state, where e3
is used as the starting value. The loop body e4 is checked in a privacy context
Γ4 + ebΓ′4cd{x′ε,δ1 ,...,x′n}, shorthand for ebΓ
′
4c{x′1,...,x′n}d
ε,δ where bΓ′4c{x′1,...,x′n} is
a context restricted to only the variables x′1, . . . , x′n. The ε, δ is an upper bound
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on the privacy cost of the variables x′i in the loop body, and the resulting privacy
bound is restricted to only those variables. This allows variables for which the
programmer is not interested in tracking privacy to appear in Γ4 in the premise,
and the rule’s conclusion makes no claims about privacy for these variables. We
make use of this feature in all of our examples programs.
The gauss expression is a mechanism of (ε, δ)-differential privacy; other
mechanisms are used for other privacy variants. Like the loop expression,
mechanism expressions take a list of variables to indicate which variables should
be considered in the final privacy cost. The typing rule (Gauss) is similar in spirit
to Loop: it takes parameters to the mechanism which must be statically known
(encoded as singleton types), a list of variables to consider for the purposes of
the resulting privacy bound, and a term {e} for which there is a bound ṙ on
the sensitivity of free variables x1, . . . , xn. The resulting privacy guarantee is
that the term in brackets {e} is ε, δ differentially private. Whereas loop and
advanced composition consider a privacy term loop body with an upper bound
on privacy leakage, gauss considers a sensitivity term body with an upper bound
on its sensitivity.
5.1.6 Metatheory
We denote sensitivity language terms e ∈ exp into total, functional, linear
maps between metric spaces—the same model as the terminating fragment of
Fuzz. Every term in our language terminates by design, which dramatically
simplifies our models and proofs. This restriction poses no issues in implementing
most differentially private machine learning algorithms, because such algorithms
typically terminate in a statically determined number of loop iterations in order
to achieve a particular privacy cost.
Types in Duet denote metric spaces, as in Fuzz. We notate metric spaces D,
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their underlying carrier set ‖ D ‖, and their distance metric |x− y|D, or |x− y|
where D can be inferred from context. Sensitivity typing judgments Γ ` e : τ
denote linear maps from a scaled cartesian product interpretation of Γ:
JΓ {x1:s1τ1, . . . ,xn:snτn} ` τK , !s1Jτ1K⊗ · · · ⊗ !snJτnK( JτK
Although we do not make metric space scaling explicit in our syntax (for the
purposes of effective type inference, a la DFuzz De Amorim et al. (2014)), scaling
becomes apparent explicitly in our model. Privacy judgments Γ ` e : τ denote
probabilistic, privacy preserving maps from an unscaled product interpretation
of Γ:
JΓ {x1:p1τ1, . . . ,xn:pnτn} ` τK , (Jτ1K@p1, . . . ,JτnK@pn)(∗‖ JτK ‖
The multi-arity (ε, δ)-differential-privacy-preserving map is defined:
(D1@(ε1, δ1), . . . ,Dn@(εn, δn))(∗ X ,
{ f ∈‖ D1 ‖ × · · · × ‖ Dn ‖→ D(X)
| |xi − y|Di ≤ 1⇒ Pr[f(x1, . . . ,xi, . . . ,xn) = d]
≤ eεiPr[f(x1, . . . ,y, . . . ,xn) = d] + δi }
where D(X) is a distribution over elements in X.
We give a full semantic account of typing in the extended version of this
paper Near et al. (2019a), as well as prove key type soundness lemmas, many of
which appeal to well-known differential privacy proofs from the literature.
The final soundness theorem, proven by induction over typing derivations, is
that the denotations for well-typed open terms es and ep in well-typed environ-
ments γs and γp are contained in the denotation of their typing contexts Γs ` τ
and Γp ` τ .
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Theorem 5.1.1.
1. If Γp ` ep : τ and Γp ` γp then JepKγp ∈ JΓp ` τK
2. If Γs ` es : τ and Γs ` γs then JesKγs ∈ JΓs ` τK
A corollary is that any well-typed privacy lambda function satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy for each of its arguments w.r.t. that argument’s privacy
annotation used in typing.
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Chapter 6
Machine Learning in Duet
6.1 Language Tools for Machine Learning
Machine learning algorithms typically operate over a training set of samples,
and implementations of these algorithms often represent datasets using matrices.
To express these algorithms, Duet includes a core matrix API which encodes
sensitivity and privacy properties of matrix operations.
We add a matrix type Mc`[m,n] τ , encode vectors as single-row matrices, and
add typing rules for gradient computations that encode desirable properties. We
also introduce a type for matrix indices idx[n] for type-safe indexing. These new
types are shown in Figure 6.2, along with sensitivity operations on matrices—
encoded as library functions because their types can be encoded using existing
connectives—and new matrix-level differential PprivacyP mechanisms—encoded
as primitive syntactic forms because their types cannot be expressed using
existing type-level connectives.
In the matrix type Mc`[m,n] τ , the m and n parameters refer to the number
of rows and columns in the matrix, respectively. The ` parameter determines
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the distance metric used for the matrix metric for the purposes of sensitivity
analysis; the c parameter is used to specify a norm bound on each row of the
matrix, which will be useful when applying gradient functions.
6.1.1 Distance Metrics for Matrices
Differentially private machine learning algorithms typically move from one
distance metric on matrices and vectors to another as the algorithm progresses.
For example, two input training datasets are neighbors if they differ on exactly
one sample (i.e. one row of the matrix), but they may differ arbitrarily in that
row. After computing a gradient, the algorithm may consider the L2 sensitivity of
the resulting vector—i.e. two gradients g1 and g2 are neighbors if ‖ g1−g2 ‖2≤ 1.
These are very different notions of distance—but the first is required by the
definition of differential privacy, and the second is required as a condition on the
input to the Gaussian mechanism.
The ` annotation on matrix types in Duet enables specifying the desired
notion of distance between rows. The annotation is one of L∞, L1, or L2; an
annotation of L∞, for example, means that the distance between two rows is
equal to the L∞ norm of the difference between the rows. The distance between
two matrices is always equal to the sum of the distances between rows. The
distance metric for the element datatype τ determines the distance between
two corresponding elements, and the row metric ` specifies how to combine
elementwise distances to determine the distance between two rows.
Figure 6.1 presents the complete set of distance metrics for matrices, as well
as real numbers and the new domain data for elements of the D type, which is
operationally a copy of R but with a discrete distance metric. Many combinations
are possible, including the following common ones:
Ex. 1: |X −X ′|MUL∞[m,n] D =
∑
i
maxj |Xi,j −X ′i,j |D
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Domain Carrier : X ∈ set Metric: | − | ∈ X → X → R ] {∞}
real R |r1 − r2| , |r1 − r2|R
data R |r1 − r2| ,
{
0 when r1 = r2
1 when r1 6= r2
matrix[n1, n2]L∞(D) M[n1, n2](‖ D ‖) |m1 −m2| ,
∑
i
maxj |m1[i, j]−m2[i, j]|D










Figure 6.1: Distance Metrics for Matrices
Distance is the number of rows on which X and X ′ differ ; commonly used to
describe neighboring input datasets.





|Xi,j −X ′i,j |R
Distance is the sum of elementwise differences.





|Xi,j −X ′i,j |2R
Distance is sum of the L2 norm of the differences between corresponding rows.
Ex. 4: |X −X ′|MUL2[1,n] R =
√∑
j
|X1,j −X ′1,j |2R
Represents a vector; distance is L2 sensitivity for vectors, as required by the
Gaussian mechanism.
These distance metrics are used in the types of library functions which operate
over matrices.
6.1.2 Matrix Operations
Figure 6.2 summarizes the matrix operations available in Duet’s API. We focus
on the non-standard operations which are designed specifically for sensitivity or
privacy applications. For example, fr-sens allows converting between notions of
distance between rows; when converting from L2 to L1, the distance between
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` ∈ norm ::= L1 | L2 | L∞ c ∈ clip ::= ` | U τ ∈ type := . . . | D | idx[n] | Mc`[n, n] τ
rows : Mc`[m, n] τ (0 N[m] convert : M``′ [m, n] D(1 MU`[m, n] R
cols : Mc`[m, n] τ (0 N[n] clip` : Mc`′ [m, n] D(1 M``′ [m, n] D
discf : (τ (∞ R)(1 τ (1 D fr-sensL∞ : McL∞[m, n] τ (√n McL2[m, n] τ
undisc : D(∞ R fr-sensL2 : McL2[m, n] τ (√n McL1[m, n] τ
transpose : McL1[m, n] τ (1 MUL1[n, m] τ to-sens` : McL1[m, n] τ (1 Mc`[m, n] τ
mcreate : N[m](0 N[n](0 (idx[m](∞ idx[n](∞ τ)(mn MUL1[m, n] τ
# [ , ] : Mc`[m, n] τ (1 idx[m](∞ idx[n](∞ τ
# [ , 7→ ] : Mc`[m, n] τ (1 idx[m](∞ idx[n](∞ τ (1 MU`[m, n] τ
fld : (τ1 (s1 τ2 (s2 τ3)(mn τ2 (smn2 M
c
L1[m, n] τ1 (s1 τ2
map : (τ1 (s τ2)(mn Mc`[m, n] τ1 (s MU`[m, n] τ2
fld-row : (τ1 (s1 τ2 (s2 τ2)(m τ2 (s2m Mc`[m, n] τ1 (s1 MU`[m, 1] τ2
map-row : (M`c11 [1, n1] τ1 (s M`c22 [1, n2] τ2)(m M`c11 [m, n1] τ1 (s M`c22 [m, n2] τ2
L ∇g` [ ; , ] : M
`
`′ [1, n] R(∞ M``′′ [1, n] D(1 D(1 MU`[1, n] R
U ∇[ ; , ] : M``′ [1, n] R(∞ M`
′′
L∞[1, n] D(1 D(1 MUL∞[1, n] D
above-threshold : (Mc`[1, n] (τ (1 R)@∞, R+[ε]@0, τ@〈ε, 0〉, R@∞)(* idx[n]
pfld-rows : (Mc1L∞[m, n1] D@〈ε, δ〉, M
c2
L∞[m, n2] D@〈ε, δ〉,
((Mc1L∞[1, n1] D@〈ε, δ〉, M
c2
L∞[1, n2] D@〈ε, δ〉, D@∞)(* τ)@∞,
τ@∞
)(* τ
sample : (N[m2]@〈0, 0〉,
McL∞[m1, n1] D@〈2m2ε1/m1, m2δ1/m1〉, McL∞[m1, n2] D@〈2m2ε2/m1, m2δ2/m1〉,
((McL∞[m2, n1] D@〈ε1, δ1〉, McL∞[m2, n2] D@〈ε2, δ2〉)(* τ)@∞
)(* τ
Γ ` e : τ
MGauss
Γ1 ` e1 : R+[_r]
Γ2 ` e2 : R+[ε] Γ3 ` e3 : R+[δ] Γ4 + ebΓ5cdṙ{x1,...,xn} ` e4 : M
c
L2[m, n] R
eΓ1 + Γ2 + Γ3d0,0 + eΓ4d∞ + eΓ5dε,δ ` mgauss[e1, e2, e3] <x1, . . . , xn> {e4} : MUL∞[m, n] R
Exponential
Γ1 ` e1 : R+[_r]
Γ2 ` e2 : R+[ε] Γ3 ` e3 : Mc`[1, m](τ) Γ4 + ebΓ5cdṙ{x1,...,xn} ] {x :∞ τ} ` e4 : R
eΓ1 + Γ2d0,0 + eΓ3 + Γ4d∞ + eΓ5dε,0 ` exponential[e1, e2] <x1, . . . , xn> e3 {x⇒ e4} : τ
Figure 6.2: Matrix Typing Rules
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two rows may increase by
√
n (by Cauchy-Schwarz), so the corresponding version
of fr-sens has a sensitivity annotation of
√
n.
undisc allows converting from discrete to standard reals, and is infinitely
sensitive. discf allows converting an infinitely sensitive function which returns a
real to a 1-sensitive function returning a discrete real; we can recover a 1-sensitive
function from reals to discrete reals (disc : R(1 D) by applying discf to the
identity function.
Pabove-thresholdP encodes the Sparse Vector Technique Dwork et al. (2014a),
discussed in the extended version of this paper Near et al. (2019a). Ppfld-rowsP
encodes parallel composition of privacy mechanisms, and is discussed in Sec-
tion 7.1.5. P sampleP performs random subsampling with privacy amplification,
and is discussed in Section 7.1.4.
Gradients are computed using L ∇gM`M [ ; , ] and U ∇[ ; , ]. The first
represents an `-Lipschitz gradient (typical in convex optimization problems like
logistic regression) like the gradient function introduced in Section 5.1.2; it is
a 1-sensitive function which produces a matrix of real numbers. The second
represents a gradient without a known Lipschitz constant (typical in non-convex
optimization problems, including training neural networks); it produces a matrix
of discrete reals. We demonstrate applications of both in Section 7.1.
In order to produce a matrix with sensitivity bound L2, L ∇gML2M requires
input of type MML2` [m, n] DM for any `. We obtain such a matrix by clipping,
a common operation in differentially private machine learning. Clipping scales




‖xi‖c if ‖ xi ‖c> 1
xi if ‖ xi ‖c≤ 1
The clipping process is encoded in Duet as clip (Figure 6.2), which introduces
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a new bound on the c norm of its output.
6.1.3 Vector-Valued Privacy Mechanisms
Both the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms are capable of operating directly
over vectors; the Laplace mechanism adds noise calibrated to the L1 sensitivity
of the vector, while the Gaussian mechanism uses its L2 sensitivity. With the
addition of matrices to Duet, we can introduce typing rules for these vector-
valued mechanisms, using single-row matrices to represent vectors. We present
the typing rule for MGauss in Figure 6.2; the rule for MLaplace is similar.
We also introduce a typing rule for the exponential mechanism, which picks one




Case Studies in Duet
7.1 Case Studies
In this section, we demonstrate the use of Duet to express and verify a number
of different algorithms for differentially private machine learning.
There are four basic approaches to differentially private convex optimization:
input perturbation Chaudhuri et al. (2011), objective perturbation Chaudhuri
et al. (2011), gradient perturbation Song et al. (2013); Bassily et al. (2014b),
and output perturbation Chaudhuri et al. (2011); Wu et al. (2017). Of these,
the latter three are known to provide competitive accuracy, and the latter two
(gradient perturbation and output perturbation) are the most widely used; our
first two case studies verify these two techniques. Our third case study verifies
the noisy Frank-Wolfe algorithm Talwar et al. (2015), a variant of gradient
perturbation especially suited to high-dimensional datasets.
Our next three case studies demonstrate the use of Duet to verify commonly-
used variations on the above algorithms, including various kinds of minibatching
and a gradient clipping approach used in deep learning. Our final three case stud-
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ies explore techniques for preprocessing input datasets so that the preconditions
of the above algorithms are satisfied.
In Section 7.1.6, we discuss the use of Duet to combine all of these
components—many of which leverage different variants of differential privacy—to
build a complete machine learning system. Our case studies are summarized in
the following table.
Technique Ref. § Privacy Concept
Optimization Algorithms
Noisy Gradient Descent Bassily et al. (2014b) 7.1.1 Composition
Gradient Descent w/ Output Perturbation Wu et al. (2017) 7.1.2 Parallel comp. (sens.)
Noisy Frank-Wolfe Talwar et al. (2015) 7.1.3 Exponential mechanism
Variations on Gradient Descent
Minibatching Bassily et al. (2014b) 7.1.4 Ampl. by sampling
Parallel-composition minibatching — 7.1.5 Parallel composition
Gradient clipping Abadi et al. (2016) † Sensitivity bounds
Preprocessing & Deployment
Hyperparameter tuning Chaudhuri and Vinterbo (2013) † Exponential mechanism
Adaptive clipping — † Sparse Vector Technique
Z-Score normalization skl (2019) † Composition
Combining All of the Above 7.1.6 Composition
7.1.1 Noisy Gradient Descent
We begin with a fully-worked version of the differentially-private gradient descent
algorithm from Section 5.1.2. This algorithm was first proposed by Song et
al. Song et al. (2013) and later refined by Bassily et al. Bassily et al. (2014b).
Gradient descent is a simple but effective training algorithm in machine learning,
and has been applied in a wide range of contexts, from simple linear models to
deep neural networks. The program below implements noisy gradient descent
in Duet (without minibatching, though we will extend it with minibatching
in Section 7.1.4). It performs k iterations of gradient descent, starting from an
initial guess θ0 consisting of all zeros. At each iteration, the algorithm computes
a noisy gradient using noisy-grad, scales the gradient by the learning rate η, and
† these case studies appear in this paper Near et al. (2019a).
60
subtracts the result from the current model θ to arrive at the updated model.
noisy-grad(θ,X, y, ε, δ) ,
let s = R[1. 0]/real (rows X) in
let z = zeros (cols X) in
let gs = mmap-row (sλ Xi yi ⇒
L ∇LRL2[θ; Xi, yi]) X y in
let g = fld-row (sλ x1 x2 ⇒ x1 + x2) z gs in
let gs = map (sλ x⇒ s · x) g in
mgauss[s, ε, δ] <X, y> {gs}
zeros(n) , mcreateL∞ 1 n (sλ i j ⇒ 0.0)
noisy-gradient-descent(X, y, k, η, ε, δ) ,
let X1 = box (mclip
L2 X) in
let θ0 = zeros (cols X1) in
loop[δ′] k on θ0 <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒
gp ← noisy-grad θ (unbox X1) y ε δ ;
return θ − η·gp }
Under (ε, δ)-differential privacy, Duet derives a total privacy cost of
(2ε
√
2k log(1/δ′), kδ + δ′)-differential privacy for this implementation, which
matches the total cost manually proven by Bassily et al. Bassily et al. (2014b).
Duet can also derive a total cost for other privacy variants: the same program
satisfies kρ-zCDP, or (α, kε)-RDP.
7.1.2 Output Perturbation Gradient Descent
An alternative to gradient perturbation is output perturbation—adding noise to
the final trained model, rather than during the training process. Wu et al. Wu
et al. (2017) present a competitive algorithm based on this idea, which works
by bounding the total sensitivity (rather than privacy) of the iterative gradient
descent process. Their algorithm leverages parallel composition for sensitivity:
it divides the dataset into small chunks called minibatches, and each iteration
of the algorithm processes one minibatch. A single pass over all minibatches
(and thus, the whole dataset) is often called an epoch. If the dataset has size
m and each minibatch is of size b, then each epoch comprises m/b iterations of
the training algorithm. This approach to minibatching is often used (without
privacy) in deep learning. The sensitivity of a complete epoch in this technique
is just 1/b.
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gd-output-perturbation(xs, ys, k, η, ε, δ) ,
let m0 = zeros (cols X) in
let c = box (mclipL2 xs) in
let s = real k/real b in
mgauss[s, ε, δ] <xs, ys> {
loop k on m0 { a, θ ⇒
mfold-row b, θ,unbox c, ys { θ, xb, yb⇒
let g = ∇LRL2 [θ ; xb, yb] in
θ-η·g } } }
We encode parallel composi-
tion for sensitivity in Duet us-
ing the mfold-row function, de-
fined in Section 6.1, whose type
matches that of foldl for lists in
the Fuzz type system Reed and
Pierce (2010). mfold-row consid-
ers each row to be a “minibatch”
of size 1, but is easily extended to
consider multiple rows at a time (as in our encoding below). Duet derives a
sensitivity bound of k/b for the training process, and a total privacy cost of
(ε, δ)-differential privacy, matching the manual analysis of Wu et al. Wu et al.
(2017).
7.1.3 Noisy Frank-Wolfe
frank-wolfe X y k ε δ ,
let X1 = clip-matrixL∞ X in
let d = cols X in
let θ0 = zeros d in
let idxs = mcreateL∞[1,2·d]{i,j⇒
〈j mod d,sign(j-d)〉} in
ZCDP [δ] { loop k on θ0 {t, θ ⇒
let µ = 1. 0/((real t) + 2. 0) in
let g = L ∇LRL∞[θ; X1, y] in
〈i, s〉 ← EPS DP {
exponential[ 1
rows X1
, ε] idxs {〈i, s〉 ⇒
s·g # [0, i]} ;}
let gp = (zeros d)# [0, i 7→ s·100] in
return ((1.0− µ)·θ) + (µ·gp) } }
We next consider a variation
on gradient perturbation called
the private Frank-Wolfe algo-
rithm Talwar et al. (2015).
This algorithm has dimension-
independent utility, making
it useful for high-dimensional
datasets. In each iteration, the
algorithm takes a step of fixed
size in a single dimension, using
the exponential mechanism to
choose the best direction based
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on the gradient. The sensitiv-
ity of each update is therefore
dependent on the L∞ norm of each sample, rather than the L2 norm.
Our implementation uses the exponential mechanism to select the direction
in which the gradient has its maximum value, then updates θ in only the
selected dimension. To get the right sensitivity, we compute the gradient with
L ∇LRL∞, which requires an L∞ norm bound on its input and ensures bounded
L∞ sensitivity.
We mix several variants of differential privacy in this implementation. Each
use of the exponential mechanism provides ε-differential privacy; each itera-
tion of the loop satisfies 12ε






2 log(1/δ), δ)-differential privacy. The use of zCDP for composition is an
improvement over the manual analysis of Talwar et al. Talwar et al. (2015),
which used advanced composition.
7.1.4 Minibatching
An alternative form of minibatching to the one discussed in Section 7.1.2 is to
randomly sample a subset of of the data in each iteration. Bassily et al. Bassily
et al. (2014b) present an algorithm for differentially private stochastic gradient
descent based on this idea: their approach samples a single random example
from the training to compute the gradient in each iteration, and leverages the
idea of privacy amplification to improve privacy cost. The privacy amplification
lemma states that if mechanismM(D) provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy for the
datset D of size n, then runningM on uniformly random γn entries of D (for
γ ≤ 1) provides (2γε, γδ)-differential privacy Bassily et al. (2014b); Wang et al.
(2018) (this bound is loose, but used here for readability).
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minibatch-gradient-descent X y k b η ε δ ,
let X1 = clip-matrix X in
loop [δ] k on zeros (cols X1) <X1, y> {t, θ ⇒
sample b on X1, y {X′1, y′ ⇒
gp ← noisy-grad θ X′1 y′ ε δ ; return θ-η·gp }}
We encode the privacy
amplification lemma in
Duet using the sample
construct defined in Sec-
tion 6.1. Similar privacy
amplification lemmas ex-
ist for RDP Wang et al. (2018) and tCDP Bun et al. (2018), but not for zCDP.
We can use sampling with privacy amplification to implement minibatching SGD
in Duet. Under (ε, δ)-differential privacy with privacy amplification, Duet
derives a total privacy cost of (4(b/m)ε
√
2k log(1/δ′), (b/m)kδ + δ′)-differential
privacy for this algorithm, which is equivalent to the manual proof of Bassily et
al. Bassily et al. (2014b).
7.1.5 Parallel-Composition Minibatching
As a final form of minibatching, we consider extending the parallel composition
approach used by Wu et al. Wu et al. (2017) for sensitivity to parallel composition
of privacy mechanisms for minibatching in the gradient perturbation approach
from Section 7.1.1. Since the minibatches are disjoint in this approach, we
can leverage the parallel composition property for privacy mechanisms (McSh-
erry McSherry (2009), Theorem 4; Dwork & Lei Dwork and Lei (2009), Corollary
20), which states that running an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism k times
on k disjoint subsets of a database yields (ε, δ)-differential privacy. We encode
this concept in Duet using the pfld-rows construct defined in Section 6.1. The
arguments to pfld-rows include the dataset and a function representing an
(ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism, and pfld-rows ensures (ε, δ)-differential
privacy for the dataset. This version considers minibatches of size 1, and is
easily extended to consider other sizes. We can use pfld-rows to implement
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epoch-based minibatching with gradient perturbation, even for privacy variants
like zCDP which do not admit sampling:
epoch b ρ η ,
pλ xs ys θ ⇒
let s = R+[1. 0]/real b in
g← mgauss[s, ρ] <xs, ys> {∇LR [θ ; xs, ys] } ;
return θ-η·g
epoch-minibatch-GD X y ρ η k b ,
let m0 = zeros (cols xs) in
loop k on m0 <X, y> {a, θ ⇒
pfld-rows(b, θ,mclipL2 X, y, epoch b ρ η)
}
This algorithm is similar in concept to the output perturbation approach
of Wu et al. Wu et al. (2017), but leverages parallel composition of privacy
mechanisms for gradient perturbation instead, and has not been previously
published. The algorithm runs k epochs with a batch size of b, for a total of kb
iterations. Duet derives a privacy cost of kρ-zCDP for the algorithm.
7.1.6 Composing Privacy Variants to Build Complete Learn-
ing Systems
adaptiveClippingGradientDescent xs ys k ε δ ηs bs ,
means← colMeans(xs, ε, δ, bs);
scales← EPS_DP { colScaleParams(xs, ε, bs, means) };
let xsn = box (normalize xs means scales) in
η ← pick_η(unbox xsn, ys, k, ε, δ, ηs);








ential privacy often requires mixing privacy variants in order to obtain optimal
results. We can use Duet’s ability to mix variants of differential privacy to
combine components in a way that optimizes the use of the privacy budget. We
demonstrate this ability with an example that performs several data-dependent
analyses as pre-processing steps before training a model. Our example uses
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Duet’s ability to mix variants to compose z-score normalization (using both pure
ε and (ε, δ)-differential privacy), hyperparameter tuning (with (ε, δ)-differential





8.1 Implementation & Evaluation
This section describes our implementation of Duet, and our empirical evaluation
of Duet’s ability to produce accurate differentially private models. Our results
demonstrate that the state-of-the-art privacy bounds derivable by Duet can
result in huge gains in accuracy for a given level of privacy.
8.1.1 Implementation & Typechecking Performance
Technique LOC Time (ms)
Noisy G.D. 23 0.51ms
G.D. + Output Pert. 25 0.39ms
Noisy Frank-Wolfe 31 0.59ms
Minibatching 26 0.51ms
Parallel minibatching 42 0.65ms
Gradient clipping 21 0.40ms
Hyperparameter tuning 125 3.87ms
Adaptive clipping 68 1.01ms
Z-Score normalization 104 1.51ms
Figure 8.1: Summary of Typechecking Perfor-
mance on Case Study Programs
We have implemented a proto-
type of Duet in Haskell that
includes type inference of pri-
vacy bounds, and an inter-
preter that runs on all exam-
ples described in this paper.
We do not implement Hindley-
Milner-style constraint-based
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type inference of quantified
types; our type inference is
syntax-directed and limited to
construction of privacy bounds
as symbolic formulas over input
variables. Our implementation of type inference roughly follows the bottom-up
approach of DFuzz’s implementation De Amorim et al. (2014). Type checking
requires solving constraints over symbolic expressions containing log and square
root operations. Prior work (DFuzz and HOARe2) uses an SMT solver during
typechecking to check validity of these constraints, but SMT solvers typically
do not support operators like log and square root, and struggle in the presence
of non-linear formulas. Because of these limitations, we implement a custom
solver for inequalities over symbolic real expressions instead of relying on support
from off-the-shelf solvers. Our custom solver is based on a simple decidable (but
incomplete) theory which supports log and square root operations, and a more
general subset of non-linear (polynomial) formulas than typical SMT theories.
The Duet typechecker demonstrates very practical performance. Figure 8.1
summarizes the number of lines of code and typechecking time for each of our
case study programs; even medium-size programs with many functions typecheck
in just a few milliseconds.
8.1.2 Evaluation of Private Gradient Descent and Private
Frank-Wolfe
We also study the accuracy of the models produced by the Duet implementations
of private gradient descent and private Frank-Wolfe in Section 7.1. We evaluate
both algorithms on 4 datasets. Details about the datasets can be found in
Figure 8.2.
68
We ran both algorithms on each dataset with per-iteration εi ∈
{0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1} and then used Duet to derive the corresponding total
privacy cost. We fixed δ = 1n2 , where n is the size of the dataset. For private
gradient descent, we set η = 1.0, and for private Frank-Wolfe we set the size of
each corner c = 100.
We randomly shuffled each dataset, then chose 80% of the dataset as training
data and reserved 20% for testing. We ran each training algorithm 5 times on
the training data, and take the average testing error over all 5, to account for






Figure 8.2: Dataset Used in Accu-
racy Evaluation
We present the results in Figure 8.3.
Both algorithms are capable of generating
accurate models at reasonable values of ε.
Note that all three models in the results pro-
vide exactly the same privacy guarantee for
a given value of ε, yet their accuracies vary
significantly—demonstrating the advantages































































































Adv. Comp. Rényi DP zCDP










Differential privacy enables general statistical analysis of data with formal
guarantees of privacy protection at the individual level. Tools that assist data
analysts with utilizing differential privacy have frequently taken the form of
programming languages and libraries. However, many existing programming
languages designed for compositional verification of differential privacy impose
significant burden on the programmer (in the form of complex type annotations).
Supplementary library support for privacy analysis built on top of existing
general-purpose languages has been more usable, but incapable of pervasive
end-to-end enforcement of sensitivity analysis and privacy composition.
We introduce DDuo, a dynamic analysis for enforcing differential privacy.
DDuo is usable by non-experts: its analysis is automatic and it requires no
additional type annotations. DDuo can be implemented as a library for existing
programming languages; we present a reference implementation in Python which
features moderate runtime overheads on realistic workloads. We include support
for several data types, distance metrics and operations which are commonly
used in modern machine learning programs. We also provide initial support for
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tracking the sensitivity of data transformations in popular Python libraries for
data analysis.
We formalize the novel core of the DDuo system and prove it sound for
sensitivity analysis via a logical relation for metric preservation. We also illustrate
DDuo’s usability and flexibility through various case studies which implement
state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms.
Both static and dynamic tools have been developed to help non-experts
write differentially private programs. Many of the static tools take the form of
statically-typed programming languages, where correct privacy analysis is built
into the soundness of the type system. However, existing language-oriented tools
for compositional verification of differential privacy impose significant burden
on the programmer (in the form of additional type annotations) (Reed and
Pierce, 2010; Gaboardi et al., 2013b; Near et al., 2019b; de Amorim et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019a; Winograd-Cort et al., 2017; Barthe et al., 2019, 2012, 2013,
2016b; Sato et al., 2019; Albarghouthi and Hsu, 2018; Zhang and Kifer, 2017;
Wang et al., 2019; Bichsel et al., 2018; Ding et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2020) (see
Chapter 25 for a longer discussion).
The best-known dynamic tool is PINQ (McSherry, 2009), a dynamic anal-
ysis for sensitivity and privacy. It features an extensible system which allows
non-experts in differential privacy to execute SQL-like queries against relational
databases. However, PINQ comes with several restrictions that limit its ap-
plicability. For example, PINQ’s expressiveness is limited to a subset of the
SQL language for relational databases. Methods in PINQ are assumed to be
side-effect free, which is necessary to preserve their privacy guarantee.
We introduce DDuo, a dynamic analysis for enforcing differential privacy.
DDuo is usable by non-experts: its analysis is automatic and it requires no
additional type annotations. DDuo can be implemented as a library for existing
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programming languages; we present a reference implementation in Python. Our
goal in this work is to answer the following four questions, based on the limitations
of PINQ:
• Can a PINQ-style dynamic analysis extend to base types in the programming
language, to allow its use pervasively?
• Is the analysis sound in the presence of side effects?
• Can we use this style of analysis for complex algorithms like differentially
private gradient descent?
• Can we extend the privacy analysis beyond pure ε-differential privacy?
We answer all four questions in the affirmative, building on PINQ in the following
ways:
• DDuo provides a dynamic analysis for base types in a general purpose
language (Python). DDuo supports general language operations, such as
mapping arbitrary functions over lists, and tracks the sensitivity (stability)
and privacy throughout.
• Methods in DDuo are not required to be side-effect free and allow pro-
grammers to mutate references inside functions which manipulate sensitive
values.
• DDuo supports various notions of sensitivity and arbitrary distance metrics
(including L1 and L2 distance).
• DDuo is capable of leveraging advanced privacy variants such as (ε, δ) and
Rényi differential privacy.
Privacy analysis is reliant on sensitivity analysis, which determines the scale
of noise an analyst must add to values in order to achieve any level of privacy.
Dynamic analysis for differential privacy is thus a dual challenge:
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9.1 Dynamic sensitivity analysis.
Program sensitivity is a (hyper)property quantified over two runs of a program
with related inputs (sources). A major challenge for dynamic sensitivity analysis
is the ability to bound sensitivity, ensuring that the metric preservation property
is satisfied, by only observing a single run of the program. In addition, an
analysis which is performed on a specific input to the program must generalize
to future possible arbitrary inputs.
The key insight to our solution is attaching sensitivity environments and
distance metric information to values rather than variables. Our approach
provides a sound upper bound on global sensitivity even in the presence of side
effects, conditionals, and higher-order functions. We present a proof using a
step-indexed logical relation which shows that our sensitivity analysis is sound.
9.2 Dynamic privacy analysis.
To implement a dynamic privacy analysis, we leverage prior work on privacy
filters and odometers (Rogers et al., 2016). This work, originally designed for
the adaptive choice of privacy parameters, can also be used as part of a dynamic
analysis for privacy analysis. We view each application of a privacy mechanism
(e.g. the Laplace mechanism) as a global privacy effect on total privacy cost, and
use privacy filters and odometers to track total privacy cost.
We implemented these features in a Python prototype of DDuo via object
proxies and other pythonic idioms. We implement several case studies to showcase
these features and demonstrate the usage of DDuo in practice. We also provide
integrations with several popular Python libraries for data and privacy analysis.
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9.3 Contributions.
In summary, DDuo makes the following contributions:
- We introduce DDuo, a dynamic analysis for enforcing differential privacy, and
a reference implementation as a Python library 1.
- We formalize a subset of DDuo in a core language model, and prove the
soundness of DDuo’s dynamic sensitivity analysis (as encoded in the model)
using a step-indexed logical relation.
- We present several case studies demonstrating the use of DDuo to build
practical, verified Python implementations of complex differentially private
algorithms.





DDuo is a dynamic analysis for enforcing differential privacy. Our approach does
not require static analysis of programs, and allows DDuo to be implemented as
a library for programming languages like Python. DDuo’s dynamic analysis has
complete access to run-time information, so it does not require the programmer
to write any additional type annotations—in many cases, DDuo can verify
differential privacy for essentially unmodified Python programs (see the case
studies in Chapter 15). As a Python library, DDuo is easily integrated with
popular libraries like Pandas and NumPy.
Challenges of dynamic analysis for differential privacy. Differential
privacy is an example of a hyperproperty—a property that relates two executions
of a program on two different inputs. Verifying a hyperproperty via dynamic
analysis is challenging, because in this setting, only one execution of the pro-
gram is observable. Control flow is particularly difficult: only one branch of a
conditional is visible to a dynamic analysis, for example, while a static analysis
can examine both branches. This is the key challenge of DDuo—to build a
sound dynamic analysis for a hyperproperty.
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Advantages and disadvantages of dynamic privacy analysis Dynamic
privacy analysis of general purpose programs is valuable due to its usability
and practicality for a wide variety of programmers. DDuo takes a lightweight
approach based on implementation around existing general-purpose languages
such as Python. A static analyzer for all of Python is unrealistic; and it would be
very inconvenient to learn an entirely new language with a confusing/unfamiliar
type system. Tools such as Python, Pandas, and NumPy are incredibly popular,
and a runtime privacy monitor built around these tools is much more convenient.
However there are also certain disadvantages to the dynamic approach: it is
impossible to obtain a privacy bound without running the program, and there
may be instrumentation overhead cost during runtime.
10.1 Threat model.
We assume an “honest but fallible” programmer—that is, the programmer intends
to produce a differentially private program, but may unintentionally introduce
bugs. We assume that the programmer is not intentionally attempting to subvert
DDuo’s enforcement approach. Our reference implementation is embedded in
Python, an inherently dynamic language with run-time features like reflection.
In this setting, a malicious programmer or privacy-violating third-party libraries
can bypass our dynamic monitor and extract sensitive information directly.
We allow several common side-effects such as reference mutation, printing,
reading/writing files, etc. Note that printing/writing sensitive values in DDuo
will reveal the type of the value, but not the actual value. Data-independent
exceptions can be safely used in our system, however our model must explicitly
avoid data-dependent exceptions such as division-by-zero errors. Terminated
programs can be rerun safely (while consuming the privacy budget) because our
analysis is independent of any sensitive information (our metatheory implies that
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sensitivity of a value is itself not sensitive). We also do not address side-channels,
including execution time. Like existing enforcement approaches (PINQ, OpenDP,
Diffprivlib), DDuo is intended as a tool to help well-intentioned programmers
produce correct differentially private algorithms.
Soundness of the analysis. We formalize our dynamic sensitivity analysis
and prove its soundness in Chapter 14. Our formalization includes the most
challenging features of the dynamic setting—conditionals and side effects—and
provides evidence that our Python implementation will be effective in catching
privacy bugs in real programs. DDuo relies on existing work on privacy filters
and odometers (discussed in Chapter 13), whose soundness has been previously




This chapter introduces the DDuo system via examples written using our
reference Python implementation.
Data Sources. Data sources are wrappers around sensitive data that enable
tracking of privacy information in the DDuo python library. Each data source is
associated with an identifying string, such as the name of the input file the data
was read from. Data sources can be created manually by attaching an identifying
string (such as a filename) to a raw value (such as a vector). Or, data sources be
created automatically upon loading data through DDuo’s custom-wrapped third
party APIs, such as pandas. Note that our API can be easily modified to account
for initial sensitivities greater than 1 when users have multiple datapoints in the
input data.




Sensitive(<'DataFrame'>, {data.csv 7→ 1}, L∞)
A Sensitive value is returned. Sensitive values represent sensitive infor-
mation that cannot be viewed by the analyst. When a Sensitive value is printed
out, the analyst sees (1) the type of the value, (2) its sensitivity environment,
and (3) its distance metric. The latter two components are described next. The
analyst is prevented from viewing the value itself.
11.1 Sensitivity & distance metrics.
Function sensitivity is a scalar value which represents how much a change in
a function’s input will change the function’s output. For example, the binary
addition function f(x, y) = x+y is 1-sensitive in both x and y, because changing
either input by n will change the sum by n. The function f(x) = x+ x, on the
other hand, is 2-sensitive in its argument x, because changing x by n changes
the function’s output by 2n. Sensitivity is key to differential privacy because it
is directly proportional to the amount of noise we must add to the output of a
function to make it private.
A sensitivity environment is a mapping of program variables to their sensitiv-
ities. For example, in the program f(x) = x+ x, the sensitivity ennvironment is
x : 2. In the program f(x, y) = x+ y, the sensitivity environment is x : 1, y : 1.
Note that the identity function f(x) = x that does nothing with its input and
simply returns it as output has a sensitivity environment of x : 1, y : 1
DDuo tracks the sensitivity of a value to changes in the program’s inputs
using a sensitivity environment mapping input data sources to sensitivities. Our
example program returned a Sensitive value with a sensitivity environment of
{data. csv 7→ 1}, indicating that the underlying value is 1-sensitive in the data
contained in data. csv . The DDuo library tracks and updates the sensitivity
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environments of Sensitive objects as operations are applied to them. For
example, adding a constant value to the elements of the DataFrame results in
no change to the sensitivity environment.
df + 5 # no change to sensitivity environment
Sensitive(<'DataFrame'>, {data.csv 7→ 1}, L∞)
Adding the DataFrame to itself doubles the sensitivity, in the same way as the
function f(x) = x+ x.
df + df # doubles the sensitivity
Sensitive(<'DataFrame'>, {data.csv 7→ 2}, L∞)
Finally, multiplying the DataFrame by a constant scales the sensitivity, and
multiplying the DataFrame by itself results in infinite sensitivity.
( df * 5, df * df)
( Sensitive(<'DataFrame'>, {data.csv 7→ 5}, L∞),
Sensitive(<'DataFrame'>, {data.csv 7→ ∞}, L∞) )
The distance metric component of a Sensitive value describes how to
measure sensitivity. For simple numeric functions like f(x) = x+ x, the distance
between two possible inputs x and x′ is simply |x−x′| (this is called the cartesian
metric). For more complicated data structures (e.g. DataFrames), calculating
the distance between two values is more involved. The L∞ metric used in
our example calculates the distance between two DataFrames by measuring
how many rows are different (this is one standard way of defining “neighboring
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databases” in differential privacy). DDuo’s handling of distance metrics is
detailed in Section 12.2.
11.2 Privacy.
DDuo also tracks the privacy of computations. To achieve differential privacy,
programs add noise to sensitive values. The Laplace mechanism described earlier
is one basic mechanism for achieving differential privacy by adding noise drawn
from the Laplace distribution (DDuo provides a number of basic mechanisms,
including the Gaussian mechanism). The following expression counts the number
of rows in our example DataFrame and uses the Laplace mechanism to achieve
ε-differential privacy, for ε = 1.0.
dduo.laplace(df.shape[0], ε=1.0)
9.963971319623278
The result is a regular Python value—the analyst is free to view it, write it to a
file, or do further computation on it. Once the correct amount of noise has been
added, the principle of post-processing applies, and so DDuo no longer needs to
track the sensitivity or privacy cost of operations on the value.
When the Laplace mechanism is used multiple times, their privacy costs
compose (i.e. the εs “add up” as described earlier). DDuo tracks total privacy
cost using objects called privacy odometers (Rogers et al., 2016). The analyst
can interact with a privacy odometer object to learn the total privacy cost of a
complex computation.
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with dduo.EpsOdometer() as odo:
_ = dduo.laplace(df.shape[0], ε = 1.0)
_ = dduo.laplace(df.shape[0], ε = 1.0)
print(odo)
Odometer_ε({data.csv 7→ 2.0})
Printing the odometer’s value allows the analyst to view the privacy cost of the
program with respect to each of the data sources used in the computation. In
this example, two differentially private approximations of the number of rows in
the dataframe df are computed, each with a privacy cost of ε = 1.0. The total
privacy cost of running the program is therefore 2·ε = 2.0.
DDuo also allows the analyst to place upper bounds on total privacy cost (i.e.
a privacy budget) using privacy filters (Rogers et al., 2016). Privacy odometers




DDuo implements a dynamic sensitivity analysis by wrapping values in Sensitive
objects and calculating sensitivities as operations are performed on these objects.
Type systems for sensitivity (Reed and Pierce, 2010; Gaboardi et al., 2013b)
construct a sensitivity environment for each program expression; in the static
analysis setting, a sensitivity environment records the expression’s sensitivity
with respect to each of the variables currently in scope.
DDuo attaches sensitivity environments to values at runtime: each Sensitive
object holds both a value and its sensitivity environment. As described earlier,
DDuo’s sensitivity environments record a value’s sensitivity with respect to each
of the program’s data sources.






Where d is a distance metric over the values x and y could take (distance metrics
are discussed in Section 12.2). Thus, a sensitivity environment {a 7→ 1} means
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that if the value of the program input a changes by n, then the value of f(a)
will change by at most n.
12.1 Bounding the Sensitivity of Operations
Operations on Sensitive objects are defined to perform the same operation
on the underlying values, and also construct a new sensitivity environment for
the operation’s result. For example, DDuo’s __add__ operation sums both the
underlying values and their sensitivity environments:
def __add__(self, other):
assert self.metric == other.metric
return dduo.Sensitive(self.value + other.value,
self.senv + other.senv,
self.metric)
The sum of two sensitivity environments is defined as the element-wise sum of
their items. For example:
{a 7→ 2, b 7→ 1}+ {b 7→ 3, c 7→ 5} = {a 7→ 2, b 7→ 4, c 7→ 5}
The DDuo library provides sensitivity-aware versions of Python’s basic numeric
operations (formalized in Chapter 14). We have also defined sensitivity-aware
versions of commonly-used library functions, including the Pandas functions
used in Chapter ??, and subsets of NumPy and Scikit-learn.
12.2 Distance Metrics
At the core of the concept of sensitivity is the notion of distance: how far apart
we consider two information sources to be from each other. For scalar values,
the following two distance metrics are often used:
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• Cartesian (absolute difference) metric: d(x, y) = |x− y|
• Discrete metric: d(x, y) = 0 if x = y; 1 otherwise
For more complex structures—like lists and dataframes—we can use distance
metrics on vectors. Two commonly-used metrics for vectors x and y of equal
length are:








Both metrics are parameterized by di, a metric for the vector’s elements. In
addition to these two, we use the shorthand L∞ to mean L1(d), where d is the
cartesian metric defined above. The L∞ metric works for any space with equality
(e.g. strings), and measures the number of elements where x and y differ.
The definition of differential privacy is parameterized by a distance metric that
is intended to capture the idea of two inputs that differ in one individual’s data.
Database-oriented algorithms typically assume that each individual contributes
exactly one row to the database, and use the L∞ metric to define neighboring
databases (as we did in Chapter ??).
Distance metrics can be manipulated manually through operations such
as clipping, a technique commonly employed in differentially private machine
learning. DDuo tracks distance metrics for Sensitive information, which can
allow for automatic conservation of the privacy budget while providing more
accurate query analysis.
Lists and arrays are compared by one of the L1, L2, or L∞ distance metrics.
The choice of distance metric is important when defining sensitivity and thus
privacy. For example, the Laplace mechanism can only be used with the L1
metric, while the Gaussian mechanism can be used with either L1 or L2.
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12.3 Conditionals & Side Effects
Conditionals and other branching structures are challenging for any sensitiv-
ity analysis, but they present a particular challenge for our dynamic analysis.
Consider the following conditional:
if df.shape[0] == 10:
return df.shape[0]
else:
return df.shape[0] * 10000
Here, the two branches have different sensitivities (the else branch is 10,000
times more sensitive in its data sources than the then branch). Static sensitivity
analyses handle this situation by taking the maximum of the two branches’
sensitivities (i.e. they assume the worst-case branch is executed), but this
approach is not possible in our dynamic analysis.
In addition, special care must be taken when a sensitive value appears in the
guard position (as in our example). Static analyses typically scale the branches’
sensitivity by the sensitivity of the guard; in practice, this approach results in
infinite sensitivity for conditionals with a sensitive guard.
To retain soundness in our dynamic analysis, DDuo requires that conditional
guards contain no sensitive values. A run-time error is thrown if DDuo finds
a sensitive value in the guard position (as in our example above). Disallowing
sensitive guards makes it possible to ignore branches that are not executed:
the guard’s value remains the same under neighboring program inputs, so the
program follows the same branch for neighboring executions. This approach
does not limit the set of useful programs we can write, since conditionals with
sensitive guards yield infinite sensitivities even under a precise static analysis.
Since DDuo attaches sensitivity environments to values (instead of variables),
88
the use of side effects does not affect the soundness of the analysis. When a
program variable is updated to reference a new value, that value’s sensitivity
environment remains attached. DDuo handles many common side-effect-based
patterns used in Python this way; for example, DDuo correctly infers that the
following program results in the variable total holding a value that is 20 times
more sensitive than df.shape[0].
total = 0
for i in range(20):
total = total + df.shape[0]
For side effects, our dynamic analysis is more capable than type-based
static analysis, due to the additional challenges arising in the static setting (e.g.
aliasing). We have formalized the way DDuo handles side effects and conditionals,





DDuo tracks privacy cost dynamically, at runtime. Dynamic privacy tracking is
challenging because the dynamic analysis has no visibility into code that is not
executed. For example, consider the following conditional:




The executed branch of this conditional depends on the result of the first call
to dduo.gauss , which is non-deterministic. The two branches use different
privacy parameters for the remaining calls to dduo.gauss ; in other words, the
privacy parameter for the second use of the Gaussian mechanism is chosen
adaptively, based on the results of the first use. Sequential composition theorems
for differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014b) are typically stated in terms of
fixed (i.e. non-adaptive) privacy parameters, and do not apply if the privacy
parameters are chosen adaptively.
A static analysis of this program will consider both branches, and most
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analyses will produce an upper bound on the program’s privacy cost by combining
the two (i.e. taking the maximum of the two ε values). This approach avoids
the issue of adaptively-chosen privacy parameters.
A dynamic analysis, by contrast, cannot consider both branches, and must
bound privacy cost by analyzing only the branch that is executed. Sequential
composition does not apply directly when privacy parameters are chosen adap-
tively, so ignoring the non-executed branch in a dynamic analysis of privacy
would be unsound.
13.1 Privacy Filters & Odometers
Privacy filters and odometers were originally developed by Rogers et al. (Rogers
et al., 2016) specifically to address the setting in which privacy parameters are
selected adaptively. Winograd-Cort et al. (Winograd-Cort et al., 2017) used
privacy filters and odometers as part of the Adaptive Fuzz framework, which
integrates both dynamic analysis (for composing privacy mechanisms) and static
analysis (for bounding the cost of individual mechanisms). Recently, Feldman
and Zrnic (Feldman and Zrnic, 2020) developed filters and odometers for Rényi
differential privacy (Mironov, 2017b).
Privacy odometers can be used to obtain a running upper bound on total
privacy cost at any point in the sequence of adaptive mechanisms, and to obtain
an overall total at the end of the sequence. A function COMPδg : R2k≥0 → R∪{∞} is
called a valid privacy odometer (Rogers et al., 2016) for a sequence of mechanisms
M1, . . . ,Mk if for all (adaptively-chosen) settings of (ε1, δ1), . . . , (εk, δk) for the
individual mechanisms in the sequence, their composition satisfies (COMPδg (·), δg)-
differential privacy. In other words, COMPδg(·) returns a value for ε that upper-
bounds the privacy cost of the adaptive sequence of mechanisms. A valid privacy
odometer for sequential composition in (ε, δ)-differential privacy can be defined
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as follows (Rogers et al. (Rogers et al., 2016), Theorem 3.6):









Privacy filters allow the analyst to place an upper bound (εg, δg) on the
desired privacy cost, and halt the computation immediately if the bound is
violated. A function COMPεg,δg : R2k≥0 → {HALT, CONT} is called a valid privacy
filter (Rogers et al., 2016) for a sequence of mechanismsM1, . . . ,Mk if for all
(adaptively-chosen) settings of (ε1, δ1), . . . , (εk, δk) for the individual mechanisms
in the sequence, COMPεg,δg(ε1, δ1, . . . , εk, δk) outputs CONT only if the sequence
satisfies (εg, δg)-differential privacy (otherwise, it outputs HALT for the first
mechanism in the sequence that violates the privacy cost bound). A valid privacy
filter for sequential composition in (ε, δ)-differential privacy can be defined as
follows (Rogers et al. (Rogers et al., 2016), Theorem 3.6):









It is clear from these definitions that the odometer and filter for sequential
composition under (ε, δ)-differential privacy yield the same bounds on privacy
loss as the standard theorem for sequential composition (Dwork et al., 2014b)
(i.e. there is no “cost” to picking the privacy parameters adaptively).
Rogers et al. (Rogers et al., 2016) also define filters and odometers for advanced
composition under (ε, δ)-differential privacy ((Rogers et al., 2016), §5 and §6); in
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this case, there is a cost. In exchange for the ability to set privacy parameters
adaptively, filters and odometers for advanced composition have slightly worse
constants than the standard advanced composition theorem (Dwork et al., 2014b)
(but are asymptotically the same).
13.2 Filters & Odometers in DDuo
DDuo’s API allows the programmer to explicitly create privacy odometers and
filters, and make them active for a specific part of the program (using Python’s
with syntax). When an odometer is active, it records a running total of the total
privacy cost, and it can be queried to return this information to the programmer.
with dduo.EdOdometer(max_delta = 10e-5) as odo:
_ = dduo.gauss(df.shape[0], ε = 1.0, δ = 10e-6)
_ = dduo.gauss(df.shape[0], ε = 1.0, δ = 10e-6)
print(odo)
Odometer_(ε, δ)({data.csv 7→ (2.0, 20−6)})
When a filter is active, it tracks the privacy cost for individual mechanisms, and
halts the program if the filter’s upper bound on privacy cost is violated.
with dduo.EdFilter(ε = 1.0, δ = 10e-6) as odo:
print('1:', dduo.gauss(df.shape[0], ε=1.0, δ=10e-6))
print('2:', dduo.gauss(df.shape[0], ε=1.0, δ=10e-6))
1: 10.5627




In addition to odometers and filters for sequential composition under (ε, δ)-
differential privacy (such as EdFilter and EdOdometer), DDuo provides odome-
ters and filters for advanced composition (AdvEdFilter and AdvEdOdometer)
and Rényi differential privacy (RenyiFilter and RenyiOdometer, which follow
the results of Feldman and Zrnic (Feldman and Zrnic, 2020)).
13.3 Loops and Composition
Iterative algorithms can be built in DDuo using Python’s standard looping
constructs, and DDuo’s privacy odometers and filters take care of ensuring
the correct form of composition. Parallel composition is also available—via
functional mapping. Advanced composition can be achieved via special advanced
composition filters and odometers exposed in the DDuo API. For example, the
following simple loop runs the Laplace mechanism 20 times, and its total privacy
cost is reflected by the odometer:
with dduo.EpsOdometer() as odo:
for i in range(20):
dduo.laplace(df.shape[0], ε = 1.0)
print(odo)
Odometer_ε({data.csv 7→ 20.0})
To use advanced composition instead of sequential composition, we simply replace
the odometer with a different one:
with dduo.AdvEdOdometer() as odo:
for i in range(20):
dduo.gauss(df.shape[0], ε = 0.01, δ = 0.001)
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13.4 Mixing Variants of Differential Privacy
The DDuo library includes support for pure ε-differential privacy, (ε, δ)-differential
privacy, and Rényi differential privacy (RDP). Programs may use all three vari-
ants together, convert between them, and compose mechanisms from each.
We demonstrate execution of a query while switched to the Rényi differential
privacy variant using pythonic "with" syntax blocks. For programs that make
extensive use of composition, this approach yields significant improvements in
privacy cost. For example, the following program uses the Gaussian mechanism
200 times, using Rényi differential privacy for sequential composition; the total
privacy cost is automatically converted into an (ε, δ)-differential privacy cost
after the loop finishes.
with dduo.EdOdometer(max_delta = 1e-4) as odo:
with dduo.RenyiDP(1e-5):
for x in range(200):
noisy_count = dduo.renyi_gauss(α = 10,
ε=0.2, df.shape[0])
print(odo)





In DDuo we implement a novel dynamic analysis for function sensitivity , which
is a relational (hyper)property quantified over two runs of the program with
arbitrary but related inputs. In particular, our analysis computes function
sensitivity—a two-run property—after only observing one execution of the
program. Only observing one execution poses challenges to the design of the
analysis, and significant challenges to the proof, all of which we overcome. To
overcome this challenge in the design of the analysis, we first disallow branching
control flow which depends on any sensitive inputs; this ensures that any two
runs of the program being considered for the purposes of privacy will take the
same branch observed by the dynamic analysis. Second, we disallow sensitive
input-dependent arguments to the “scalar” side of multiplication; this ensures
that the dynamic analysis’ use of that argument in analysis results is identical
for any two runs of the program being considered for the purposes of privacy.
Our dynamic analysis for function sensitivity is sound—meaning that the true
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sensitivity of a program is guaranteed to be equal or less than the sensitivity
reported by DDuo’s dynamic monitor—and we support this claim with a detailed
proof.
14.1 Formalism Approach.
We formalize the correctness of our dynamic analysis for function sensitivity
using a step-indexed big-step semantics to describe the dynamic analysis, a
step-indexed logical relation to describe the meaning of function sensitivity, and
a proof by induction and case analysis on program syntax to show that dynamic
analysis results soundly predict function sensitivity. A step-indexed relation is a
relation R ∈ A→ B → prop whose definition is stratified by a natural number
index n, so for each level n there is a new relation Rn. Typically, the relation
R0 is defined R0(x, y) , true, and the final relation of interest is R̂ ,
⋂
nRn,
i.e., R̂(x, y) ⇐⇒ ∀n. Rn(x, y). Step-indexing is typically used—as we do in our
formalism—when the definition of a relation would be not well founded in its
absence. The most common reason a relation definition might be not well-founded
is the use of self-reference without any decreasing measure. When a decreasing
measure exists, self-reference leads to well-founded recursion, however when a
decreasing measure does not exist, self-reference is not well-founded. When using
step-indexing, self-reference is allowed in the definition of Rn, but only for the
relation at strictly lower levels, so Rn′ when n′ < n; this is well-founded because
the index n becomes a decreasing measure for the self-reference. In this way,
step-indexing enables self-reference without any existing decreasing measure by
introducing a new decreasing measure, and maintains well-foundedness of the
relation definition.
A logical relation is one where the definition of relation on function values (or
types) is extensional, essentially saying “when given related inputs, the function
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produces related outputs”. This definition is self-referrential and not well-founded,
and among common reasons to introduce step-indexing in programming language
proofs. As the relation R is stratified with a step-index to Rn, so must the
definition of the semantics, so for a big-step relation e ⇓ v (relating an expression
e to its final value v after evaluation) we stratify as e ⇓n v. Also, because the
definition of a logical relation decrements the step-index for the case of function
values, we increment the step-index in the semantic case for function application.
These techniques are standard from prior work (Ahmed, 2006), and we merely
summarize the key ideas here to give background to our reader.
14.2 Formal Definition of Dynamic Analysis.
We model language features for arithmetic operations (e  e), conditionals
(if0(e){e}{e}), pairs (〈e, e〉 and πi(e)), functions (λx. e and e(e)) and references
(ref(e), !e and e← e); the full language is shown in Figure 22.1. There is one base
value: r@Σm for a real number result r tagged with dynamic analysis information
Σ—the sensitivity analysis for the expression which evaluated to r—and m—the
metric associated with the resulting value r. The sensitivity analysis Σ—also
called a sensitivity environment—is a map from sensitive sources o ∈ source to
how sensitive the result is w.r.t. that source. Our formalism includes two base
metrics m ∈ metric: diff and disc for absolute difference (|x− y|) and discrete
distance (0 if x = y and 1 otherwise) respectively—and two derived metrics: >
and ⊥ for the smallest metric larger than each base metric and largest metric
smaller than each base metric, respectively. Each metric is commonly used
when implementing differentially private algorithms. Pair values (〈v, v〉), closure
values (〈λx. e | ρ〉) and reference values (`) do not contain dynamic analysis
information.








q where ρ ∈ var ⇀ value is the lexical environment mapping lexical variables
to values, σ ∈ loc ⇀ value is the dynamic environment (i.e., the heap, or
store) mapping dynamically allocated references to values, e is the expression
being executed, and v is the resulting runtime value which also includes dynamic




q and the “output” configuration x
p
σ, vy
q to aid readability. The index n is for
step-indexing, and tracks the number of function applications which occurred in
the process of evaluation. We show the full definition of the dynamic analysis in
Figure 22.5.
Consider the following example:
{x 7→ 21@{o7→1}diff } ` ∅, (x+ x) ⇓0 42@
{o7→2}
diff
This relation corresponds to a scenario where the program to evaluate and
analyze is x+ x, the variable x represents a sensitive source value o, we want to
track sensitivity w.r.t. the absolute difference metric, and the initial value for x is
21. This information is encoded in an initial environment ρ = {x 7→ 21@{o 7→1}diff }.
The result value is 42, and the resulting analysis reports that e is 2-sensitive in
the source o w.r.t. the absolute difference metric. This analysis information is
encoded in the return value 42@{o 7→2}diff . Because no function applications occur
during evaluation, the step index n is 0.
14.3 Formal Definition of Function Sensitivity.
Function sensitivity is encoded through multiple relation definitions:
1. ρ1, σ1, e1 ∼Σn ρ2, σ2, e2 holds when the input triples ρ1, σ1, e1 and ρ2, σ2, e2
evaluate to output stores and values which are related by Σ. Note this
definition decrements the step-index n, and is the constant relation when
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b ∈ B n ∈ N i ∈ Z r ∈ R x ∈ var
o ∈ source sensitive sources
` ∈ loc reference locations
e ∈ expr ::= x variables
| r real numbers
| e e arith. operations
| if0(e){e}{e} cond. branching
| 〈e, e〉 pair creation
| πi(e) pair access
| λx. e function creation
| e(e) function application
| ref(e) reference creation
| !e reference read
| e← e reference write
q ∈ R̂ ::= r | ∞ ext. reals
 ∈ binop ::= + | n | o operations
m ∈ metric ::= diff absolute difference
| disc discrete
| ⊥ bot metric
| > top metric
v ∈ value ::= r@Σm tagged base value
| 〈v, v〉 pair
| 〈λx. e | ρ〉 function (closure)
| ` location (pointer)
ρ ∈ env , var ⇀ value value environment
σ ∈ store , loc ⇀ value mutable store
Σ ∈ senv , source ⇀ R̂ sens. environment
ρ1, σ1, e1 ∼Σ0 ρ2, σ2, e2
M⇐⇒ true
ρ1, σ1, e1 ∼Σn+1 ρ2, σ2, e2

















⇒ n1 = n2 ∧ σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2 ∧ v1 ∼n−nΣ1 v2
ρ, σ, e ∼Σn ρ, σ, e
r ∼rm r
r1 ∼rdiff r2




0 ≤ r if r1 = r2
1 ≤ r if r1 6= r2
r1 ∼r⊥ r2
M⇐⇒ r1 ∼rdiff r2 ∧ r1 ∼rdisc r2
r1 ∼r> r2











〈v11, v12〉 ∼Σn 〈v21, v22〉
M⇐⇒ v11 ∼Σn v21 ∧ v12 ∼Σn v22
〈λx. e1 | ρ1〉 ∼Σn 〈λx. e2 | ρ2〉
M⇐⇒ ∀n′ ≤ n, v1, v2, σ1, σ2. σ1 ∼Σn′ σ2 ∧ v1 ∼
Σ
n′ v2
⇒ σ1, {x 7→ v1} ] ρ1, e1 ∼Σn′ σ2, {x 7→ v2} ] ρ2, e2
`1 ∼Σn `2
M⇐⇒ `1 = `2
v ∼Σn v
ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2
M⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ (dom(ρ1) ∪ dom(ρ2)). ρ1(x) ∼Σn ρ2(x)
σ1 ∼Σn σ2
M⇐⇒ ∀` ∈ (dom(σ1) ∪ dom(σ2)). σ1(`) ∼Σn σ2(`)
ρ ∼Σn ρ
σ ∼Σn σ
Figure 14.1: Formal Syntax & Step-indexed Logical Relation.
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n = 0.
2. r1 ∼rm r2 holds when the difference between real numbers r1 and r2 w.r.t.
metric m is less than r.
3. v1 ∼Σn v2 holds when values v1 and v2 are related for initial distance Σ and
step-index n. The definition is by case analysis on the syntactic category
for values, such as:
(a) The relation on base values r1@mΣ11 ∼
Σ
n r2@mΣ22
holds when Σ1, Σ2,
m1 and m2 are pairwise equal, and when r1 and r2 are related by
Σ·Σ1, where Σ is the initial distances between each input source o,
and Σ1 is how much r1 and r2 are allowed to differ as a linear function
of input distances Σ, and where this function is applied via vector
dot product ·.
(b) The relation on pair values 〈v11, v12〉 ∼Σm 〈v21, v22〉 holds when each
element of the pair are pairwise related.
(c) The relation on function values 〈λx. e1 | ρ1〉 ∼Σn 〈λx. e2 | ρ2〉 holds
when each closure returns related output configurations when evalu-
ated with related inputs.
(d) The relation on locations `1 ∼Σn `2 holds when the two locations are
equal.
4. ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2 holds when lexical environments ρ1 and ρ2 map all variables to
related values.
5. σ1 ∼Σn σ2 holds when dynamic environments σ1 and σ2 map all locations
to related values.
Note that the definitions of ρ1, σ1, e1 ∼Σn ρ2, σ2, e2 and v ∼Σn v are mutually
recursive, but are well founded due to the decrement of the step index in the
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former relation. We show the full definition of these relations in Figure 22.6.
The function sensitivity of an expression is encoded first as a statement
about expressions respecting relatedness, that is, returning related outputs when
given related inputs, i.e., (assuming no use of the store) if ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2 and ρ1 `
∅, e ⇓n1 ∅, v1 and ρ2 ` ∅, e ⇓n2 ∅, v2 then n1 = n2 and v1 ∼n−nΣ1 v2. When
instantiated to base types, we have: if ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2 and ρ1 ` ∅, e ⇓n1 ∅, r1@mΣ11 and
ρ2 ` ∅, e ⇓n2 ∅, r2@mΣ22 then n1 = n2, Σ1 = Σ2, m1 = m2 and r1 ∼mΣ·Σ11 r2.
The fully general form of this property is called metric preservation, which is
the main property we prove in our formal development.
14.4 Metric Preservation.
Metric preservation states that when given related initial configurations and
evaluation outputs, then those outputs are related. Outputs include result values,
as well as dynamic analysis results, and the relationship that holds demonstrates
the soundness of the analysis results.
Theorem 14.4.1 (Metric Preservation).
If: ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2 (H1)
And: σ1 ∼Σn σ2 (H2)
Then: ρ1, σ1, e ∼Σn ρ2, σ2, e
That is, either n = 0 or n = n′ + 1 and. . .
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e dr ∈ R̂→ R̂
e dr ∈ senv→ sens
er′dr ,
{
0 if r′ = 0
r if r′ 6= 0
eΣdr(o) , eΣ(o)dr


















































σ, e1 + e2y
q ⇓n1+n2 x
p



















σ, e1 n e2y
q ⇓n1+n2 x
p



















σ, e1 o e2y
q ⇓n1+n2 x
p













































































































































σ, e1 ← e2y
q ⇓n1+n2 x
p






























Figure 14.3: Formal Big-step, Step-indexed Semantics and Metafunctions.
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If: n1 ≤ n (H3)














Then: n1 = n2 (C1)
And: σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2 (C2)
And: v1 ∼n−nΣ1 v2 (C3)
Proof. See detailed proof in Chapter 16.
14.5 Instantiating Metric Preservation.
Metric preservation is not enough on its own to demonstrate sound dynamic
analysis of function sensitivity. Suppose we execute the dynamic analysis on
program e with initial environment ρ, yielding a final store σ, base value r,
sensitivity environment Σ, metric m and step-index n as a result:
ρ ` ∅, e ⇓n σ, r@Σm
To know the sensitivity of e is to know a bound on two arbitrary runs of e, that is,
using two arbitrary environments ρ1 and ρ2. Does Σ tell us this? Remarkably, it
does, with one small condition: ρ1 and ρ2 must agree with ρ on all non-sensitive
values. This is not actually limiting: a non-sensitive value is essentially auxiliary
information; they are constants and fixed for the purposes of sensitivity and
privacy.
We can encode the relationship that environments ρ and ρ1 agree on all
non-sensitive values as ρ ∼Σ′ ρ1 for any Σ′, and we allow for environments ρ
and ρ1 to differ on any sensitive value while agreeing on non-sensitive values as
ρ ∼{o 7→∞} ρ1. Under such an assumption, Σ and m are sound dynamic analysis
results for two arbitrary runs of e, i.e., under environments ρ1 and ρ2, so long as
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one of those environments agrees with ρ—the environment used to compute the
dynamic analysis. We encode this property formally as the following corollary
to metric preservation:
Corollary 14.5.0.1 (Sound Dynamic Analysis for Sensitivity).
If: n1 < n, n2 < n and n3 < n (H1)
And: ρ ∼{o 7→∞}n ρ1 (H2)

























By Metric Preservation, (H2), (H1), (H3) and (H5) we have Σ1 = Σ andm1 = m.
By Metric Preservation, (H4), (H1), (H5) and (H6) we have proved the goal
(C1).
Note that the final results are related using Σ—the analysis result derived
from an execution under ρ—while r1 and r2 are derived from executions under
unrelated (modulo auxiliary information) environments ρ1 and ρ2.
In simpler terms, this corollary shows that even though the dynamic analysis
only sees one particular execution of the program, it is accurate in describing
the sensitivity of the program—even though the notion of sensitivity considers
two arbitrary runs of the program, including those whose inputs differ entirely





We have developed a reference implementation of DDuo as a Python library,
using the approaches described in Chapters ??, 12, and 13.
A major goal in the design of DDuo is seamless integration with other
libraries. Our reference implementation provides initial support for NumPy,
Pandas, and Sklearn. DDuo provides hooks for tracking both sensitivity and
privacy, to simplify integrating with additional libraries.
We present case studies which focus on demonstrating DDuo’s (1) similarity
to regular Python code, (2) applicability to complex algorithms, (3) easy integra-
tion with existing libraries. Although our approach is automatic, DDuo is able to
compute privacy leakage bounds that match those of bespoke privacy-preserving
algorithms.
We introduce new adaptive variants of algorithms that stop early when
possible to conserve privacy budget. These variants cannot be verified by prior
work using purely static analyses, because their privacy parameters are chosen
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Name Type Conditions
laplace : (ε : R, value : R) → R where priv(laplace(ε, value)) , ε
gauss : (ε : R, δ : R, value : R) → R where priv(gauss(ε, δ, value)) , (ε, δ)
ed_odo : (f : A → B, in : A) → (out : B, (ε, δ)) where priv(ed_odo(f, in)) , priv(f(in))
renyi_odo : (f : A → B, in : A) → (out : B, (α, ε)) where priv(renyi_odo(f, in)) , priv(f(in))
ed_filter : (f : A → B, in : A, (ε, δ)) → (out : B) where (ε, δ) ≥ priv(f(in))
renyi_filter : (f : A → B, in : A, (α, ε)) → (out : B) where (α, ε) ≥ priv(f(in))
conv_renyi : (f : A → B, in : A, δ : R) → (out : B) where priv(f(...)) = (α, ε)
and conv(α, ε, δ) = (ε, δ)
svt : (ε : R, qs : [A → B], data : [A], t : R) → N where for q in qs, sens(q) = 1
and priv(svt(ε, qs, data, t)) , ε
exp : (ε : R, q : A → B, data : [A]) → N where priv(exp(ε, q, data)) , ε
map : (f : A → B, in : [A]) → [B] where sens(map(f, )) , sens(f( ))
priv: denotes the privacy leakage of a program given by dynamic analysis; sens: denotes the
sensitivity of a program given by dynamic analysis; conv: represents the conversion equation
from renyi to approximate differential privacy; ε,δ,and α are always assumed to be of type R.
Types are written as follows: the → symbol is used to seperate the domain and range of a
function, either of which may be given as an atomic type such as a natural number (N), or as
a tuple which is a comma-seperated list of types surrounded by parentheses, or as a symbol
(A) indicating parametric polymorphism (generics). In some cases, types may also be
accompanied with a placeholder name (ε : R) for further qualification in the where clause.
Figure 15.1: Core API Methods
adaptively.
15.1 Run-time overhead.
Run-time overhead is a key concern in DDuo’s instrumentation for dynamic
analysis. Fortunately, experiments on our case studies suggest that the overhead
of DDuo’s analysis is generally low. Table 15.1 presents the run-time perfor-
mance overhead of DDuo’s analysis as a percentage increase of total runtime.
The worst overhead time observed in our case studies was less than 60%.
In certain rare cases, DDuo’s overhead can be much higher. For example,
mapping the function lambda x: x + 1 over a list of 1 million numbers takes
160x longer under DDuo than in standard Python. The overhead in this
case comes from a combination of factors: first, DDuo’s map function, itself
implemented in Python, is much slower than Python’s built-in map operator;
second, DDuo’s map function requires the creation of a new Sensitive object
for each element of the list—a slow operation in Python.
Fortunately, the same strategies for producing high-performance Python
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Technique Ref. Libraries Used Overhead
Noisy Gradient Descent (Bassily et al., 2014b) NumPy 6.42%
Multiplicative Weights (MWEM) (Hardt et al., 2012) Pandas 14.90%
Private Naive Bayes Classification (Vaidya et al., 2013) DiffPrivLib 12.44%
Private Logistic Regression (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2008) DiffPrivLib 56.33%
Table 15.1: List of case studies included with the DDuo implementation.
code without privacy also help reduce DDuo’s overhead. Python’s performance
characteristics have prompted the development of higher-performance libraries
like NumPy and Pandas, which essentially provide data-processing combinators
that programmers compose. By providing sensitivity annotations for these
libraries, we can re-use these high-performance implementations and avoid
creating extra objects. As a result, none of our case studies demonstrates the
worst-case performance overhead described above.
15.2 Case study: gradient descent with NumPy.
Our first case study (Figure 23.3) is a simple machine learning algorithm based
on (Bassily et al., 2014b) implemented directly with DDuo-instrumented NumPy
primitives.
Given a dataset X which is a list of feature vectors representing training
examples, and a vector y which classifies each element of X in a finite set,
gradient descent is the process of computing a model (a linear set of weights)
which most accurately classifies a new, never seen before training example, based
on our pre-existing evidence represented by the model.
Gradient descent works by first specifying a loss function that computes the
effectiveness of a model in classifying a given dataset according to its known
labels. The algorithm then iteratively computes a model that minimizes the loss
function, by calculating the gradient of the loss function and moving the model
in the opposite direction of the gradient.
One method of ensuring privacy in gradient descent involves adding noise to
the gradient calculation, which is the only part of the process that is exposed to
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the private training data. In order to add noise to the gradient, it is convenient
to bound its sensitivity via clipping to some L2 norm. In this example, clipping
occurs in the gradient_sum function before summation.
The original implementation of this algorithm (Bassily et al., 2014b) was
based on the advanced composition theorem. Advanced composition improves
on sequential composition by providing much tighter privacy bounds over several
iterations, but requires the analyst to fix the number of iterations up front,
regardless of how many iterations the gradient descent algorithm actually takes
to converge to minimal error.
We present a modified version based on adaptive Renyi differential privacy
which provides not only a tighter analysis of the privacy leakage over several
iterations, but also allows the analyst to halt computation adaptively (conserving
the remaining privacy budget) once a certain level of model accuracy has been
reached, or loss has been minimized. We introduce random noise to the accuracy
calculation because it is a computation on the sensitive input training dataset in
this case.
15.3 MWEM with Pandas
The MWEM algorithm (Hardt et al., 2012) constructs a differentially private
synthetic dataset that approximates a real dataset. MWEM produces competi-
tive privacy bounds by utilizing a combination of the exponential mechanism,
Laplacian/Gaussian noise, and the multiplicative weights update rule. The
algorithm uses these mechanisms iteratively, providing a tight analysis of privacy
leakage via composition.
The inputs to the MWEM are as follows: some uniform or random distribu-
tion over a domain (syn_data), some sensitive dataset (age_counts), a query
workload, a number of iterations i, and a privacy budget ε.
110















theta = np.subtract(theta, noisy_avg_grad)
priv_acc_curr = dduo.renyi_gauss(alpha,
eps_acc, accuracy(theta))









Odometer_(α, ε)({data.csv 7→ (10.0, 2.40)})
final accuracy: 0.753
Figure 15.2: Gradient Descent with NumPy
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The algorithm works by, at each iteration:
• privately selecting a query from the query workload (using the exponential
mechanism) whose result on the synthetic dataset greatly differs from the
real dataset
for t in range(i):
q = exponential(q_workload,score_fn,eps/(2*i))
...
• and then privately using the query result on the real dataset to adjust
the synthetic dataset towards the truth using the multiplicative weights
update rule
for t in range(i):
...
syn_data = mwem_step(q, age_counts, syn_data)
We present a modified, adaptive MWEM algorithm (Figure 23.4) which
privately halts execution if the error of the synthetic dataset reaches an acceptably
low level before the entire privacy budget is exceeded, conserving the remainder
of the budget for other private analyses.
15.4 DiffPrivLib
DiffPrivLib is library for experimenting with analytics and machine learning
with differential privacy in Python by IBM. It provides a comprehensive suite of
differentially private mechanisms, tools, and machine learning models.
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def mwem_step(query, real_data, syn_data):
lower, upper = query
sm = [v for k, v in syn_data.items()]
total = np.sum(sm)
q_ans = range_query(real_data, lower, upper)
real = dduo.renyi_gauss(α=alpha,ε=eps,q_ans,sens)
syn = range_query(syn_data, lower, upper)
l = [(k, mwem_update(k, x, lower, upper,
real, syn, total))
for k, x in syn_data.items()]
return dict(l)
with dduo.RenyiFilter(alpha,20.0):
with dduo.RenyiOdometer((alpha,2.0)) as odo:
while stable < stability_thresh:
e = err(age_counts,curr_syn)
curr_noisy_err=dduo.renyi_gauss(α=alpha,ε=1.0,e)




for t in range(iterations):
q = exponential(q_workload,score_fn,eps/(2*i))
curr_syn = mwem_step(q,age_counts,curr_syn)
acc = dduo.renyi_gauss(alpha, eps_acc,
accuracy(age_counts,curr_syn))
print(f"final accuracy: {acc}")
Odometer_(α, ε)({data.csv 7→ (10.0, 0.5)})
final accuracy: 0.703
Figure 15.3: MWEM with Pandas
113
While DiffPrivLib provides several mechanisms, models and tools for develop-
ing private applications, as well as a basic privacy accountant, it lacks the ability
to perform a tight privacy analysis in the context of more sophisticated forms of
composition with dynamic and adaptive privacy tracking. Via integration with
DDuo we are able to gain these abilities with minimal changes to library and
program code.
Figure 15.4 shows an example of a modified DiffPrivLib program: a private
naive Bayes classifier run on the standard iris dataset. The original program
has been modified with DDuo hooks to detect sensitivity violations and track
privacy cost.
We also present a DDuo instrumented example of differentially private
logistic regression with DiffPrivLib (Figure 15.5).
Both of these programs have been modified to perform adaptively private
clipping. Over several iterations, clipping parameters are gradually modified to
optimize model accuracy. This form of control flow on probabilistic values is only
sound following the adaptive composition strategies that DDuo provides. In or-
der to preserve the privacy budget, such hyperparameter optimization procedures
should normally be run on artificial datasets based on domain knowledge.
The changes required for the integration with the DiffPrivLib library consist
of 15 lines of DDuo instrumentation code.
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from dduo import sklearn as sk
from dduo import DiffPrivLib as dpl
with dduo.AdvEdOdometer() as odo:
while noisy_acc < thresh or iters < max_iters:
prev_bounds = bounds
bounds = update_bounds(bounds)
clf = dpl.GNB(bounds=bounds, epsilon=epsilon)
clf.fit(X_train, y_train)
prev_acc = noisy_acc
accuracy = dpl.score(y_test, clf.predict(X_test))
noisy_acc = dduo.gauss(epsilon_acc,delta,accuracy)




Odometer_(ε, δ)({data.csv 7→ (0.82, 0.0035)})
Figure 15.4: DiffPrivLib: Naive Bayes Classification
from dduo import sklearn as sk
from dduo import DiffPrivLib as dpl
with dduo.AdvEdOdometer() as odo:








Odometer_(ε, δ)({data.csv 7→ (0.53, 0.0015)})
Figure 15.5: DiffPrivLib: Logistic Regression
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Chapter 16
Lemmas, Theorems & Proofs
Lemma 16.0.1 (Plus Respects). If r1 ∼rm r2 Then (r1 + r3) ∼rm (r2 + r3).
Proof. By unfolding definitions and simple arithmetic.
Lemma 16.0.2 (Times Respects). If r1 ∼rm r2 then (r1 × r3) ∼r3rm (r2 × r3).
Proof. By unfolding definitions and simple arithmetic.
Lemma 16.0.3 (Triangle). If r1 ∼mrAA r2 and r2 ∼mrBB r3 then r1 ∼mrA+rBA tmB
r3.
Proof. By unfolding definitions, simple arithmetic, and the standard triangle
inequality property for real numbers.




Proof. By unfolding definitions and simple arithmetic.
Lemma 16.0.5 (Step-index Weakening). For n′ ≤ n: (1): If ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2 then
ρ1 ∼Σn′ ρ2; (2): If σ1 ∼Σn σ2 then σ1 ∼Σn′ σ2; and (3): If ρ1, σ1, e1 ∼Σn ρ2, σ2, e2
then ρ1, σ1, e1 ∼Σn′ ρ2, σ2, e2.
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Proof. By mutual induction on n for all three properties, and additionally case
analysis on e1 and e2 for property (3).
Theorem 16.0.6 (Metric Preservation).
If: ρ1 ∼Σn ρ2 (H1)
And: σ1 ∼Σn σ2 (H2)
Then: ρ1, σ1, e ∼Σn ρ2, σ2, e
That is, either n = 0 or n = n′ + 1 and. . .
If: n1 ≤ n (H3)














Then: n1 = n2 (C1)
And: σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2 (C2)
And: v1 ∼n−nΣ1 v2 (C3)
Proof. See detailed proof later in this section.
Corollary 16.0.6.1 (Sound Dynamic Analysis for Sensitivity).
If: n1 < n, n2 < n and n3 < n (H1)
And: ρ ∼{o 7→∞}n ρ1 (H2)


























By Metric Preservation, (H2), (H1), (H3) and (H5) we have Σ1 = Σ and
m1 = m.
By Metric Preservation, (H4), (H1), (H5) and (H6) we have proved the goal
(C1).
Proof of Metric Preservation.
By strong induction on n and case analysis on e:
- Case n = 0: Trivial by definition.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = x:
By inversion on (H4) and (H5) we have: n1 = n2 = 0, σ′1 = σ1, σ′2 = σ2,
v1 = ρ1(x) and v2 = ρ2(x). To show: (C1): 0 = 0; (C2): σ1 ∼Σn σ2; and
(C3): ρ1(x) ∼Σn ρ2(x). (C1) is trivial. (C2) is immediate by (H2). (C3) is
immediate by (H1).
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = r:
By inversion on (H4) and (H5) we have n1 = n2 = 0, v1 = v2 = r@Zdisc,
σ′1 = σ1 and σ′2 = σ2. To show: (C1): 0 = 0; (C2): σ1 ∼Σn σ2; and (C3):
r ∼0disc r. (C1) is trivial. (C2) is immediate by (H2). (C3) is immediate by
definition of relation ∼rm.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = e1 + e2:




























σ′′2 , r22@mΣ2222 y
q (H5.2)
and we also have: n1 = n11 + n12, n2 = n21 + n22, σ′1 = σ′′1 , σ′2 = σ′′2 , v1 =
(r11 +r12)@mΣ11+Σ1211 tm12
and v2 = (r21 +r22)@mΣ21+Σ2221 tm22 . By IH (n = n de-
creasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H5.1) we have: n11 = n21 (IH.1.C1);
σ′1 ∼n−nΣ11 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2); and r11@mΣ1111 ∼n−nΣ11 r21@mΣ2121 (IH.1.C3). By
unfolding the definition in (IH.1.C3), we have: Σ11 = Σ21 (IH.1.C3.1);
m11 = m21 (IH.1.C3.2); and r11 ∼mΣ·Σ1111 r21 (IH.1.C3.3). Note the fol-
lowing facts: n12 ≤ n−n11 (F1); and ρ1 ∼n−nΣ11 (F2). (F1) follows from (H3)
and n1 = n11 + n12. (F2) follows from (H1) and Step-index Weakening.1. By
IH (n = n−n11 decreasing), (F2), (IH.1.C2), (F1), (H4.2) and (H5.2) we have:
n12 = n22 (IH.2.C1); σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 (IH.2.C2); and r12@mΣ1212 ∼nΣ11−n12
r22@mΣ2222
(IH.2.C3). By unfolding the definition in (IH.2.C3), we have:
Σ12 = Σ22 (IH.2.C3.1); m12 = m22 (IH.2.C3.2); and r12 ∼mΣ·Σ1212 r22
(IH.2.C3.3). To show: (C1): n11 + n12 = n21 + n22; (C2): σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 ;
and (C3): (r11 + r12)@mΣ11+Σ1211 tm12 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 (r21 + r22)@mΣ21+Σ2221 tm22 .
(C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1) and (IH.2.C1). (C2) is immediate from
(IH.2.C2). To show (C3) we must show: (C3.1): Σ11+Σ12 = Σ21+Σ22; (C3.2):
m11 tm12 = m21 tm22; and (C3.3): (r11 + r12) ∼mΣ·(Σ11+Σ12)11 tm12 (r21 + r22).
(C3.1) is immediate from (IH.1.C3.1) and (IH.2.C3.1). (C3.2) is immediate
from (IH.1.C3.2) and (IH.2.C3.2). (C3.3) holds as follows: By Plus Respects,
(IH.1.C3.3) and (IH.2.C3.3): (r11+r12) ∼mΣ·Σ1111 (r21+r12) ∼mΣ·Σ1212 (r21+r22).
By Triangle: (r11 + r12) ∼mΣ·Σ11+Σ·Σ1211 tm12 (r21 + r22). By basic algebra:
(r11 + r12) ∼mΣ·(Σ11+Σ12)11 tm12 (r21 + r22) We have shown the goal.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = e1 n e2:
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and we also have: n1 = n11 + n12, n2 = n21 + n22, σ′1 = σ′′1 , σ′2 = σ′′2 , v1 =
(r11 × r12)@mr11Σ1212 and v2 = (r21 × r22)@mr21Σ2222 . By IH (n = n decreasing),
(H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H5.1) we have: n11 = n21 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ11
σ′2 (IH.1.C2); and r11@mΣ1111 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 r21@mΣ2121 (IH.1.C3). By unfolding
the definition in (IH.1.C3), we have: Σ11 = Σ21 (IH.1.C3.1); m11 = m21
(IH.1.C3.2); and r11 ∼m011 r21 (IH.1.C3.3). As a consequence of (IH.1.C3), we
have: r11 = r21. Note the following facts: n12 ≤ n− n11 (F1); and ρ1 ∼n−nΣ11
(F2). (F1) follows from (H3) and n1 = n11 + n12. (F2) follows from (H1) and
Step-indexWeakening.1. By IH (n = n−n11 decreasing), (F2), (IH.1.C2), (F1),
(H4.2) and (H5.2) we have: n12 = n22 (IH.2.C1); σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 (IH.2.C2);
and r12@mΣ1212 ∼nΣ11−n12 r22@mΣ2222 (IH.2.C3). By unfolding the definition
in (IH.2.C3), we have: Σ12 = Σ22 (IH.2.C3.1); m12 = m22 (IH.2.C3.2);
and r12 ∼mΣ·Σ1212 r22 (IH.2.C3.3). To show: (C1): n11 + n12 = n21 + n22;
(C2): σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 ; and (C3): (r11 × r12)@mr11Σ1212 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 (r21 ×
r22)@m(r21Σ22)22
. (C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1) and (IH.2.C1). (C2) is
immediate from (IH.2.C2). To show (C3) we must show: (C3.1): r11Σ12 =
r21Σ22; (C3.2): m12 = m22; and (C3.3): (r11×r12) ∼mΣ·r11Σ1212 (r21×r22). (C3)
holds as follows: (C3.1) is immediate from r11 = r21 and (IH.2.C3.1). (C3.2)
is immediate from (IH.2.C3.2). (C3.3) holds as follows: By Times Respects,
r11 = r21 and (IH.2.C3.3): (r11 × r12) = (r21 × r12) ∼mr11(Σ·Σ11)21 (r21 × r22).
By basic algebra: (r11 × r12) = (r21 × r12) ∼mΣ·r11Σ1121 (r21 × r22). We have
shown the goal.
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- Case n = n+ 1 and e = e1 o e2: Analogous to previous case.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = if0(e1){e2}{e3}:















By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H5.1) we have:
n11 = n21 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ11 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2); and r1 ∼m01um2 r2 (IH.1.C3).
As a consequence of (IH.1.C3), we have: r1 = r2. The 4 subcases initially are
for: (1): r1 = 0 and r2 = 0; (2): r1 = 0 and r2 6= 0; (3): r1 6= 0 and r2 = 0;
and (4): r1 6= 0 and r2 6= 0. However 2 are absurd given r1 = r2, so these 4
subcases collapse to 2:
- Subcase r1 = r2 = 0:















and we also have: n1 = n11 +n12, n2 = n21 +n22, σ′1 = σ′′1 , σ′2 = σ′′2 , v1 = v1
and v2 = v2. We continue reasoning in a generic way outside this subcase. . .
- Subcase r1 6= 0 and r2 6= 0:















and we also have: n1 = n11 + n12 n2 = n21 + n22 σ′1 = σ′′1 σ′2 = σ′′2 v1 = v1
v2 = v2 We continue reasoning in a generic way outside this subcase. . .
Note the following facts: n12 ≤ n − n11 (F1); and ρ1 ∼n−nΣ11 (F2). (F1)
follows from (H3) and n1 = n11 + n12. (F2) follows from (H1) and Step-index
Weakening.1. By IH (n = n− n11 decreasing), (F2), (IH.1.C2), (F1), (H4.2)




and v1 ∼n−nΣ11−n21 v2 (IH.2.C3). To show: (C1): n11 + n12 = n21 + n22;
(C2): σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 ; and (C3): v1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 v2. (C1) is immediate
from (IH.1.C1) and (IH.2.C1). (C2) is immediate from (IH.2.C2). (C3) is
immediate from (IH.2.C3)
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = 〈e1, e2〉:





























and we also have: n1 = n11 + n12, n2 = n21 + n22, σ′1 = σ′′1 , σ′2 = σ′′2 ,
v1 = 〈v11, v12〉 and v2 = 〈v21, v22〉. By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3),
(H4.1) and (H5.1) we have: n11 = n21 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ11 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2);
and v11 ∼n−nΣ11 v21 (IH.1.C3). Note the following facts: n12 ≤ n− n11 (F1);
and ρ1 ∼n−nΣ11 (F2). (F1) follows from (H3) and n1 = n11 + n12. (F2)
follows from (H1) and Step-index Weakening.1. By IH (n = n − n11 de-
creasing), (F2), (IH.1.C2), (F1), (H4.2) and (H5.2) we have: n12 = n22
(IH.2.C1); σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 (IH.2.C2); and v12 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 v22 (IH.2.C3).
To show: (C1): n11 + n12 = n21 + n22; (C2): σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 ; and
(C3): 〈v11, v12〉 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 〈v21, v22〉. (C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1)
and (IH.2.C1). (C2) is immediate from (IH.2.C2). (C3) is immediate from
(IH.1.C3) and (IH.2.C3).
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = πi(e):
















and we also have: n1 = n1, n2 = n2, σ′1 = σ′1, σ′2 = σ′2, v1 = v1i and
v2 = v2i. By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H5.1)
we have: n1 = n2 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2); and 〈v11, v12〉 ∼n−nΣ1
〈v21, v22〉 (IH.1.C3). To show: (C1): n1 = n2; (C2): σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2; and (C3):
v1n′ ∼n−nΣ1 v2n′ . (C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1). (C2) is immediate from
(IH.1.C2). (C3) is immediate from (IH.1.C3).
- Case n = n+1 and e = λx. e: By inversion on (H4) and (H5) we have: n1 = 0,
n2 = 0, σ′1 = σ1, σ′2 = σ2, v1 = 〈λx. e | ρ1〉 and v2 = 〈λx. e | ρ2〉. To show:
(C1): 0 = 0; (C2): σ1 ∼Σn σ2; and (C3): 〈λx. e | ρ1〉 ∼Σn 〈λx. e | ρ2〉. (C1) is
trivial. (C2) is immediate from (H2). (C3) holds as follows: Unfolding the defi-
nition, we must show: (C3): ∀n′ ≤ n, v1, v2, σ′1, σ′2. σ′1 ∼Σn′ σ′2 ∧ v1 ∼Σn′ v2
⇒ σ′1, {x 7→ v1} ] ρ1, e ∼Σn′ σ′2, {x 7→ v2} ] ρ2, e
.
To show (C3), we assume: σ′1 ∼Σn′ σ′2 (C3.H1); and v1 ∼Σn′ v2 (C3.H2). And
we must show: (C3.1): σ′1, {x 7→ v1} ] ρ1, e ∼Σn′ σ′2, {x 7→ v2} ] ρ2, e. Note
the following facts: ρ1 ∼Σn′ ρ1 (F1); and {x 7→ v1} ] ρ1 ∼Σn′ {x 7→ v2} ] ρ2
(F2). (F1) holds from H1 and Step-index Weakening.1. (F2) holds from
(F1), (C3.H2) and the definition of ρ ∼Σn′ ρ. (C3.1) then holds by IH (n = n′
decreasing), F2 and C3.H1.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = e1(e2):




















































and we also have: n1 = n11 + n12 + n13 + 1, n2 = n21 + n22 + n23 + 1,
σ′1 = σ
′′′
1 , σ′2 = σ′′′2 , v1 = v′1 and v2 = v′2. By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1),
(H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H5.1) we have: n11 = n21 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ11 σ
′
2
(IH.1.C2); and 〈λx. e′1 | ρ′1 ∼n−nΣ11 v21 (IH.1.C3). Note the following facts:
n12 ≤ n− n11 (F1); and ρ1 ∼n−nΣ11 (F2). (F1) follows from (H3) and n1 =
n11 +n12 +n13 +1. (F2) follows from (H1) and Step-index Weakening.1. By IH
(n = n− n11 decreasing), (H2), (IH.1.C2), (F1), (H4.2) and (H5.2) we have:
n12 = n22 (IH.2.C1); σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 (IH.2.C2); and v1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 v2
(IH.2.C3). Note the following facts, each of which follow from (H3) and
n1 = n11 +n12 +n13 +1: n13 ≤ n−n11−n12 (F3); and n−n11−n12−n13 > 0
(F4). Also note the following facts which follow from (IH.1.C3), (IH.2.C2),
(IH.2.C3), (F3) and (F4): n13 = n23 (F4.C1); σ′′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12−n13−1 σ
′′′
2
(F4.C2); and v′1 ∼n−nσ11−n12−n13−1 v
′
2 (F4.C3). To show: (C1): n11 + n12 +
n13 + 1 = n21 + n22 + n23 + 1; (C2): σ′′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12−n13−1 σ
′′′
2 ; and (C3):
v′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12−n13−1 v
′
2. (C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1), (IH.2.C1) and
(F4.C1). (C2) is immediate from (F4.C2) and Step-index Weakening.2. (C3)
is immediate from (F4.C3) and Step-index Weakening.3.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = ref(e):





















and we also have: n1 = n1, n2 = n2, σ′1 = {` 7→ v1} ] σ′1, σ′2 = {` 7→ v2} ] σ′2,
v1 = `1 and v2 = `2. By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and
(H5.1) we have: n1 = n2 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2); and v1 ∼n−nΣ1 v2
(IH.1.C3). Because σ1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2, we know dom(σ1) = dom(σ2) and therefore
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`1 = `2. To show: (C1): n1 = n2; (C2): {` 7→ v1} ] σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 {` 7→ v2} ] σ
′
2;
and (C3): `1 ∼n−nΣ1 `2. (C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1). (C2) is immediate
from (IH.1.C2), (IH.1.C3) and the definition of σ ∼Σn σ. (C3) is immediate
by definition of v ∼Σn v and `1 = `2.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = !e:















and we also have: n1 = n1, n2 = n2, σ′1 = σ′1, σ′2 = σ′2, v1 = σ′1(`1) and
v2 = σ
′
2(`2). By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H5.1)
we have: n1 = n2 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2); and `1 ∼n−nΣ1 `2
(IH.1.C3). Because `1 ∼n−nΣ1 `2, we know `1 = `2 by definition of v ∼
Σ
n v. To
show: (C1): n1 = n2; (C2): σ′1 ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2; and (C3): σ′1(`1) ∼n−nΣ1 σ
′
2(`2).
(C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1). (C2) is immediate from (IH.1.C2). (C3)
is immediate from (IH.1.C2) and `1 = `2.
- Case n = n+ 1 and e = e1 ← e2:





























and we also have: n1 = n11 + n12, n2 = n21 + n22, σ′1 = σ′′1 , σ′2 = σ′′2 ,
v1 = v1 and v2 = v2. By IH (n = n decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1)
and (H5.1) we have: n11 = n21 (IH.1.C1); σ′1 ∼n−nΣ11 σ
′
2 (IH.1.C2); and
`1 ∼n−nΣ11 `2 (IH.1.C3). Because `1 ∼n−nΣ11 `2 we know `1 = `2. Note
the following facts: n12 ≤ n − n11 (F1); and ρ1 ∼n−nΣ11 (F2). (F1) follows
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from (H3) and n1 = n11 + n12. (F2) follows from (H1) and Step-index
Weakening.1. By IH (n = n− n11 decreasing), (F2), (IH.1.C2), (F1), (H4.2)
and (H5.2) we have: n12 = n22 (IH.2.C1); σ′′1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 (IH.2.C2); and
v1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 v2 (IH.2.C3). To show: (C1): n11 + n12 = n21 + n22; (C2):
σ′′1 [` 7→ v1] ∼n−nΣ11−n12 σ
′′
2 [` 7→ v2]; and (C3): v1 ∼n−nΣ11−n12 v2. (C1) is
immediate from (IH.1.C1) and (IH.2.C1). (C2) is immediate from (IH.2.C2)
and (IH.2.C3). (C3) is immediate from (IH.2.C3).
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Part IV







All current approaches for statically enforcing differential privacy in higher
order languages make use of either linear or relational refinement types. A
barrier to adoption for these approaches is the lack of support for expressing
these “fancy types” in mainstream programming languages. For example, no
mainstream language supports relational refinement types, and although Rust
and modern versions of Haskell both employ some linear typing techniques, they
are inadequate for embedding enforcement of differential privacy, which requires
“full” linear types a la Girard/Reynolds. We propose a new type system that
enforces differential privacy, avoids the use of linear and relational refinement
types, and can be easily embedded in mainstream richly typed programming
languages such as Scala, OCaml and Haskell. We demonstrate such an embedding
in Haskell, demonstrate its expressiveness on case studies, and prove that our
type-based enforcement of differential privacy is sound.
Recent work has made significant progress towards techniques for static
128
verification of differentially private programs. Existing techniques typically
define novel programming languages that incorporate specialized static type
systems (linear types (Reed and Pierce, 2010; Near et al., 2019b), relational
types (Barthe et al., 2015), dependent types (Gaboardi et al., 2013b), etc.).
However, there remains a major challenge in bringing these techniques to practice:
the specialized features they rely on do not exist in mainstream programming
languages.
We introduce Solo, a novel type system for static verification of differential
privacy, and present a reference implementation as a Haskell library. Solo is
similar to Fuzz (Reed and Pierce, 2010) and its descendants in expressive power,
but Solo does not rely on linear types and can be implemented entirely in
Haskell with no additional language extensions. In particular, Solo’s sensitivity
and privacy tracking mechanisms are compatible with higher-order functions,
and leverage Haskell’s type inference system to minimize the need for additional
type annotations.
In differential privacy, the sensitivity of a computation determines how much
noise must be added to its result to achieve differential privacy. Fuzz-like
languages track sensitivity relative to program variables, using a linear typing
discipline. The key innovation in Solo is to track sensitivity relative to a
set of global data sources instead, which eliminates the need for linear types.
Compared to prior work on static verification of differential privacy, our system
can be embedded in existing programming languages without support for linear
types, and supports advanced variants of differential privacy like (ε, δ)-differential
privacy and Rényi differential privacy.
We describe our approach using the Haskell implementation of Solo, and
demonstrate its use to verify differential privacy for practical algorithms in four
case studies. We formalize a subset of Solo’s sensitivity analysis and prove
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metric preservation, the soundness property for this analysis.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce Solo, a novel type system for the static verification of differ-
ential privacy without linear types.
• We present a reference implementation of Solo as a Haskell library, which
retains support for type inference and does not require additional language
extensions.
• We formalize a subset of Solo’s type system and prove its soundness.
• We demonstrate the applicability of the Solo library in four case studies.
Type Systems for Differential Privacy. The first static approach for verify-
ing differential privacy in the context of higher-order programming constructs
was Fuzz (Reed and Pierce, 2010). Fuzz uses linear types to verify both
sensitivity and privacy properties of programs, even in the context of higher-
order functions. Conceptual descendents of Fuzz include DFuzz (Gaboardi
et al., 2013b), Adaptive Fuzz (Winograd-Cort et al., 2017), Fuzzi (Zhang et al.,
2019a), Duet (Near et al., 2019b), and the system due to Azevedo de Amorim et
al. (de Amorim et al., 2019). Approaches based on linear types combine a high
degree of automation with support for higher-order programming, but require
the host language to support linear types, so none has yet been implemented in





Solo is a static analysis for differential privacy, which can be implemented as
a library in Haskell. Its analysis is completely static, and it does not impose
any runtime overhead. Solo requires special type annotations, but in many
cases these types can be inferred, and typechecking is aided by the flexibilty of
parametric polymorphism in Haskell. Solo retains many of the strengths of linear
typing approaches to differential privacy, while taking a light-weight approach
capable of being embedded in mainstream functional languages. Specifically,
Solo:
1. is capable of sensitivity analysis for general-purpose programs in the context
of higher order programming.
2. implements a privacy verification approach with separate privacy cost
analysis for multiple program inputs using ideas from Duet.
3. leverages type-level dependency on values via Haskell singleton types,
allowing verification of private programs with types that reference symbolic
parameters
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4. features verification of several recent variants of differential privacy includ-
ing (ε, δ) and Rényi differential privacy.
However, Solo is not intended for the verification of low-level privacy mech-
anisms such as the core mechanisms described previously, the exponential mech-
anism (Dwork et al., 2014b), or the sparse vector technique (Dwork et al.,
2014b).
18.1 Threat Model.
The threat model for Solo is “honest but fallible”—that is, we assume the
programmer intends to write a differentially private program, but may make
mistakes. Solo is intended as a tool to help the programmer implement correct
differentially private programs in this context. Our approach implements a sound
analysis for sensitivity and privacy, but its embedding in a larger system (Haskell)
may result in weak points that a malicious programmer could exploit to subvert
Solo’s guarantees (unsoundness in Haskell’s type system, for example). The
Solo library can be used with Safe Haskell (Terei et al., 2012) to address this
issue; Solo exports only a set of safe primitives which are designed to enforce
privacy preserving invariants that adhere to our metatheory. However, Solo’s
protection against malicious programmers are only as strong as the guarantees
made by Safe Haskell. Our guarantees against malicious programmers are
therefore similar to those provided by language-based information flow control
libraries that also utilize Safe Haskell (e.g. (Russo et al., 2008)).
18.2 Soundness.
We formalize our privacy analysis in terms of a metric preservation metatheory
and prove its soundness in Chapter 22 via a step-indexed logical relation w.r.t. a
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step-indexed big-step semantics relation. A consequence of metric preservation
is that well-typed pure functions are semantically sensitive functions, and that
well-typed monadic functions are semantically differentially private functions.
Our model includes two variants of pair and list type connectives—one sensitive




This section introduces the usage of Solo based on code examples written in
our Haskell reference implementation.
19.1 Data Sources.
Our approach makes use of the idea that a static privacy analysis of a program
can be centered around a set of sensitive data sources which the analyst wants to
preserve privacy for. A data source may be represented by some identifier such
as a string value, which represents some sensitive program input such as raw
numeric data, a file or an IO stream. Solo’s data sources are inspired by ideas
from static taint analysis—we “taint” the program’s data sources with sensitivity
annotations that are tracked and modified throughout type-checking.
To enable the static privacy analysis of a program, we track privacy infor-
mation for data sources at the type-level. Because our analysis is based on the
information flow of distinguished data source values throughout a program, we
are able to perform a fully static analysis without precise tracking of variable
usage within functions, and without a specialized linear type system. In Solo,
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data sources are created for sensitive inputs external to the program. For ex-
ample, the readDoubleFromIO function reads in a sensitive double value from the
user:
readDoubleFromIO :: ∀ m o. IO (SDouble m '[ '(o, 1) ])
Sensitive values (whose types are prefixed with "S" such as SDouble ) repre-
sent base values that have been tagged with sensitivity tracking information—
specifically, a sensitivity environment σ . readDoubleFromIO instantiates the
sensitivity environment to '[ '(o, 1) ] , which indicates that values with this
type are 1-sensitive with respect to the input read from the sensitive source. The
distance metric identifier m specifies the metric used to measure distance (as
described in Definition 2.2.1).
Sensitive values (like SDouble ) are encapsulated in order to restrict their
usage to only privacy preserving operations. The constructors of sensitive data
types are hidden, and they are manipulated solely through trusted primitive
operations provided in our implementation.
19.2 Sensitivity Tracking.
We can operate on SDouble values with an attached sensitivity environments
using specialized operators provided by Solo. For example, Solo’s <+> function
adds two SDouble values, and has the following type:
(<+>) :: SDouble 'Diff s1 -> SDouble 'Diff s2 -> SDouble 'Diff (Plus s1 s2)
The type of the <+> function indicates that it adds the sensitivity environments
of its arguments together ( (Plus a b) ), just like the typing rule for addition in
Fuzz. The distance metric Diff is described in Chapter 20. We can use <+>
to define a doubling function, as below. The type signature can be left off, and
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will be inferred automatically by Haskell. The type signature of dbl describes
its sensitivity—it is 2-sensitive in its argument.
dbl :: SDouble 'Diff senv -> SDouble 'Diff (Plus senv senv)
dbl x = x <+> x
19.3 Privacy.
We can use the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms introduced in Part 2 to add
noise to sensitive values and satisfy differential privacy. Solo tracks the total
privacy cost of multiple uses of these mechanisms using a privacy monad, which
is similar to the one used in Fuzz and related systems. Solo implements privacy
monads for several different privacy variants, with conversion operations between
them. These monads are described in detail in Chapter 21. The following
function takes a SDouble as input, doubles it, and adds noise:
privacyFunc :: SDouble 'Diff '[ '(o, 1) ] -> EpsPrivacyMonad '[ '(o, 2) ] Double
privacyFunc x = laplace @2 Proxy x
The type EpsPrivacyMonad '[ '(o, 2) ] Double indicates that the function satisfies
ε-differential privacy for ε = 2. As in the previous example, Haskell is able to




Prior type-based analyses for sensitivity analysis (Reed and Pierce, 2010;
Gaboardi et al., 2013b; Winograd-Cort et al., 2017; Near et al., 2019b) focus
on function sensitivity with respect to program variables. Solo’s type system,
in contrast, associates sensitivity with base types (not functions), and these
sensitivities are determined with respect to data sources (not program variables).
This difference represents a significant departure from previous systems, and is
the key innovation that enables embedding Solo’s type system in a language (like
Haskell) without linear types. Figure 20.1 presents the types for the sensitivity
analysis in the Solo system. The rest of this section describes types in Solo and
how they can be used to describe the sensitivity of a program. We describe the
privacy analysis in Chapter 21, and we formalize both analyses in Chapter 22.
20.1 Types, Metrics, and Environments
This section describes Figure 20.1 in detail. We begin with sources (written o),
environments (Σ), metrics (m and w), types (τ), and sensitive types (σ).
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import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TL
-- Sources & Sensitivity Environments (§20.1)
type Source = TL.Symbol -- sensitive data sources
data Sensitivity = InfSens | NatSens TL.Nat -- sensitivity values
type SEnv = [(Source, Sensitivity)] -- sensitivity environments
-- Distance Metrics (§20.1)
data NMetric = Diff | Disc -- distance metrics
SDouble :: NMetric -> SEnv -> * -- sensitive doubles
-- Pairs (§20.3.1)
data CMetric = L1 | L2 | LInf -- compound type metrics
SPair :: CMetric -> (SEnv -> *) -> (SEnv -> *) -- sensitive pairs
-> SEnv -> *
L1Pair = SPair L1 -- ⊗-pairs in Fuzz
L2Pair = SPair L2 -- Not in Fuzz
LInfPair = SPair LInf -- &-pairs in Fuzz
-- Lists (§20.3.1)
SList :: CMetric -> (SEnv -> *) -> SEnv -> * -- sensitive lists
L1List = SList L1 -- τ list in Fuzz
L2List = SList L2 -- Not in Fuzz
LInfList = SList LInf -- τ alist in Fuzz
Figure 20.1: Sensitivity Types in Solo.
Sources & Environments. Sensitive data sources are placeholders for sources
of sensitive data external to the program (e.g. the filename of a file full of sensitive
data that has been read in using readSensitiveFile ). These placeholders are
represented in Solo using type-level symbols. Solo tracks sensitivity relative to
data sources (i.e. Solo assumes that data sources have an “absolute sensitivity”
of 1). In Solo, like in Fuzz, sensitivities can be either a number or ∞. In
Solo, numeric sensitivities are represented using type-level natural numbers.
A sensitivity environment SEnv is an association list of data sources and their
sensitivities, and corresponds to the same concept in Fuzz.
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20.2 Distance Metrics & Metric-Carrying Types.
Interpreting sensitivity requires describing how to measure distances between
values; different metrics for this measurement produce different privacy properties.
Solo provides support for several distance metrics including those commonly
used in differentially private algorithms. The base metrics listed in Figure 20.1
( BMetric ) are distance metrics for base types. The sensitive base types ( SBase )
are metric-carrying base types (i.e. every sensitive type must have a distance
metric). For example, the type of a sensitive Double would be SBase Double m ,
where m is a metric. The metrics for base types in Solo are:
• Diff , the absolute difference metric, is defined as the absolute value of the
difference between two values: d(x, y) = |x− y|.
• Disc , the discrete metric, is 0 if its arguments are equivalent, and 1 if its
arguments are distinct: d(x, y) = 0 if x = y; 1 otherwise
Thus the types SBase Double Diff and SBase Double Disc mean very different
things when interpreting sensitivity. The distance between two values v1, v2 :
SBase Double Diff is |v1 − v2|, but the distance between two values v3, v4 :
SBase Double Disc is at most 1 (when v3 6= v4).
Both of these metrics are useful in writing differentially private programs;
basic mechanisms for differential privacy (like the Laplace mechanism) typically
require their inputs to use the Diff metric, while the distance between program
inputs is often described using the Disc metric. For example, we might consider
a “database” of real numbers, each contributed by one individual; two neighboring
databases in this setting will differ in exactly one of those numbers, but the
change to the number itself may be unbounded. In this case, each number in the
database would have the type SBase Double Disc . Fuzz fixes the distance metric
for numbers to be the absolute difference metric; Duet provides two separate
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types for real numbers, each with its own distance metric.
20.3 Types.
A sensitive type in Solo carries both a metric and a sensitivity environment (e.g.
SBase has kind * -> BMetric -> SEnv -> * ). Thus, sensitivities are associated
with values, rather than with program variables (as in Fuzz). For example,
the type SDouble '[ '("sensitive_input", 1) ] 'Diff from Chapter 19 is the type
of a double value that is 1-sensitive with respect to the data source input
under the absolute difference metric. Adding such a value to itself results in
the type SDouble '[ '("sensitive_input", 2) ] 'Diff —encoding the fact that the
sensitivity has doubled. In Fuzz, the same information is encoded by the
sensitivities recorded in the context; but with respect to program variables
rather than data sources. Note that it is not possible to attach a sensitivity
environment to a function type—only the metric-carrying sensitive types may
have associated sensitivity environments. Solo does not provide a “sensitive
function” type connective (like Fuzz’s (); in Solo, function sensitivity must
be stated in terms of the sensitivity of the function’s arguments with respect to
the program’s data sources (more in Section 20.4).
20.3.1 Pairs and Lists
The Fuzz system contains two connectives for pairs, ⊗ and &, which differ in
their metrics. The distance between two ⊗ pairs is the sum of the distances
between their elements, while the distance between two & pairs is the maximum
of distances between their elements. Solo provides a single pair type, SPair ,
that can express both types by specifying a compound metric CMetric .
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20.3.2 Compound Metrics
In Solo, metrics for compound types are derived from standard vector-space
distance metrics. For example, a sensitive pair has the type SPair w where w
is one of the compound metrics in Figure 20.1:
• L1 , the L1 (or Manhattan) distance, is the sum of the distances between




• L2 , the L2 (or Euclidian) distance, is the root of the sum of squares of




• LInf , the L∞ distance, is the maximum of the distances between corre-
sponding elements: d(x, y) = maxxi∈x,yi∈y di(xi, yi)
Thus we can represent Fuzz’s ⊗ pairs in Solo using the SPair L1 type con-
structor, and Fuzz’s & pairs using SPair LInf . We can construct pairs from
sensitive values using the following two functions:
makeL1Pair :: a m s1 -> b m s2 -> SPair L1 a b (Plus s1 s2) -- Fuzz's ⊗-pair
makeLInfPair :: a m s1 -> b m s2 -> SPair LInf a b (Join s1 s2) -- Fuzz's &-pair
Here, the Plus operator for sensitivity environments performs elementwise
addition on sensitivities, and the Join operator performs elementwise maximum.
20.3.3 Lists
Fuzz defines the list type τ list, and gives types to standard operators over
lists reflecting their sensitivities. In Solo, we define the SList type to represent
sensitive lists. Sensitive lists in Solo carry a metric, in the same way as sensitive
pairs, and can only contain metric-carrying types. The type of a sensitive list
of doubles with the L1 distance metric, for example, is SList L1 SDouble ; this
type corresponds to Fuzz’s ⊗-lists. The type SList LInf SDouble corresponds
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to Fuzz’s &-lists. Fuzz does not provide the equivalent of SList L2 SDouble ,
which uses the L2 distance metric.
The distance metrics available in Solo are useful for writing practical dif-
ferentially private programs. For example, we might want to sum up a list of
sensitive numbers drawn from a database. The typical definition of neighbor-
ing databases tells us that the distance between two such lists is equal to the
number of elements which differ—and those elements may differ by any amount.
As a result, their sums may also differ by any amount, and the sensitivity of
the computation is unbounded. To address this problem, differentially private
programs often clip (or “top-code”) the input data, which enforces an upper
bound on input values and results in bounded sensitivity. We can implement
this process in a Solo program:
db :: L1List (SDouble Disc) '[ '( "input_db", 1 ) ]
clip :: L1List (SDouble Disc) senv -> L1List (SDouble Diff) senv
sum :: L1List (SDouble Diff) senv -> SDouble Diff senv
summationFunction :: L1List (SDouble Disc) senv -> SDouble Diff senv
summationFunction = sum . clip
summationResult :: SDouble Diff '[ '( "input_db", 1 ) ]
summationResult = summationFunction db
Here, the clip function limits each element of the list to lie between 0 and 1,
which allows changing the metric on the underlying SDouble from the discrete
metric to the absolute difference metric (which is the metric required by the sum
function). Without the use of clip in summationFunction , the metrics would not
match, and the program would not be well-typed.
Solo’s sensitive list types are less powerful than Fuzz’s, but serve the same
purpose in analyzing programs. In Solo, it is possible to give types to recursive
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functions over lists (like map ), and we do so in Section 20.4. However, it is not
possible to implement these functions using Solo’s types, since the structure
of a sensitive list is opaque to programs written using the Solo library. Hence
map is provided as a trusted primitive with sound typing.
20.4 Function Sensitivity & Higher-Order Func-
tions
In Fuzz, an s-sensitive function is given the type τ1 (s τ2. Solo does not have
sensitive function types, but we have already seen examples of the approach
used in Solo to bound function sensitivity: we write function types that are
polymorphic over sensitivity environments. In general, we can recover the notion
of an s-sensitive function in Solo by writing a Haskell function type that scales
the sensitivity environment of its input by a scalar s:
-- An s-sensitive function
s_sensitive :: SDouble senv m -> SDouble (ScaleSens senv s) m
Here, ScaleSens is implemented as a type family that scales the sensitivity
environment senv by s : for each mapping o 7→ s1 in senv , the scaled sensitivity
environment contains the mapping o 7→ s·s1. The common case of a 1-sensitive (or
linear) function can be represented by keeping the input’s sensitivity environment
unchanged (as in clip and sum in the previous section):
-- A 1-sensitive function
one_sensitive :: SDouble senv m -> SDouble senv m
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20.5 Sensitive Higher-Order Operations
An important goal in the design of Solo is support for sensitivity analysis for
higher-order, general-purpose programs. For example, prior systems such as
Fuzz and Duet encode the type for the higher-order map function as follows:
map : (τ1 (s τ2)(∞ list τ1 (s list τ2
This map function describes a computation that accepts as inputs: an s-sensitive
unary function from values of type τ1 to values of type τ2 (map is allowed to
apply this function an unlimited number of times), and a list of values of type
τ1. map returns a list of values of type τ2 which is s-sensitive in the former list.
We can give an equivalent type to map in Solo as follows, by explicitly scaling
the appropriate sensitivity environments using type-level arithmetic:
map :: ∀ m s s1 a b.(∀ s'. a s' -> b (s*s')) -> SList m a s1 -> SList m b (s*s1)
20.6 Polymorphism for Sensitive Function Types.
Special care is needed for functions that close over sensitive values, especially in
the context of higher-order functions like map . Consider the following example:
dangerousMap :: SDouble m1 s1 -> SList m2 (SDouble m1) s2 -> _
dangerousMap x ls =
let f y = x
in map f ls
Note that f is not a function that is s-sensitive with respect to its input—
instead, it is s1-sensitive with respect to the closed-over value of x . This use
of map is dangerous, because it may apply f many times, creating duplicate
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copies of x without accounting for the sensitivity effect of this operation. Fuzz
assigns an infinite sensitivity for x in this program.
Solo rejects this program as not well-typed. The type of f is equiva-
lent to SDouble m1 s3 -> SDouble m1 s1 , but map requires it to have the type
(∀ s'. a s' -> b (s * s')) —and these two types do not unify. Specifically, the
scope of the sensitivity environment s' is limited to f ’s type—but in the
situation above, the environment s1 comes from outside of that scope.
This use of parametric polymorphism to limit the ability of higher-order
functions to close over sensitive values is key to our ability to support this kind
of programming. Without it, we would not be able to give a type for map that
ensures soundness of the sensitivity analysis. The use of parametric polymorphism





The goal of static privacy analysis is to check that (1) the program adds the
correct amount of noise for the sensitivity of underlying computations (i.e. that
core mechanisms are used correctly), and (2) the program composes privacy-
preserving computations correctly (i.e. the total privacy cost of the program is
correct, according to differential privacy’s composition properties). A well-typed
program should satisfy both conditions. As described earlier, sensitivity analysis
often supports privacy analysis, especially in systems based on linear types.
Previous work has taken several approaches to static privacy analysis; we
provide a summary in the next section. Solo provides a privacy monad that
encodes privacy as an effect. As in our sensitivity analysis, the primary difference
between Solo and previous work is that our privacy monad tracks privacy cost
with respect to data sources, rather than program variables. This distinction
allows the implementation of Solo’s privacy monad in Haskell, and additionally
enables our approach to describe variants of differential privacy without linear
group privacy (e.g. (ε, δ)-differential privacy).
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21.1 Existing Approaches for Privacy Analysis
The Fuzz language pioneered static verification of ε-differential privacy, using a
linear type system to track sensitivity of data transformations. In this approach,
the linear function space can be interpreted as a space of ε-differentially private
functions by lifting into the probability monad. However, more advanced variants
of differential privacy such as (ε, δ) differential privacy do not satisfy the restric-
tions placed on the interpretation of the linear function space in this approach,
and Fuzz cannot be easily extended to support these variants. Azevedo de
Amorim et al. (de Amorim et al., 2019) provide an extension discussion of this
challenge.
More recently, Lobo-Vesga et al. in DPella present an approach in Haskell
which tracks sensitivity via data types which are indexed with their accumulated
stability i.e. sensitivity. Typically in privacy analysis we consider sensitivity
to be a property of functions, however as they show, we can also represent
sensitivity via the arguments to these functions. Their approach represents
private computations via a monad value and monadic operations, similar to the
approach in Fuzz. However, in the absence of true linear types, their approach
relies on dynamic taint analysis and runtime symbolic execution.
The technique of separating sensitivity composition from privacy composition
has been seen before, subsequent to Fuzz, in order to facilitate (ε, δ) differential
privacy. Azevedo de Amorim et al. (de Amorim et al., 2019) introduce a path
construction technique which performs a parameterized comonadic lifting of
a metric space layer à la Fuzz to a separate relational space layer for (ε, δ)
differential privacy. The Duet system (Near et al., 2019b) uses a dual type
system, with dedicated systems for sensitive composition and privacy composition.
In principle, this follows a combined effect/co-effect system approach (Petricek,
2017), where one type system tracks the co-effect (in this case sensitivity) and
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another tracks the effect which is randomness due to privacy.
Our approach embodies the spirit of Duet and simulates coeffectful program
behavior by embedding the co-effect (i.e. the entire sensitivity environment) as
an index in comonadic base data types. We then track privacy composition via a
special monadic type as an effect. As in Duet, the core privacy mechanisms such
as Laplace and Gauss police the boundary between the two. Due to the nature
of our co-effect oriented approach in which we track the full sensitivity context,
our solution can be embedded in Haskell completely statically, without the need
for runtime dynamic symbolic execution. We are also able to verify advanced
privacy variants such as (ε, δ) and state-of-the-art composition theorems such as
advanced composition and the moments accountant via a family of higher-order
primitives.
21.1.1 Monads & Effect Systems
Effect systems are known for providing more detailed static type information
than possible with monadic typing. They are the topic of a variety of research on
enhancing monadic types with program effect information, in order to provider
stricter static guarantees. Orchard et al (Orchard et al., 2014), following up on
initial work by Wadler and Thiemann (Wadler and Thiemann, 2003), provide a
denotational semantics which unify effect systems with a monadic-style semantics
as an parametric effect monad, establishing an isomorphism between indices of
the denotations and the effect annotations of traditional effect systems. They
present a formulation of parametric effect monads which generalize monads to
include annotation of an effect with a strict monoidal structure. Below typing
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rules of the general parametric effect monad are shown:
Bind
f : a→M r b g : b→M s c
λx. f x >>= g : a→M (r ⊗ s) c
Return
return : a→M ∅ a
These typing rules describe a formulation of parametric effect monads M which
accept an effect index as their first argument. This effect index of some arbitrary
type E is a monoid (E,⊗,∅).
21.2 Solo’s Privacy Monad
Solo defines privacy environments in the same way as sensitivity environments;
instead of tracking a sensitivity with respect to each of the program’s data
sources, however, a privacy environment tracks a privacy cost associated with
each data source. Privacy environments for pure ε-differential privacy are defined
as follows:
-- Privacy Environments
data EpsPrivacyCost = InfEps | EpsCost TLRat -- values for ε
type EpsPrivEnv = [(Source, EpsPrivacyCost)] -- privacy environments
TLRat is a type-level encoding of positive rational numbers by a pair of the
numerator and denominator as natural numbers in GCD-reduced form.
The sequential composition theorem for differential privacy (Theorem 2.4.1)
says that when sequencing ε-differentially private computations, we can add up
their privacy costs. This theorem provides the basis for the definition of a privacy
monad. We observe that our privacy environments have a monoidal structure
(EpsPrivEnv, EpsSeqComp, '[]) , where EpsSeqComp is a type family implementing
the sequential composition theorem. We derive a privacy monad which is indexed
by our privacy environments, in the same style as a notion of effectful monads
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or parametric effect monads given separately by Orchard (Orchard et al., 2014;
Orchard and Petricek, 2014) and Katsumata (Katsumata, 2014). Computations
of type PrivacyMonad are constructing via these core functions:
-- Privacy Monad for ε-differential privacy
return :: a -> EpsPrivacyMonad '[] a
(>>=) :: EpsPrivacyMonad p1 a -> (a -> EpsPrivacyMonad p2 b)
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (EpsSeqComp p1 p2) b
The return operation accepts some value and embeds it in the PrivacyMonad
without causing any side-effects. The (>>=) ( bind ) operation allows us to
sequence private computations using differential privacy’s sequential composition
property, encoded here as the type family EpsSeqComp . The implementation
of EpsSeqComp performs elementwise summation of two privacy environments.
In the computation f>>=g we execute the private computation f for some
polymorphic privacy cost p1 , pass its result to the private computation g , and
output the result of g at a total privacy cost of the degradation of the p1 and
p2 privacy environments combined according to sequential composition. Note
that while PrivacyMonad is not a regular monad in Haskell (due to the extra
index in its type) we may still make use of do -notation in our examples by using
Haskell’s RebindableSyntax language extension.
Note that return in Solo’s privacy monad is very different from the same
operator in Fuzz. The typing rule for return in Fuzz scales the sensitivities
in the context by ∞—reflecting the idea that return’s argument is revealed
with no added noise, incurring infinite privacy cost. However, this definition of
return does not satisfy the monad laws; for example, in Fuzz:
return x= laplace 6= laplace x
The return operator in Solo attaches an empty privacy environment to the
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returned value, and does satisfy the monad laws. If a sensitive value is given as
the argument to return , then it remains sensitive, rather than being revealed
(as in Fuzz)—so there is no need to assign the value an infinite privacy cost.
This approach is not feasible in Fuzz because privacy costs are associated with
program variables rather than with values. We can recover Fuzz’s return
behavior (revealing a value without noise, and scaling its privacy cost by infinity)
using a reveal function with the following type:
reveal :: SDouble m senv -> EpsPrivacyMonad (ScaleToInfinity senv) Double
21.2.1 Core Privacy Mechanisms.
We can define core privacy mechanisms like the Laplace mechanism (described
in Part 2), which satisfies ε-differential privacy:
laplace :: Proxy ε -> SDouble s Diff
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (TruncateSens ε s) Double
listLaplace :: Proxy ε -> L1List (SDouble Diff) s
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (TruncateSens ε s) [Double]
The first argument to laplace is the privacy parameter ε (as a type-level
natural). The second argument is the value we would like to add noise to; it
must be a sensitive number with the Diff metric. The function’s result is a
regular Haskell Double , in the privacy monad. The TruncateSens type family
transforms a sensitivity environment into a privacy environment by replacing
each sensitivity with the privacy parameter ε. The function’s implementation
follows the definition of the Laplace mechanism; it determines the scale of the
noise to add using the maximum sensitivity in the sensitivity environment s
and the privacy parameter ε.
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The listLaplace function implements the vector-valued Laplace mechanism,
which adds noise to each element of a vector based on the vector’s L1 sensitivity.
Its argument is required to be a L1List of sensitive doubles with the Diff
metric, and its output is a list of Haskell doubles in the privacy monad.
As a simple example, the following function adds noise to its input twice,
once with ε = 2 and once with ε = 3, for a total privacy cost of ε = 5. If the
type annotation is left off, Haskell infers this type.
addNoiseTwice :: TL.KnownNat (MaxSens s)
=> SDouble s Diff
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (Plus (TruncateSens 2 s) (TruncateSens 3 s)) Double
addNoiseTwice x = do
y1 <- laplace @2 Proxy x
y2 <- laplace @3 Proxy x
return $ y1 + y2
21.2.2 (ε, δ)-Differential Privacy & Advanced Composition
The advanced composition theorem for differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014b)
provides tighter bounds on the privacy cost of iterative algorithms, but requires
the use of (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Theorem 21.2.1 (Advanced composition). For 0 < ε′ < 1 and δ′ > 0, the
class of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies (ε′, kδ + δ′)-differential




To support advanced composition in Solo, we first define privacy environments
and a privacy monad for (ε, δ)-differential privacy as follows:
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-- Privacy Environments & Monad for (ε, δ)-differential privacy
data EDPrivacyCost = InfED | EDCost TLReal TLReal
type EDEnv = [(TL.Symbol, EDPrivacyCost)]
return :: a -> EDPrivacyMonad '[] a
(>>=) :: EDPrivacyMonad p1 a -> (a -> EDPrivacyMonad p2 b)
-> EDPrivacyMonad (EDSeqComp p1 p2) b
where EDSeqComp is a type family that implements sequential composition for
(ε, δ)-differential privacy (Theorem 2.4.1) via elementwise summation of both
ε and δ values. Rational numbers were sufficient to represent privacy costs in
pure ε-differential privacy, but we use a type-level representation of real numbers
( TLReal ) for (ε, δ)-differential privacy. For advanced composition, we will need
operations like square root and natural logarithm. Haskell avoids supporting
doubles at the type level, because equality for doubles does not interact well
with the notion of equality required for typing. We therefore implement TLReal
by building type-level expressions that represent real-valued computations, and
interpret those expressions using Haskell’s standard double type at the value
level.
We can now write the type of a looping combinator primitive that leverages
advanced composition:
advloop :: NatS k -> a -> (a -> EDPrivacyMonad p a)
-> EDPrivacyMonad (AdvComp k δ′ p) a
The looping combinator advloop is designed to run an (ε, δ)-differentially
private mechanism k times, and satisfies (2ε
√
2k ln(1/δ′), δ′+kδ)-differential
privacy—which is significantly lower than the standard composition theorem
when k is large. The first argument k is the statically known number of iterations.
The type family AdvComp is a helper to statically compute the appropriate total
privacy cost given the privacy parameters of the private function passed as the
153
penultimate parameter to the primitive which satisfies ε, δ-differential privacy.
AdvComp builds a type-level expression containing square roots and logarithms,
as described earlier.
The Gaussian Mechanism. The Gaussian mechanism (described in Part 2)
adds Gaussian noise instead of Laplace noise, and ensures (ε, δ)-differential
privacy (with δ > 0). The primary advantage of the Gaussian mechanism is
in the vector setting: the Gaussian mechanism uses L2 sensitivity, which is
typically much lower than the L1 sensitivity used by the Laplace mechanism.
This requirement is reflected in the type of the Gaussian mechanism in Solo:
gauss :: Proxy ε -> Proxy δ -> SDouble s Diff
-> EDPrivacyMonad (TruncateSensED ε δ s) Double
listGauss :: Proxy ε -> Proxy δ -> L2List (SDouble Diff) s
-> EDPrivacyMonad (TruncateSensED ε δ s) [Double]
21.2.3 Additional Variants & Converting Between Variants
Solo provides a type class of privacy monads instantiated for each supported
variant of differential privacy. For each privacy variant, the corresponding privacy
monad is indexed with a privacy environment that tracks the appropriate privacy
parameters, and the bind operation enforces the appropriate form of sequential
composition. Conversion operations are provided between variants to enable
variant-mixing in programs. For example, the following function converts an ε-
differentially private computation into an (ε, δ)-differentially private one, setting
δ = 0.
-- variant conversion function
conv_eps_to_ed :: EpsPrivacyMonad p1 a -> EDPrivacyMonad (ConvEpstoED p1) a
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-- interactive conversion example
x = conv_eps_to_ed applied3
:t x
-- x :: EDPrivacyMonad '[ '("sensitive_input",5,1)] Double
Solo currently supports ε-differential privacy, (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and
Rényi differential privacy (RDP) (Mironov, 2017b). Conversions are possible
from ε-DP to (ε, δ)-DP and RDP, and from RDP to (ε, δ)-DP. Conversions are




In Solo, we implement a novel static analysis for function sensitivity and
differential privacy. Our approach can be seen as a type-and-effect system, which
may be embedded in statically typed functional languages with support for
monads and type-level arithmetic.
22.1 Program Syntax.
Figure 22.1 shows a core subset of the syntax for our analysis system. Our
language model includes arithmetic operations (e e), pairs (〈e, e〉 and πi(e)),
conditionals (if0(e){e}{e}), and functions (λxx. e and e(e)). Types τ presented
in the formalism include: base numeric types real, singleton numeric types with
a known runtime value at compile-time real[r], booleans bool, functions τ → τ ,
pairs τ × τ , and the privacy monad ©Σ(τ). Regular types τ are accompanied
by sensitive types σ which are essentially regular types annotated with static
sensitivity analysis information Σ—which is the sensitivity analysis (or sensitivity
environment) for the expression which was typed as τ . Senstitive types shown in
our formalism include sensitive numeric types sreal, sensititve pairs σ ⊗ σ, and
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sensitive lists slist(σ). A metric-carrying singleton numeric type is unnecessary
since its value is fixed and cannot vary. Σ—the sensitivity/privacy environment—
is defined as a mapping from sensitive sources o ∈ source to scalar values which
represent the sensitivity/privacy of the resulting value with respect to that
source.
Types/values with standard treatment are not shown in our formalism, but
included in our implementation with both regular and metric-carrying versions,
include vectors and matrices which have known dimensions at compile-time
via singleton natural number indices. Single natural numbers are also used to
execute loops with statically known number of iterations and to help contruct
sensitivity and privacy quantities.
Figure 22.5 shows a core subset of the standard dynamic semantics that
accompanies the syntax for our analysis system.
22.2 Typing Rules.
Figure 22.3 shows typing rules in our system used to reason about the sensitivity
of computations. Sensitivity environment composition Σ1 t Σ2, and sensitivity
environment scaling s(Σ) are defined as seen in prior work (Reed and Pierce,
2010; Near et al., 2019b).
22.2.1 Type Soundness.
The property of type soundness in our system is defined (as in prior work) as
the metric preservation theorem. Essentially, metric preservation dictates a
maximum variation which is possible when a sensitive open term is closed over by
two distinct but related sensitive closure environments. This means that given
related initial well-typed configurations, we expect the outputs to be related by
some level of variation. Specifically: given two well-typed environments which are
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b ∈ B r ∈ R ṙ ∈ R ::= r | ∞ x, z ∈ var o ∈ source
Σ ∈ spenv , source ⇀ Ṙ sensitivity/privacy environment
τ ∈ type ::= bool | real | real[r] base and singleton types
| τ × τ | list(τ) | τ → τ connectives
| ©Σ(τ) | σ@Σ privacy monad and sensitive types
σ ∈ stype ::= sreal | σ ⊗ σ | slist(σ) sensitive types
 ∈ binop ::= + | × | o operations
e ∈ expr ::= x | b | r | sing(r) variables and literals
| e e | if(e){e}{e} binary operations and conditionals
| 〈e, e〉 | πi(e) pair creation and access
| [] | e :: e list creation
| case(e){[].e}{x :: x.e} list destruction
| λxx. e | e(e) recursive functions
| reveal(e) | laplace[e, e](e) privacy operations
| return(e) | x← e ; e privacy monad
| 〈̂e, e〉̂ | π̂i(e) sensitive pair creation and access
| [̂̂] | e :̂: e sensitive list creation
| case(e){̂[̂].e}{x :̂: x.e} sensitive list destruction
γ ∈ venv , var ⇀ value evaluation environment
ρ ∈ ddist ,
{






v ∈ value ::= b | r literals
| 〈v, v〉 pairs
| [] | v :: v lists
| 〈λxx. e | γ〉 recursive closures
| ρ distributions of values
Figure 22.1: Syntax for types, expressions and values.  = sensitivity sources,
types and expressions unique to Solo.
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Γ ∈ tenv , var ⇀ type eΣds(o) , eΣ(o)ds esds′ ,
{
0 if s , 0
s′ if s 6= 0
R(sreal) , real R(σ ⊗ σ) , R(σ)×R(σ) R(slist(σ)) , list(R(σ))
Γ ` e : τ
t-var
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ` x : τ
t-blit
Γ ` b : bool
t-rlit
Γ ` r : real
t-sing
Γ ` sing(r) : real[r]
t-op
Γ ` e1 : real Γ ` e2 : real  ∈ {+,×}
Γ ` e1  e2 : real
t-if
Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : τ Γ ` e3 : τ
Γ ` if(e1){e2}{e3} : τ
t-pair
Γ ` e1 : τ1 Γ ` e2 : τ2
Γ ` 〈e1, e2〉 : τ1 × τ2
t-proj
Γ ` e : τ1 × τ2
Γ ` πi(e) : τi
t-nil
Γ ` [] : list(τ)
t-cons
Γ ` e1 : τ Γ ` e2 : list(τ)
Γ ` e1 :: e2 : list(τ)
t-case
Γ ` e1 : list(τ) Γ ` e2 : τ ′ {x1 7→ τ, x2 7→ list(τ)} ] Γ ` e3 : τ ′
Γ ` case(e1){[].e2}{x1 :: x2.e3} : τ ′
t-lam
{x 7→ τ1, z 7→ τ1 → τ2} ] Γ ` e : τ2
Γ ` λzx. e : τ1 → τ2
t-app
Γ ` e1 : τ1 → τ2 Γ ` e2 : τ1
Γ ` e1(e2) : τ2
t-reveal
Γ ` e : σ@Σ
Γ ` reveal(e) : ©eΣd∞ (R(σ))
t-laplace
Γ ` e1 : real[rs] Γ ` e2 : real[rε] Γ ` e3 : sreal@Σ Σ v eΣds
Γ ` laplace[e1, e2](e3) : ©eΣdε (real)
t-return
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` return(e) : ©∅(τ)
Figure 22.2: The type system.  = type rules unique to Solo.
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Γ ` e : τ
t-bind
Γ ` e1 : ©Σ1 (τ1){x 7→ τ1} ] Γ ` e2 : ©Σ2 (τ2)
Γ ` x← e1 ; e2 : ©Σ1+Σ2 (τ2)
t-splus
Γ ` e1 : sreal@Σ1 Γ ` e2 : sreal@Σ2
Γ ` e1 + e2 : sreal@(Σ1 + Σ2)
t-stimes
Γ ` e1 : real[r] Γ ` e2 : sreal@Σ
Γ ` e1 n e2 : sreal@rΣ
t-spair
Γ ` e1 : σ1@Σ1 Γ ` e2 : σ2@Σ2
Γ ` 〈̂e1, e2 〉̂ : (σ1 ⊗ σ2)@(Σ1 t Σ2)
t-sproj
Γ ` e : (σ1 ⊗ σ2)@Σ
Γ ` π̂i(e) : σi@Σ
t-snil
Γ ` [̂̂] : slist(σ)@∅
t-scons
Γ ` e1 : σ@Σ1 Γ ` e2 : slist(σ)@Σ2
Γ ` e1 :̂: e2 : slist(τ)@(Σ1 t Σ2)
t-scase
Γ ` e1 : slist(σ)@Σ Γ ` e2 : τ ′ {x1 7→ σ@Σ, x2 7→ slist(σ)@Σ} ] Γ ` e3 : τ ′
Γ ` case(e1){̂[̂].e2}{x1 :̂: x2.e3} : τ ′
Figure 22.3: The type system.  = type rules unique to Solo.
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ρ̄ ∈ value→ ddist n̄ ∈ value→ N γ ` e ⇓n v
e-var
γ(x) = v
γ ` x ⇓0 v
e-blit
γ ` b ⇓0 b
e-rlit
γ ` r ⇓0 r
e-plus
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 r1 γ ` e2 ⇓n2 r2
γ ` e1 + e2 ⇓n1+n1 r1 + r2
e-times
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 r1 γ ` e2 ⇓n2 r2
γ ` e1 × e2 ⇓n1+n2 r1r2
γ ` e1 n e2 ⇓n1+n2 r1r2
e-if-true
γ ` e1 ⇓ trueγ ` e2 ⇓ v
γ ` if(e1){e2}{e3} ⇓ v
e-if-false
γ ` e1 ⇓ falseγ ` e3 ⇓ v
γ ` if(e1){e2}{e3} ⇓ v
e-pair
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 v1 γ ` e2 ⇓n2 v2
γ ` 〈e1, e2〉 ⇓n1+n2 〈v1, v2〉
γ ` 〈̂e1, e2〉̂ ⇓n1+n2 〈v1, v2〉
e-proj
γ ` e ⇓n 〈v1, v2〉
γ ` πi ⇓n vi
γ ` π̂i ⇓n vi
e-nil
γ ` [] ⇓0 []
γ ` [̂̂] ⇓0 []
e-cons
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 v1 γ ` e2 ⇓n2 v2
γ ` e1 :: e2 ⇓n1+n2 v1 :: v2
γ ` e1 :̂: e2 ⇓n1+n2 v1 :: v2
e-case-nil
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 [] γ ` e2 ⇓n2 v
γ ` case(e1){[].e2}{x1 :: x2.e3} ⇓n1+n2 v
γ ` case(e1){̂[̂].e2}{x1 :̂: x2.e3} ⇓n1+n2 v
e-case-cons
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 v1 :: v2 {x1 7→ v1, x2 7→ v2} ] γ ` e3 ⇓n2 v3
γ ` case(e1){[].e2}{x1 :: x2.e3} ⇓n1+n2 v3
γ ` case(e1){̂[̂].e2}{x1 :̂: x2.e3} ⇓n1+n2 v3
Figure 22.4: Step-indexed big-step evaluation semantics.
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ρ̄ ∈ value→ ddist n̄ ∈ value→ N γ ` e ⇓n v
e-lam
γ ` λzx. e ⇓0 〈λzx. e | γ〉
e-app
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 〈λzx. e′ | γ′〉
γ ` e2 ⇓n2 v1 {x 7→ v1, z 7→ 〈λzx. e′ | γ′〉} ] γ′ ` e′ ⇓n3 v2
γ ` e1(e2) ⇓n1+n2+n3+1 v2
e-reveal
γ ` e ⇓n v
γ ` reveal(e) ⇓n {v 7→ 1}γ ` return(e) ⇓n {v 7→ 1}
e-laplace
γ ` e ⇓n r
γ ` laplace(e) ⇓n laplace(r)
e-bind
γ ` e1 ⇓n1 ρ1 ∀v. {x 7→ v} ] γ ` e2 ⇓n̄2(v) ρ̄2(v)














Figure 22.5: Step-indexed big-step evaluation semantics.
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related by the logical relation (values may be apart by distance Σ, for n steps),
and a well typed term, then each evaluation of that term in each environment is
related by the relation, that is, when one side terminates in < n steps to a value,
the other side will deterministically terminate to a related value.
Theorem 22.2.1 (Metric Preservation).
If: γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ GΣn JΓK (H1)
And: Γ ` e : τ (H2)
Then: γ1, e ∼ γ2, e ∈ EΣn JτK
That is, either n = 0, or n = n′ + 1 and. . .
If: n′′ ≤ n (H3)
And: γ1 ` e ⇓n′′ v1 (H4)
Then: ∃!v2. γ2 ` e ⇓n′′ v2 (C1)
And: v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn−n′′JτK (C2)
Similar to prior work, in order to state and prove the metric preservation
theorem, we define the notion of function sensitivity as a (step-indexed) logical
relation. Figure 22.6 shows the step-indexed logical relation used to define
function sensitivity. We briefly describe the logical relations seen in this figure
below:
1. Two real numbers are related r1 ∼r r2 at type R and distance r when the
absolute difference between real numbers r1 and r2 is less than r.
2. Two values are related v1 ∼ v2 in VΣJτK when v1 and v2 are related at
type τ for initial distance Σ. We may define relatedness for the syntactic
category of values via case analysis as follows:
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(a) Base numeric values are related r1 ∼Σ r2 at type R in VΣ1JτK when r1
and r2 are related by Σ·Σ1, where Σ is the initial distances between
each input source o, and Σ1 describes how much these values may
wiggle as function arguments i.e. the maximum permitted argument
variation. · is defined as the vector dot product.
(b) Function values 〈λx. e1 | γ1〉 ∼ 〈λx. e2 | γ2〉 are related at type
(τ → τ) in VΣJτK when given related inputs, they produce related
computations.
(c) Pair values 〈v11, v12〉 ∼ 〈v21, v22〉 are related at type 〈τ, τ〉 in VΣJτK
when they are elementwise related.
(d) γ1, e1 ∼ γ2, e2 are related at type τ and distance Σ in EΣJτK when
the input doubles γ1, e1 and γ2, e2 evaluate to output values which
are related by Σ.
3. Two value environments γ1 ∼ γ2 are related at type environment Γ and
sensitivity environment Σ in GΣJΓK if value environments γ1 and γ2 both
map each variable in the type environment Γ to related values at a matching
type at distance Σ.
The proofs appear in Chapter 24.
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γ1, e1 ∼ γ2, e2 ∈ EΣn JτK
M⇐⇒ n = 0 =⇒ true
∧ n = n′ + 1 =⇒ ∀n′′ ≤ n′, v1. γ1 ` e1 ⇓n′′ v1
⇒ ∃!v2. γ2 ` e2 ⇓n′′ v2 ∧ v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn′−n′′JτK
γ, e ∼ γ, e ∈ EΣn JτK
r1 ∼r r2
M⇐⇒ |r1 − r2| ≤ r r ∼r r
b1 ∼ b2 ∈ VΣn JboolK
M⇐⇒ b1 = b2
r1 ∼ r2 ∈ VΣn JrealK
M⇐⇒ r1 = r2
r1 ∼ r2 ∈ VΣn Jreal[r]K
M⇐⇒ r1 = r2 = r




〈v11, v12〉 ∼ 〈v21, v22〉 ∈ VΣn Jτ1 × τ2K
M⇐⇒ v11 ∼ v21 ∈ VΣn Jτ1K
∧ v12 ∼ v22 ∈ VΣn Jτ2K
〈v11, v12〉 ∼ 〈v21, v22〉 ∈ VΣn J(σ1⊗σ2)@Σ′K
M⇐⇒ v11 ∼ v21 ∈ VΣn Jσ1@Σ′K
∧ v12 ∼ v22 ∈ VΣn Jσ2@Σ′K
v11 :: v12 ∼ v21 :: v22 ∈ VΣn Jlist(τ)K
M⇐⇒ v11 ∼ v21 ∈ VΣn JτK
∧ v12 ∼ v22 ∈ VΣn Jlist(τ)K
v11 :̂: v12 ∼ v21 :̂: v22 ∈ VΣn Jslist(σ)@Σ′K
M⇐⇒ v11 ∼ v21 ∈ VΣn Jσ@Σ′K
∧ v12 ∼ v22 ∈ VΣn Jslist(σ)@Σ′K
〈λzx.e1|γ1〉 ∼ 〈λzx.e2|γ2〉 ∈ VΣn Jτ1 → τ2K
M⇐⇒ ∀n′ ≤ n, v1, v2. v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn′Jτ1K
⇒ {x 7→ v1, z 7→ 〈λzx.e1 | γ1〉} ] γ1, e1
∼ {x 7→ v2, z 7→ 〈λzx.e2 | γ2〉} ] γ2, e2
∈ EΣ
n′Jτ2K
ρ1 ∼ ρ2 ∈ VΣn J©Σ′ (τ)K
M⇐⇒ ∀v. ρ1(v) ≤ e|eΣd
1×Σ′|L∞ρ2(v)
v ∼ v ∈ VΣn JτK
γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ GΣn JΓK
M⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ dom(γ1 ∪ γ2). γ1(x) ∼ γ2(x) ∈ VΣn JτK γ ∼ γ ∈ GΣn JΓK





Additional tools. For our case studies, we introduce sensitive matrices
SMatrix σ m r c a , sensitive key-value mappings (dictionaries) SDict σ m a b ,
and sensitive sets SSet σ a , as well as sound primitive operations over these
values. r c are matrix dimensions, a b are type parameters representing the
contents of the compound types. σ represents the sensitivity environments as
usual, and m represents the distance metric. We provide the usual primitives
over these types seen in prior work (Reed and Pierce, 2010; Near et al., 2019b).
Sets are assumed to use the Hamming metric, while matrices and key-value maps
use the standard compound metrics discussed earlier: L1 | L2 | LInf . Recall
that NatS is a type for singleton naturals and natS @ 5 creates a singleton for
the value 5 .
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23.1 k-means clustering
We present a case study based on the privacy-preserving implementation of the
k-means clustering algorithm seen originally in Blum et al, as well as in the
presentation of the Fuzz language. The goal of the k-means clustering algorithm
is to iteratively find a set of k clusters to which n datapoints can be partitioned,
where each datapoint belongs to the cluster with the nearest center or centroid
to it.
The algorithm operates by beginning from an initial guess at the list of cluster
centroids which it iteratively improves on. A single iteration consists of grouping
each datapoint with the centroid it is closest to, then recalculating the mean of
each group to initialize the next round’s list of centroids.
The assign function is responsible for pairing each initial datapoint with the
index of the centroid it is closest to in the initial centroid list. The partition
function then groups the set of datapoints into a list of sets, where each set
represents a cluster. The rest of the algorithm proceeds to compute the private
new center of each cluster. Given that our datapoints are two-dimensional, totx
and toty sum the x and y coordinates of each cluster of datapoint. After
we compute the size of each cluster, the avg function calculates the new mean
of each cluster with the three-element tuple of coordinate and size data zipped
together for each cluster.
The Haskell typechecker can infer the privacy cost of one iteration of the
k-means algorithm as 3ε.
23.2 Cumulative Distribution Function
Our next case study implements the private cdf function as seen in DFuzz
(McSherry and Mahajan, 2010; Gaboardi et al., 2013b). Given a database of
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type Pt = (Double, Double)
-- helpers
assign :: [Pt] -> SSet σ Pt -> SSet σ (Pt,Integer)
ppartition :: SSet σ (Pt,Integer) -> SList σ m SSet (Set Pt)
totx :: SSet β Pt -> SDouble β 'AbsoluteM
toty :: SSet β Pt -> SDouble β 'AbsoluteM
size :: SSet β Pt -> SDouble β 'AbsoluteM
avg :: ((Double, Double), Double) -> (Double, Double)
-- kmeans: 3ε-private
iterate :: ∀ m σ. (TL.KnownNat (MaxSens σ)) => SSet σ Pt -> [Pt] -> _
iterate b ms = do
let b' = ppartition (assign ms b)
tx <- vector_laplace @1 Proxy $ map0 totx b'
ty <- vector_laplace @1 Proxy $ map0 toty b'
t <- vector_laplace @1 Proxy $ map0 size b'
let stats = zip (zip tx ty) t
return $ (map avg stats)
Figure 23.1: kmeans
numeric records, and a set of buckets associated with cutoff values, the cdf
function privately partitions each record to its respective bucket. As in DFuzz,
this case study demonstrates the ability of Solo to verify privacy costs which
depend on a program input, in this case the symbolic number of buckets m .
However, our approach to achieve this feature relies on singleton types in Haskell,
and does not require a true dependent type system.
23.3 Gradient Descent
We now present a case study (Figure 23.3) based on a simple machine learning
algorithm (Bassily et al., 2014b) which performs gradient descent.
As inputs, the gd algorithm accepts a list of feature vectors xs representing
sensitive user data, a set of corresponding classifier labels ys , a number of
iterations to run k and the desired privacy cost per iteration ε . Gradient
descent also requires a loss function which describes the accuracy of the current
model in predicting the correct classification of user examples. The algorithm
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cdf :: ∀ m o s ε. (TL.KnownNat m,TL.KnownNat ε) =>
NatS m
-> NatS ε
-> Matrix m 1 Double -- buckets
-> SSet σ Double -- db
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (ScalePriv m (TruncateSens ε σ)) [Double]
cdf m t buckets db = do
let f :: Double -> SSet σ Double
-> _
f = \x -> \db1 ->
let (lt,gt) = bag_split (\k -> k < x) db1 in
(laplace @ε Proxy (natS @5) $ (bag_size lt), db)
z = mloop1 m buckets db f $ return []
z
Figure 23.2: CDF
works by moving the current model in the opposite direction of the gradient
of the loss function. In order to preserve privacy for this algorithm, we may
introduce noise at the point where user data is exposed: the gradient calculation.
The let-bound function f in the gd algorithm contains the workload of a single
iteration of the program: in which we perform the gradient calculation and
introduce noise using the vector-based Laplacian mechanism.
23.4 Multiplicative-Weights Exponential Mecha-
nism
Our final case study, the MWEM algorithm (Hardt et al., 2012), builds a
differentially private synthetic dataset which approximates some sensitive real
dataset with some level of accuracy. The algorithm combines usage of the
Exponential Mechanism, Laplacian noise, and the multiplicative-weights update
rule to construct a noisy synthetic dataset over several iterations with competitive
privacy leakage bounds via composition.
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-- sequential composition privacy loop over a matrix
mloop :: NatS k
-> SMatrix σ LInf 1 n SDouble
-> (SMatrix σ LInf 1 n SDouble ->
EpsPrivacyMonad (TruncateSens ε σ) (Matrix 1 n Double))
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (ScalePriv k (TruncateSens ε σ)) (Matrix 1 n Double)
-- gradient descent algorithm
gd :: NatS k
-> NatS ε
-> SMatrix σ LInf m n SDouble
-> SMatrix σ LInf m 1 SDouble
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (ScalePriv k (TruncateSens ε σ)) (Matrix 1 n Double)
gd k t xs ys = do
let m0 = matrix (sn32 @ 1) (sn32 @ n) $ \ i j -> 0
cxs = mclip xs (natS @ 1)
let f :: SMatrix σ1 LInf 1 n SDouble
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (TruncateSens ε σ1) (Matrix 1 n Double)
f = \θ -> let g = mlaplace @ε Proxy (natS @5) $ xgradient θ cxs ys
in msubM (return θ) g
z = mloop @(TruncateNat t 1) k (sourceM $ xbp m0) f
z
Figure 23.3: Gradient Descent
mwem (Figure 23.4) takes the following inputs: a number of iterations k , a
privacy cost ε to be used by the exponential mechanism and Laplace, real_data
the sensitive information dataset, a query workload queries over the sensitive
dataset, and lastly syn_data which represents a uniform or random distribution
over the domain of the real dataset.
Each iteration, the mwem algorithm selects a query from the query workload
privately using the exponential mechanism. The query selected is selected by
virtue of a scoring function which determines that the result of the query on
the synthetic dataset greatly differs from its result on the real dataset (more so
than other queries in the workload, with some amount of error). The algorithm
updates the synthetic dataset using the multiplicative weights update rule, based
on the query result on the real dataset with some noise added. This process
continues over several iterations until the synthetic dataset reaches some some





-> SDict σ LInf SDouble SDouble
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (TruncateSens ε σ) Int
-- exponential mechanism + laplace loop
expnloop :: NatS k
-> NatS ε
-> [(Double,Double)]
-> SDict σ LInf SDouble SDouble
-> Map.Map Double Double
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (ScalePriv (2 TL.* k) (TruncateSens ε σ)) (Map.Map Double Double)
-- multiplicative-weights exponential mechanism
mwem :: NatS k
-> NatS ε
-> [(Double,Double)]
-> SDict σ LInf SDouble SDouble
-> Map Double Double
-> EpsPrivacyMonad (ScalePriv (2 TL.* k) (TruncateSens ε σ)) (Map Double Double)
mwem k ε queries real_data syn_data =
expnloop k ε queries real_data syn_data
Figure 23.4: Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism.
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Chapter 24
Lemmas, Theorems & Proofs
Lemma 24.0.1 (Plus Respects).
If r1 ∼r r2 then r1 + r3 ∼r r2 + r3.
Proof.
By |r1 − r2| ≤ r =⇒ |(r1 + r3)− (r2 + r3)| ≤ r.
Lemma 24.0.2 (Times Respects).
If r1 ∼r r2 then r3r1 ∼r3r r3r2.
Proof.
By |r1 − r2| ≤ r =⇒ |r3r1 − r3r2| ≤ r.
Lemma 24.0.3 (Triangle).
If r1 ∼rA r2 and r2 ∼rB r3 then r1 ∼rA+rB r3.
Proof.
By the classic triangle inequality lemma for real numbers.
Lemma 24.0.4 (Step-index Weakening).
For n′ ≤ n: (1) If γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ GΣn JΓK then γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ GΣn′JΓK; and (2) If
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v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn JτK then v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn′JτK; and (3) If γ1, e1 ∼ γ2, e2 ∈ EΣn JτK then
γ1, e1 ∼ γ2, e2 ∈ EΣn JτK.
Proof.
By induction on n mutually for all properties; case analysis on v1 and v2 for
property (2), and case analysis on e1 and e2 for property (3).
Theorem 24.0.5 (Metric Preservation).
If: γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ GΣn JΓK (H1)
And: Γ ` e : τ (H2)
Then: γ1, e ∼ γ2, e ∈ EΣn JτK
That is, either n = 0, or n = n′ + 1 and. . .
If: n′′ ≤ n (H3)
And: γ1 ` e ⇓n′′ v1 (H4)
Then: ∃!v2. γ2 ` e ⇓n′′ v2 (C1)
And: v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn−n′′JτK (C2)
Proof.
By strong induction on n and case analysis on e and τ :
- Case n = 0: Trivial by definition.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = x:
By inversion on (H4) we have: n′ = 0 and v1 = γ1(x). Instantiate v2 = γ2(x)
in the conclusion. To show: (C1): γ2 ` x ⇓0 γ2(x) unique; and (C2):
γ1(x) ∼ γ2(x) ∈ VΣn′JτK. (C1) is by e-var application and inversion. (C2) is by
(H1) and Step-index Weakening.
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- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = r and τ = real:
By inversion on (H4) we have: n′ = 0 and v1 = r. Instantiate v2 = r in the
conclusion. To show: (C1): γ2 ` r ⇓0 r unique; and (C2): r = r. (C1) is by
e-real application and inversion. (C2) is trivial.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = r and τ = sreal@∅:
By inversion on (H4) we have: n′ = 0 and v1 = r. Instantiate v2 = r in the
conclusion. To show: (C1): γ2 ` r ⇓0 r unique; and (C2): r ∼0 r. (C1) is by
e-sreal application and inversion. (C2) is immediate by |r − r| = 0 ≤ 0.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = sing(r) and τ = real[r]:
By inversion on (H4) we have: n′ = 0 and v1 = r. Instantiate v2 = r in the
conclusion. To show: (C1): γ2 ` sing(r) ⇓0 r unique; and (C2): r = r. (C1)
is by e-sing application and inversion. (C2) is immediate.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = e1 + e2 and τ = real:
By inversion on (H4):
γ1 ` e1 ⇓n1 r11 (H4.1)
γ1 ` e2 ⇓n2 r12 (H4.2)
and we also have: n′ = n1 + n2, v1 = r11 + r12 and By IH (n = ni decreasing),
(H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H4.2) we have: γ2 ` e1 ⇓n1 r21 (unique)
(IH.C1.1); γ2 ` e2 ⇓n2 r22 (unique) (IH.C1.2); r11 = r21 (IH.C2.1) ; and
r12 = r22 (IH.C2.2) . Instantiate v2 = r21 + r22. To show: (C1): γ2 `
e1 + e2 ⇓n1+n2 r21 + r22 (unique); and (C2): r11 + r12 = r21 + r22. (C1) is
by (IH.C1.1), (IH.C1.2), and e-plus application and inversion. (C2) is by
(IH.C2.1) and (IH.C2.2).
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = e1 + e2 and τ = sreal@Σ′:
By inversion on (H2) and (H4) we have:
174
Γ ` e1 : sreal@Σ1 (H2.1)
Γ ` e2 : sreal@Σ2 (H2.2)
γ1 ` e1 ⇓n1 r11 (H4.1)
γ1 ` e2 ⇓n2 r12 (H4.2)
and we also have: Σ′ = Σ1 + Σ2, n′ = n1 + n2, v1 = r11 + r12 and By
IH (n = ni decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H4.2) we have:
γ2 ` e1 ⇓n1 r21 (unique) (IH.C1.1); γ2 ` e2 ⇓n2 r22 (unique) (IH.C1.2);
r11 ∼Σ·Σ1 r21 (IH.C2.1); and r21 ∼Σ·Σ2 r22 (IH.C2.2). Instantiate v2 =
r21 + r22. To show: (C1): γ2 ` e1 + e2 ⇓n1+n2 r21 + r22 (unique); and (C2):
r11 + r12 ∼Σ·(Σ1+Σ2) r21 + r22. (C1) is by (IH.C1.1), (IH.C1.2), and e-plus
application and inversion. (C2) is by (IH.C2.1), (IH.C2.2), Plus Respects and
Triangle.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = e1 n e2 and either τ = real or τ = sreal@Σ′:
Similar to previous two cases, using Times Respects instead of Plus Respects.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = if0(e1){e2}{e3}:
By inversion on (H4) we have 2 subcases, each which induce:
γ1 ` e1 ⇓n1 b1 (H4.1)
By IH (n = n1 decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3) and (H4.1) we have: γ2 ` e1 ⇓n1
b2 (unique) (IH.1.C1); and b1 = b2 (IH.1.C2).
- Subcase b1 = b2 = true:
From prior inversion on (H4) we also have:
γ1 ` e2 ⇓n2 v1 (H4.2)
By IH (n = n2 decreasing), (H1), (H2), (H3) and (H4.2) we have: γ2 `
e2 ⇓n2 v2 (unique) (IH.2.C1); and v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VnΣ1 +n2JτK (IH.2.C2). In-
stantiate v2 = v2. To show: (C1): γ2 ` if(e1){e2}{e3} ⇓n1+n2 v2; and
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(C2): v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VnΣ1 +n2JτK. (C1) is by (IH.1.C1), (IH.2.C2) and e-if-true
application and inversion. (C2) is by (IH.2.C2).
- Subcase b1 = b2 = false:
Analogous to case b1 = b2 = true.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and either e = 〈e1, e2〉 and τ = τ1 × τ2 or e = 〈̂e1, e2〉̂ and
τ = (σ1 ⊗ σ2)@Σ′:
Analogous to cases for e = e1 + e2 where τ = real or τ = sreal@Σ′, and
instead of appealing to Triangle, appealing to the definition of the logical
relation.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and either e = πi(e) or e = π̂i(e)):
Analogous to cases for e = e1 + e2 where τ = real or τ = sreal@Σ′, and
instead of appealing to Triangle, appealing to the definition of the logical
relation.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and either e = e1 :: e2 and τ = list(τ) or e = e1 :̂: e2 and
τ = slist(σ)@Σ′:
Analogous to cases for e = e1 + e2 where τ = real or τ = sreal@Σ′, and
instead of appealing to Triangle, appealing to the definition of the logical
relation.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and either e = case(e1){[].e2}{x1 :: x2.e3} or e =
case(e1){̂[̂].e2}{x1 :̂: x2.e3}:
Analogous to cases for e = if(e1){e2}{e3}.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = λzx. e and τ = τ1 → τ2: By inversion on (H4)
we have: n′ = 0, and v1 = 〈λxz. e | γ1〉. Instantiate v2 = 〈λzx. e | γ2〉.
To show: (C1): γ2 ` λzx. e ⇓ 〈λzx. e | γ2〉 unique; and (C2): 〈λzx. e |
γ1〉 ∼ 〈λzx. e | γ2〉 ∈ VΣn′Jτ1 → τ2K. Unfolding the definition, we must
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show: ∀n′′ ≤ n′, v1, v2, . v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn′′Jτ1K ⇒ {x 7→ v1, z 7→ 〈λzx. e | γ1〉} ]
γ1, e ∼ {x 7→ v2, z 7→ 〈λzx. e | γ2〉} ] γ2, e ∈ EΣn′′Jτ2K. To show, we assume:
v1 ∼ v2 ∈ VΣn′Jτ1K (C2.H1). Note the following facts: γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ GΣn′JΓK (F1);
and {x 7→ v1} ] γ1 ∼ {x 7→ v2} ] γ2 ∈ GΣn′J{x 7→ τ1, z 7→ τ1 → τ2} ] ΓK
(F2). (F1) holds from H1 and Step-index Weakening.1. (F2) holds from (F1),
(C2.H1) and the definition of γ ∼ γ ∈ GΣn JΓK. Conclusion holds by IH (n = n′
decreasing), F2 and C2.H1.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and e = e1(e2):
By inversion on (H4) we have:
γ1 ` e1 ⇓n1 〈λzx. e′1 | γ′1〉 (H4.1)
γ1 ` e2 ⇓n2 v1 (H4.2)
{x 7→ v1, z 7→ 〈λzx. e′1 | γ′1〉} ] γ′1 ` e′1 ⇓n3 v′1 (H4.3)
and we also have: n′ = n1+n2+n3+1, and v1 = v′1. By IH (n = n′ decreasing),
(H1), (H2), (H3), (H4.1) and (H4.2) we have: γ2 ` e1 ⇓n1 〈λzx. e′2 | γ′2〉
(IH.1.C1), γ2 ` e2 ⇓n2 v2 (IH.2.C1), 〈λzx. e′1 | γ′1〉 ∼ 〈λzx. e′2 | γ′2〉 ∈
Vn′−nΣ1 Jτ1 → τ2K (IH.1.C2), and v1 ∼ v2 ∈ Vn′−nΣ2 Jτ1K (IH.2.C2). Note the
following facts: n3 ≤ n′ − n1 − n2 (F1); γ1 ∼ γ2 ∈ Gn−nΣ1 −n2JΓK (F2); and
v1 ∼ v2 ∈ Vn−nΣ1 −n2Jτ2K (F3). (F1) follows from (H3) and n
′ = n1+n2+n3+1.
(F2) and (F3) follow from (H1), (IH.2.C2) and Step-index Weakening. By
IH (n = n′ − n1 − n2 decreasing), (H2), (IH.1.C2), (IH.2.C2), (F1), (F2),
(F3) and (H4.3) we have: {x 7→ v2, z 7→ 〈λzx. e′2 | γ′2〉} ] γ′2 ` e′2 ⇓n3 v′2
((IH.3.C1)) and v′1 ∼ v′2 ∈ Vn−nΣ1 −n2−n3Jτ2K (IH.3.C2). Instantiate v2 = v
′
2.
To show: (C1): γ2 ` e1(e2) ⇓n1+n2+n3+1 v′2 (unique); and (C2): v′1 ∼ v′2 ∈
Vn−nΣ11−n12−n13−1Jτ2K. (C1) is immediate from (IH.1.C1), (IH.2.C1) and
(IH.3.C1). (C2) is immediate from (IH.3.C2) and Step-index Weakening.2.
- Case n = n′ + 1 and either e = reveal(e′) or e = return(e′) or e =
laplace[e1, e2](e3) or e = x← e1 ; e2:
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Follows from inductive hypothesis, post processing (for laplace) and sequen-
tial composition (for x ← e1 ; e2) theorems from the differential privacy
literature (Dwork et al., 2014a).
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Part V




25.1 Languages for Static Verification of Differen-
tial Privacy.
25.1.1 Linear Types.
Fuzz was the first language and type system designed to verify differential
privacy costs of a program, and did so by modeling sensitivity using linear types
(Reed and Pierce, 2010). DFuzz extended Fuzz with dependent types and
automation aided by SMT solvers (Gaboardi et al., 2013b).
As described by Azevedo de Amorim et al. (de Amorim et al., 2018), en-
coding (ε, δ)-differential privacy in linear type systems like Fuzz is particularly
challenging because these systems place restrictions on the interpretation of
the linear function space, and (ε, δ)-differential privacy does not satisfy these
restrictions. In particular, using Fuzz requires that the desired notion of privacy
can be recovered from an instantiation of function sensitivity for an appropriately
defined metric on probabilistic functions. No such metric can be defined for
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(ε, δ)-differential privacy, preventing a straightforward interpretation of linear
functions as (ε, δ)-differentially private functions.
The Duet language extends Fuzz with support for advanced variants of dif-
ferential privacy such as (ε, δ)-differential privacy (Near et al., 2019b). Adaptive
Fuzz embeds a static sensitivity analysis within a dynamic privacy analysis using
privacy odometers and filters (Winograd-Cort et al., 2017).
25.1.2 Indexed Monadic Types
In their work, Azevedo de Amorim et al. (de Amorim et al., 2018) define a
path construction to encode non-linear scaling via an indexed probability monad,
which can be used to extend Fuzz with support for arbitrary relational properties
(including (ε, δ)-differential privacy). However, this approach (1) internalizes
the use of group privacy (Dwork et al., 2014a) which in many cases provides
sub-optimal bounds on privacy cost–and (2) is unable to provide privacy bounds
for more than one input to a function–a useful capability of the original Fuzz
language, and a necessary feature to obtain optimal privacy bounds for multi-
argument functions. Note, however, that all the novel approaches proposed in
this dissertation provide optimal privacy bounds for multi-argument functions.
25.1.3 Program Logics
Program logics such as apRHL (Barthe et al., 2012, 2013) are very flexible and
expressive but difficult to automate. Fuzzi introduces a type system equivalent
to Fuzz which is then enriched with program logics (Zhang et al., 2019a) and is
more amenable to automation.
At a high level, Fuzzi (Zhang et al., 2019b) has a similar aim to Duet:
supporting differential privacy for general-purpose programs and supporting
recent variants of differential privacy. Duet is designed primarily as a fully-
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automated type system with a rich set of primitives for vector-based and higher-
order programming; low-level mechanisms in Duet are opaque and trusted.
On the other hand, Fuzzi is designed for general-purpose programming, low-
level mechanism implementation, and their combination; however, to achieve
this, Fuzzi has less support for higher-order programming and automation in
typechecking.
25.1.4 Higher-order Relational Type Systems
Following the initial work on linear typing for differential privacy (Reed and
Pierce, 2010), a parallel line of work (Barthe et al., 2015, 2016a) leverages
relational refinement types aided by SMT solvers in order to support type-
level dependency of privacy parameters (à la DFuzz (Gaboardi et al., 2013a)) in
addition to more powerful variants of differential privacy such as (ε, δ)-differential
privacy. These approaches support (ε, δ)-differential privacy, but did not support
usable type inference until a recently proposed heuristic bi-directional type
system (Çiçek et al., 2018). Although a direct case study of bidirectional type
inference for relational refinement types has not yet been applied to differential
privacy, the possibility of such a system appears promising.
The overall technique for supporting (ε, δ)-differential privacy in these rela-
tional refinement type systems is similar to (and predates) Azevedo de Amorim
et al.–privacy cost is tracked through an “effect” type, embodied by an indexed
monad. It is this “effect”-based treatment of privacy cost that fundamentally
limits these type system to not support multi-arity functions, resulting in non-
optimal privacy bounds for some programs.
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25.1.5 Relational Type Systems with Randomness Align-
ments & Probabilistic Couplings.
Yet another approach is LightDP which uses a light-weight relational type
system and randomness alignments to verify (ε, δ)-differential privacy bounds
of first-order imperative programs (Zhang and Kifer, 2017), and is suitable
for verifying low-level implementations of differentially private mechanisms.
Essentially, aligning randomness involves the creation of an injective function
from the randomness in the execution under a database D1 into the randomness
in the execution under an adjacent database D2, so that both executions generate
the same output. A notable achievement of this work is a lightweight, automated
verification of the Sparse Vector Technique (Dwork et al., 2014a) (SVT). However,
LightDP is not suitable for sensitivity analysis, an important component of
differentially-private algorithm design. Note that all the novel approaches
proposed in this dissertation are capable of sensitivity analysis, but are incapable
of verified implementation of the Sparse Vector Technique.
Differential privacy mechanisms often require knowledge of (or place restric-
tions on) function sensitivity of arguments to the mechanism. In principle, a
language like Fuzz could be combined with LightDP to fully verify both an
application which uses SVT, as well as the implementation of SVT itself.
Barthe et al introduce an approach for proving differential privacy using a
generalization of probabilistic couplings. They present several case studies in
the apRHL+ (Barthe et al., 2016b) language which extends program logics with
approximate couplings. The technique of aligning randomness is also used in
the coupling method.
Albarghouthi and Hsu (Albarghouthi and Hsu, 2018) use an alternative
approach based on randomness alignments as well as approximate couplings.
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25.2 Dynamic Enforcement of Differential Pri-
vacy.
The first approach for dynamic enforcement of differential privacy was PINQ
(McSherry, 2009). Since then several works have been based on PINQ, such as
Featherweight PINQ (Ebadi and Sands, 2015) which models PINQ formally and
proves that any programs which use its simplified PINQ API are differentially
private. ProPer (Ebadi et al., 2015) is a system (based on PINQ) designed to
maintain a privacy budget for each individual in a database system, and operates
by silently dropping records from queries when their privacy budget is exceeded.
UniTrax (Munz et al., 2018) follows up on ProPer: this system allows per-user
budgets but gets around the issue of silently dropping records by tracking queries
against an abstract database as opposed to the actual database records. These
approaches are limited to an embedded DSL for expressing relational database
queries, and do not support general purpose programming.
A number of programming frameworks for differential privacy have been
developed as libraries for existing programming languages. DPella (Lobo-Vesga
et al., 2020) is a Haskell library that provides static bounds on the accuracy of
differentially private programs. Diffprivlib (Holohan et al., 2019) (for Python) and
Google’s library (Wilson et al., 2020) (for several languages) provide differentially
private algorithms, but do not track sensitivity or privacy as these algorithms
are composed. εktelo (Zhang et al., 2018) executes programmer-specified plans
that encode differentially private algorithms using framework-supplied building
blocks.
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25.2.1 Dynamic Information Flow Control.
Our approach to dynamic enforcement of differential privacy can be seen as similar
to work on dynamic information flow control (IFC) and taint analysis (Austin
and Flanagan, 2009). The sensitivities that we attach to values are comparable
to IFC labels. However, dynamic IFC typically allows the programmer to branch
on sensitive information and handles implicit flows dynamically.
25.2.2 Dynamic Testing for Differential Privacy.
A recent line of work (Bichsel et al., 2018; Ding et al., 2018; Wang et al.,
2020; Wilson et al., 2020) has resulted in approaches for testing differentially
private programs. These approaches generate a series of neighboring inputs,
run the program many times on the neighboring inputs, and raise an alarm if
a counterexample is found. These approaches do not require type annotations,
but do require running the program many times. Static or dynamic analysis is
preferable to testing because it is more efficient and generates a proof of privacy.
25.3 Security as a Library/Language Extension
Li et al (Peng Li and Zdancewic, 2006) present an embedded security sublanguage
in Haskell using the arrows combinator interface. Russo et al introduce a
monadic library for light-weight information flow security in Haskell (Russo et al.,
2008). Crockett et al propose a domain specific language for safe homomorphic
encryption in Haskell (Crockett et al., 2018). Safe Haskell (Terei et al., 2012)
is a Haskell language extension which implements various security policies as
monads. Parker et al (Parker et al., 2019) introduce a Haskell framework for
enforcing information flow control policies in database-oriented web applications.
DPella (Lobo-Vesga et al., 2020) is a programming framework in Haskell that
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Differential privacy has become the standard for protecting the privacy of
individuals with formal guarantees of plausible deniability. In this dissertation we
have proposed new techniques for language-based analysis of differential privacy
of programs in a variety of contexts spanning static and dynamic analysis. Our
approach towards differential privacy analysis makes use of ideas from linear
type systems and static/dynamic taint analysis. We have shown a series of works
that, in short, demonstrated the following key ideas:
• A pure linear typing discipline is sufficient to perform accurate analysis of
differential privacy, even for its advanced variants.
• Prescriptive and descriptive dynamic analysis of differential privacy is
possible with low overhead for general-purpose programming languages.
• Mainstream statically typed languages can be made to perform differential
privacy analysis as part of their standard typechecking process, without
any runtime execution or information.
• Language-based analysis of differential privacy can be practical and conve-
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nient in any given scenario.
It is our hope that the usability and strong guarantees of the works contained
in this dissertation will inspire data analysts, technology corporations, researchers,
and students in computer science to continue to build a community and culture
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